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This dissertation contributes to the fledgling field of medieval empathy studies by tracing 
the articulation of fellow-feeling in the literature and culture of Anglo-Saxon England across a 
broad corpus of anonymous homilies, saints’ lives, elegies, and heroic poems including Beowulf. 
The first three chapters identify cultural concepts and literary strategies that enabled Anglo-
Saxon writers and readers to express and experience narrative empathy as well as cognitive 
linguistic strategies that enable modern critics to discern when texts invite shared emotions. 
These three chapters delineate cultural functions of literary fellow-feeling in relation to a wide 
range of Old English genres; the final two chapters develop these insights in detailed case 
studies. This project contributes to Anglo-Saxon and medieval studies by enlarging our 
understanding of narrative empathy and reading mentalities in Old English literature. Further, it 
contributes to empathy studies by highlighting culturally-specific functions of empathy not 
encompassed by contemporary theories. 
After an introduction that surveys theories of narrative empathy and the limited work on 
medieval empathy, my first chapter explores linguistic and cultural bases for a general concept of 
fellow-feeling in Anglo-Saxon England. Evidence from biblical exegesis and Old English 
homilies reveals that Anglo-Saxons characteristically view empathy in the context of pastoral 
care and conceive of it as a skill that must be learned. They also link fellow-feeling to the 
doctrine of all Christians as “limbs” of Christ’s body, an image that connects Christians in an 
organic metaphor that emphasizes shared embodiment as the basis for empathy in a community. 
Further, typology – which sees past events as foreshadowing present and future significance – 
invited Anglo-Saxons to identify with past characters in liturgical reenactment, making empathy 





compassionate co-suffering with community members in tribulation, and an immersive 
educational or interpretive narrative empathy with exemplary figures, both with the ultimate goal 
of perfecting the individual Christian’s soul. 
I turn in chapter 2 from what empathy is to how Anglo-Saxon texts elicit shared emotion, 
drawing on the work of historian Richard Morrison and cognitive linguists David Miall and Peter 
Stockwell to describe how linguistic patterns in texts invite increased mental and emotional 
engagement. The cognitive linguistic strategies described in this chapter offer new tools for 
medievalists to discern how texts invite and manage readers’ emotion. I apply these tools to 
analyses of several Old English homilies and elegies, showing how cognitive cues invite 
empathy in culturally-specific ways. For example, Napier Homily 29, a sermon on the terrors of 
Judgment Day, invokes empathy for damned souls through Morrison’s “biological paradigm” 
that roots fellow-feeling in the shared bodily experience described in chapter 1: readers are more 
likely to feel the terror and regret of the condemned because readers’ bodies will also one day 
undergo death and judgment. The homily also presents a disorienting set of shifts between points 
of view, times, and locations, which cognitive linguists argue leads to empathetic engagement. 
These fine-grained linguistic features work together with larger cultural patterns in Old English 
texts to enable a diversity of approaches for encouraging fellow-feeling. 
  Chapter 3 turns from how to why, examining the functions and effects of the two types of 
empathy discussed in chapter 1. Empathy in Anglo-Saxon narratives frequently focuses on 
reforming the individual by inculcating exemplary religious emotions such as compunction or 
righteous anger in readers. Anglo-Saxon texts that invite empathy can also fulfill a pastoral 
function of “condescension of emotion,” enacting compassionate co-suffering as they prompt 





appropriate emotions. For example, the Life of Euphrosyne foregrounds the saint’s grieving 
father as an empathetic model for how to move from despair over loss of worldly wealth to 
desire for heaven. But in addition to teaching appropriate Christian emotions, narrative empathy 
can enable readers to interpret deeper meanings in texts, as Gregory the Great explains in the 
Moralia in Job. Old English texts often encourage empathy as an exegetical strategy, sometimes 
even with non-human subjects: for example, riddles invite empathy with objects such as a battle-
weary shield or a motherly hedgehog both to solve the riddle and to unlock deeper 
understandings of the emotional life of human subjects. In this way my analysis provides new 
insight into the function of literacy in Anglo-Saxon England as a means of emotional education. 
After exploring empathy’s foundations, causes, and effects, I apply these insights in the 
last two chapters to case studies that illustrate narrative empathy in specific texts. Chapter 4, a 
portion of which has been recently published in Philological Quarterly, analyzes the poem 
Christ and Satan. The poem begins with several elegiac plaints of Satan that invite sympathetic 
identification with the devil; however, the poem carefully manipulates these conventions to 
move the reader toward counter-empathy or pleasure at Satan’s pain, and in this way addresses 
anxieties about emotional identification with self-serving or even wicked characters through 
affectively-charged literary forms. This chapter reveals that Anglo-Saxon writers articulated 
nuanced representations of fellow-feeling as an emotion that could promote pernicious as well as 
salvific alignments. It also offers historical correlatives for scholars such as Steven Aschheim 
who explore how contemporary cultural, political, and technological factors constrain how and to 
whom empathy is expressed. 
Chapter 5 discusses Beowulf and the complex empathy it invites with its pagan heroes, 





their faith from fully embracing. I draw on Dominick LaCapra’s theory of “empathic 
unsettlement” to argue that Beowulf presents the painful conflicts and losses of its heroes in a 
way that encourages fellow-feeling and critical reflection rather than unimpeded identification 
with these characters. I focus on three stories that characters within the poem tell to one another, 
which range from historical accounts to completely fictional tales. Each story invites empathy 
with a character who faces a paralyzing emotional and ethical dilemma; as readers share the 
distress of these characters and follow their movement toward resolution, they gain greater 
understanding of the complex and contradictory emotions valorized in the Germanic heroic 
system of values, and in this way are challenged to interrogate their own affective attachments to 
these values. The functions of empathy in these narratives demonstrate that Anglo-Saxons saw 
potential in stories as vehicles not only for moral instruction but also for emotional awareness 
and catharsis. The conclusions in this chapter complement the work of scholars such as literary 
theorist Lisa Zumshine and cognitive narratologist Vera Nünning on the value of fiction as a 
mode of emotional understanding. If the dissertation as a whole seeks to show how current 
models of fellow-feeling can help us understand past emotional communities, it also seeks to 
historicize empathy studies by showing how Anglo-Saxon expressions of fellow-feeling 
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In the introductory exhortation of Blickling Homily 5, the speaker makes a seemingly 
odd observation about a subjective relationship between reader and author of Psalm 15: “Hu 
mæg he gastlicne wæstm þonne habban & healdan, gif he ne wile hine him to Gode gelyfan, & 
mid inneweardre heortan gemunan & geþencan hu Dauid se sealmsceop ongan smeagan & 
þencan, hwylce þæs godan mannes weorc & his dæda wæron…?” [How may he then have and 
hold spiritual fruit, if he does not wish to believe in God, and with inward heart to bear in mind 
and consider how David the psalmist began to ponder and consider the nature of the good man’s 
works and deeds…?]1 The homily then moves into a quotation of Psalm 15, but the lengthy 
admonition has shifted the weight of the passage away from the verse. This framing is somewhat 
strange: to be spiritually fruitful, one must consider not just David’s words, but David’s process 
of thought that led to his inspired words. Further, one must think with “inneweardre heortan” as 
one considers David’s thought intently: gemunan means ‘to bear in mind,’ geþencan ‘to 
consider,’ with the implication of sustained thought.2 This, the homily argues, is the precondition 
to acquiring lasting spiritual fruit: not simply to read the psalm but to meditate on how David 
considered the work and deeds of the good man. If it would be a mistake to put too much weight 
on this quotation, which may simply be an awkward translation from an unidentified Latin 
sermon,3 it would also be a mistake to ignore the way it focuses on the consciousness of the 
Anglo-Saxon Christian reading subject in relation to that of David the Psalmist: on its face this is 
a summons to inhabit David’s inner thoughts. 
                                                
1 Richard Morris, The Blickling Homilies, EETS os 58 (1874): 55. Unless specified, all translations from Latin and 
Old English are my own. 
2 Bosworth-Toller Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, s.vv. “geðencan,” “gemunan.” 
3 For more on the sources of Blickling 5, see Milton McGatch, “The Unknowable Audience of the Blickling 





 “Inhabiting another’s thoughts” is one way to define empathy, which has been an 
important subject of study in the last two hundred years.4 Since it was coined in English as a 
translation of the German Einfühlung (while also hearkening back to the Greek word 
empatheia5), empathy has been of interest to philosophers who theorize how we can understand 
others’ minds and emotions; psychologists who explore prosocial behaviors; cognitive scientists 
who examine the makeup of the brain; and art critics who consider how we are attracted to and 
imaginatively experience works of art. While all of these groups have developed different foci 
and concomittantly different definitions for empathy, at the heart of many of these definitions is 
the question of how one mind can recognize another, whether this involves putting oneself in 
another’s shoes, sharing another’s emotions, or being motivated to sympathetic behavior on 
behalf of another whose pain we can imagine. Scholars across a variety of fields have explored 
how and why empathy occurs, in what ways it can be marshalled and blocked, what individual 
and social functions it has, and whether it is an adequate foundation for ethical behavior.  
But the exhortation in Blickling 5 goes beyond conventional empathy: it requires that the 
process of empathy take place through text, since readers cannot commune face-to-face with 
David, but must intuit his thoughts from his writing. It is thus an invitation to narrative empathy, 
which here involves sharing thoughts but which Suzanne Keen defines as “the sharing of feeling 
and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining narratives of 
another’s situation and condition.”6 As the audience of Blickling 5 encounters David through the 
                                                
4 For an introduction to the history of empathy as a philosophical concept, see Karsten Stueber, “Empathy,” Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 2013, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/empathy/#EmpPhiProOthMin. For a more detailed explanation of various 
contemporary debates on empathy, see Coplan, Amy, and Peter Goldman, eds. Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
5 David Howe, Empathy: What it is and Why it Matters (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 9. 
6 Keen, “Narrative Empathy,” The Living Handbook of Narratology, Interdisciplinary Center for Narratology, 
University of Hamburg, 14 September 2013, http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/narrative-empathy. Whether the 





text of the sermon (or through other contexts in which the Psalms are recited), they are invited to 
gain access to his mind and emotions from his words. The exhortation in Blickling 5 to imagine 
David’s perspective on the righteous man is itself embedded in a larger admonition to not only 
listen, but also remember and act on teaching. One could argue, then, that narrative empathy with 
David allows one to better understand and receive his teaching about the righteous man, and thus 
to practice it. While this example focuses on sharing David’s thoughts and does not explicitly 
mention his emotions, many other Anglo-Saxon texts invite emotional empathy as well as shared 
perspective. 
This dissertation explores the functions of empathy in Anglo-Saxon England, or when, 
how, and why Anglo-Saxons were specifically encouraged to share the feelings and perspectives 
of others.  Because so much of our extant evidence is text-based, I will focus on narrative 
empathy, or how texts invite readers to share the perspectives and emotions of characters. I read 
fictional and non-fictional texts, including homilies, hagiography, and religious and heroic poetry 
to explore what kinds of figures are viewed as empathetic and why; what narratological and 
generic strategies are used to invite empathy; and what effects narrative empathy might have on 
individuals and communities. I draw on methodologies of close reading and genre analysis but 
also employ insights from cognitive linguistics, affect theory, trauma theory, and philosophy and 
psychology. As I will demonstrate, shared perspective and emotion played a significant role in 
Anglo-Saxon pedagogies that trained individuals both to see themselves as Christian subjects in 
a larger community and to perform appropriate emotions such as compunction. Where we may 
be inclined to think of empathy as a structure that forms the fabric of social life by encouraging 
                                                                                                                                                       
mediated through narrative. The example in Blickling 5 foregrounds shared perspective rather than shared emotion, 
making it an imperfect example of the emotionally-based narrative empathy I will focus on in the rest of this 






altruistic or prosocial behavior,7 for at least some Anglo-Saxon readers, empathy was a means of 
self-improvement, inculcating new emotions and understandings about creation, inoculating one 
against the temptations of the world, and helping one work through complex problems.8 
Studying how and why Anglo-Saxons encouraged narrative empathy thus stands to enlarge both 
our understanding of Anglo-Saxon emotional life and of empathy studies more broadly.  
Empathy: Definitions and Backgrounds 
As noted earlier, “empathy” is highly polysemous, with definitions that vary widely 
depending upon the disciplinary and philosophical bents of the scholars who discuss it. C. Daniel 
Batson lists no fewer than eight distinct categories of concepts often referred to as “empathy,”9 
and Suzanne Keen points out the additional category of “fantasy empathy.”10 As Sophie Oliver 
notes, definitions vary depending on what one sees as the primary function of empathy, and 
scholars tend to emphasize different aspects (such as the intellectual or emotional) depending on 
their primary research interests.11 However, many of these definitions of empathy involve a 
sense of shared perspective and shared emotion between two or more people.12 Amy Coplan 
                                                
7 See for example psychologist Martin Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001); C. Daniel Batson, Altruism in Humans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and my 
discussion in Chapter 3. 
8 Such self-improvement would also benefit the community, of course, and the relationship between self and 
community was far from a reductive binary in premodern cultures - see, for example, Christopher Gill, Personality 
in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). The notion of selfhood is itself 
temporally and culturally contingent; for a discussion of this in relation to Old English literature, see Antonina 
Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” Self and Identity 1(2002): 77-97. 
9 C. Daniel Batson, “These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena,” in The Social 
Neuroscience of Empathy, edited by J. Decety and W. Ickes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 3-15. 
10 Suzanne Keen, “Empathy Studies,” in A Companion to Literary Theory, edited by David S. Richter (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 126-38, at 127. 
11 Sophie Oliver, “The Aesth-Ethics of Empathy,” in Empathy and its Limits, edited by Aleida Assmann and Ines 
Detmers, (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 166-86, at 168. 
12 Not all accounts of empathy emphasize shared emotion; for example, many psychologists distinguish between 
“affective empathy” and “cognitive empathy”; see for example David Howe, Empathy: What it is and Why it 
Matters,13-14. Derek Matravers makes a distinction between “broad empathy,” which focuses on imagining 
another’s mental process, and “narrow empathy,” which involves shared emotion; see Matravers, Empathy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), 75. Emotion is also a controversial concept with many definitions; for a discussion 





argues that empathy also involves self-other distinction, or a recognition that one is feeling an 
emotion that is related to another’s situation, not one’s own – otherwise, she argues that a person 
is experiencing emotional contagion, which involves taking on another’s emotion as one’s own.13 
For this project, I will define “empathy” as sharing perspective and emotion, particularly because 
it allows me to situate my work in dialogue with other studies of emotion, and because it bears 
more similarity to standard definitions of narrative empathy, as I will describe below. 
At times, particularly in my discussion of terms for empathy in Chapter 1, I will consider 
empathy alongside similar terms such as “compassion,” “fellow-feeling,” and “sympathy,” 
which though conceptually related are distinct. Compassion might be better thought of as co-
suffering, or feeling pain because another person feels pain, while sympathy refers to feeling 
sorry “for” someone rather than feeling sorry “with” them. For example, a medieval exemplum 
that describes the plight of a beggar and invites readers to feel sad (and possibly to alleviate this 
suffering) is inviting sympathy; an exemplum that encourages audiences to imagine what the 
beggar him- or herself feels is inviting empathy. Further, compassion and sympathy can only 
occur in response to negative emotions, while one could empathetically share in positive 
emotions such as happiness. Fellow-feeling denotes shared affection or emotion (and sometimes 
also prosocial action), but does not require sharing another’s perspective. 
More recently, “narrative empathy” has become a burgeoning field of inquiry within 
literary studies.14 As already noted, Suzanne Keen’s definition of narrative empathy highlights 
                                                                                                                                                       
Anglo-Saxon Emotions: Reading the Heart in Old English Language, Literature and Culture, edited by Alice 
Jorgensen, Frances McCormack, and Jonathan Wilcox (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), 3-8. 
13 Amy Coplan, “Will the Real Empathy Please Stand Up? A Case for a Narrow Conceptualization,” The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 49, Spindel Supplement (2011): 40-65. For a discussion of emotional contagion, see Howes, 
Empathy, 10-11, and Emotional Contagion, edited by Elaine Hatfield, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson, 
Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
14 For an introduction to narrative empathy studies and current debates, see Keen, “Empathy Studies.” For a recent 





both emotion and imagination, thus excluding emotional contagion (feeling without perspective-
taking) and analytical simulation (perspective-taking without an emotional component). Some 
have debated whether shared emotion needs to be exactly matched between empathizer and 
target to be considered successful empathy.15 While I will explore how writers with an implied 
reader in mind16 directed audiences to empathize with particular emotions, I will consider 
successful narrative empathy to occur when readers believe that they are sharing a character’s 
perspective and emotion – whether or not a given reader shares the exact emotion that an author 
wishes them to have.  
Current discussions in literary empathy studies focus on what elicits narrative empathy,17 
whether narrative empathy works in the same way as “real” empathy, and whether one can be 
said to feel empathy for fictional emotions at all.18 But one of the most prominent points of 
contention is how to determine the effects and value of narrative empathy – a debate that has 
spilled over from larger arguments about the efficacy of empathy in general. Scholars have 
attributed impressive effects to narrative empathy, including the ability to produce more 
empathic citizens19 and to help individuals recognize and process complex or unfamiliar 
                                                                                                                                                       
Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim, Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 
15 “Empathic accuracy” refers to the ability to correctly guess another’s thoughts or emotions; see Empathic 
Accuracy, edited by William John Ickes, (New York, the Guilford Press, 1997). For someone critical of the ability to 
empathetically match another’s emotions, Derek Matravers, “Empathy as a Route to Knowledge,” in Empathy: 
Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 19-30. See also Suzanne Keen’s discussion of “empathic inaccuracy” among readers of fiction in 
Empathy and the Novel, 136-37. 
16 For an introduction to the concept of the implied reader - the reader imagined by a text’s author in the act of 
composition - see Wolf Schmid, “Implied Reader,” The Living Handbook of Narratology, Interdisciplinary Center 
for Narratology, University of Hamburg, 27 January 2013, https://wikis.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/lhn/index.php/Implied_Reader. We can hypothesize from details in the text the implied reader that an 
author has in mind, and further how the author might be seeking to influence this reader’s emotions. 
17 I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 2, on “mechanisms of empathy.” 
18 Keen, “Empathy Studies.” 
19 See for example Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), and Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development. See also my discussion 





emotions.20 By contrast, critics of empathy in general and narrative empathy in particular 
highlight its limitations in promoting altruistic action, its potential to be blocked or redirected, 
and its uncomfortable tendency to coexist with approval of evil behavior.21 For example, Sara 
Ahmed has criticized empathy as a self-centered and impossible attempt to interpret another’s 
untranslatable pain, while Lauren Berlant calls attention to how modern nation-states invite 
empathy with the nation to smooth over divisions and divert meaningful action to address 
systemic injustices. Still others question whether empathy is useful for morality at all: 
philosopher Jesse Prinz argues that empathy is neither necessary nor desirable for morality, and 
can lead humans to problematic decisions,22 while a 2014 edited collection on empathy and 
morality yielded mixed reactions from its contributors.23 Empathy need not lead only to 
beneficial behavior, and behavior beneficial to a community may injure other groups. As Aleida 
Assmann and Ines Detmers point out, “If we define empathy as a pure exercise of the 
imagination concerning the state of another human being, this activity can be disconnected from 
moral judgment and a serious concern for the other.”24 Empathizers might simply feel with a 
sense of detachment or even enjoy a voyeuristic pleasure at experiencing another’s emotion. 
                                                
20 See for example Keith Oatley, “Communications to Self and Others: Emotional Experience and its Skills,” 
Emotion Review 1.3 (July 2009): 206-13; “Meetings of Minds: Dialogue, Sympathy, and Identification in Reading 
Fiction,” Poetics 26 (1999): 439-54; “Why Fiction May Be Twice as True as Fact: Fiction as Cognitive and 
Emotional Simulation,” Review of General Psychology 3.2 (1999): 101-17; and Vera Nünning, “Narrative Fiction 
and Cognition: Why We Should Read Fiction,” Forum for World Literature Studies 7.1 (March 2015): 41-61. 
21 For a discussion of how empathy can be blocked or diverted, see Martin Hoffman, Empathy and Moral 
Development, 197-206; Hoffman also notes the potential for empathy to lead to harmful behavior in “Empathy, 
Justice, and Social Change,” In Empathy and Morality, edited by Helen Maibom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), 71-96, at 94. 
22 Jesse Prinz, “Against Empathy,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49, Spindel Supplement (2011): 214-33. 
23 Empathy and Morality, edited by Helen Maibom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
24 Aleida Assmann and Ines Detmers, “Introduction,” in Empathy and its Limits, ed. Assmann and Detmers (New 





Suzanne Keen, one of the most prominent literary empathy theorists, has consistently displayed 
skepticism that narrative empathy necessarily results in prosocial behavior.25 
But debates about empathy’s value or efficacy also depend on an even more basic 
disagreement over how texts invite narrative empathy (or if they can). Although some studies 
suggest the empathetic potential in certain literary techniques, there is still no widespread 
consensus on what promotes empathy.26 Further, as Keen notes, individual differences affect 
how readers respond to narratives emotionally, so that “no two readers encounter and respond to 
the same narrative, because no two readers bring the same set of literary predispositions, life 
experiences, identities, desires, and memories to the co-creative task.”27 Studying narrative 
empathy might thus seem an impossible task. But this does not mean that authors do not at times 
try to elicit emotional responses, and looking for narratological strategies that promote empathy 
may help us realize how authors attempt to stimulate shared emotion, and how a text might 
encourage empathy whether or not an author intends for it to do so. 
 Much literary scholarship on narrative empathy focuses on examples from the nineteenth 
century or later. This is understandable, given the limited history of the term “empathy.”28 In 
addition, because empathy studies frequently focus on modern genres such as the novel and 
societies such as Victorian England, they often lead to conclusions biased on these genres and 
contexts. Such studies often focus on the possibility for empathy to encourage altruistic behavior 
(or criticize empathy as being unable to do so). This is certainly a laudable result of empathy, but 
                                                
25 Keen, Empathy and the Novel, and “Narrative Empathy: A Universal Response to Fiction?,” Literary Universals 
Project, University of Connecticut, https://literary-universals.uconn.edu/2017/10/07/narrative-empathy-a-universal-
response-to-fiction/#, 10 July 2018. 
26 See Keen’s summary in “Narrative Empathy: A Universal Response to Fiction?” 
27 Keen, “Narrative Empathy: A Universal Response to Fiction?” 
28 See also Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim’s comments on this in “Introduction,” Rethinking Empathy 





is itself culturally-specific.29 In contrast, in Anglo-Saxon sermons, empathy is almost never 
invoked as a motivation for acts of compassion, which are instead understood as repayment for 
Christ’s sacrifice or as currency used to purchase rewards.30 Instead, sermons often invoke 
empathy to encourage readers to identify with exemplary figures whose emotions they should 
imitate, or to disidentify with individuals whose worldly desires will lead them to damnation. As 
I consider the way that emotional identification functions in Anglo-Saxon texts, I seek to 
broaden scholarly discussions of the process and ends of empathy by highlighting how and why 
other cultures encouraged the imaginative sharing of emotion.  
Historical work in empathy studies can broaden our appreciation of how cultural and 
literary differences affect not only how we conceive emotion, but the role of emotion in the 
process of reading. Psychological studies of how readers process emotionally-laden texts must 
rely on samples of living people, and their conclusions about empathy reflect the reading 
processes and cultural understanding of the contemporary readers that make up their sample. 
Although studying texts from the past requires different methodologies, such work may help us 
understand how culture influences reading, and further it may throw into relief how aspects of 




                                                
29 For an example of how other cultures can conceive of empathy in very different terms, see Douglas Hollan, 
“Empathy and Morality in Ethnographic Perspective,” in Empathy and Morality, edited by Heidi L. Maibom 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 230-50, and the studies in The Anthropology of Empathy, edited by 
Douglas W. Hollan and C. Jason Throop (New York, Berghahn Books, 2011). 
30 In a survey of the Catholic Homilies, the Vercelli Homilies, the Blickling Homilies, and other selected vernacular 
homilies, I could find no examples of people encouraged to show kindness to others because of how they might feel. 
Blickling IV does encourage readers to imagine the happiness of a beggar when they receive aid, but instead of 
using the beggar’s affliction as motivation to help them, the homilist encourages readers to instead imagine how 





Empathy and Anglo-Saxon Histories of Emotion 
This dissertation has ramifications not only for literary empathy studies, but also for 
Anglo-Saxon studies. By studying how texts work on the emotions of readers, we can challenge 
preexisting monolithic narratives about the history of emotions. We can also better recognize 
where our cultural blind spots lead us to misread the past, either because we expect it to reflect 
our mentalities or to be completely foreign to our mentalities. It can be tempting to import 
modern conceptions of fellow-feeling in order to speculate on how Anglo-Saxon audiences 
responded emotionally to texts – for example, assuming that we respond to elegies the same way 
that the Anglo-Saxons did. However, as Mary Garrison explains, “to assimilate evidence about 
medieval behaviour to our categories is invariably reductionist, but to use situational similarities 
to throw differences into relief is not.”31 Thus, I highlight key Anglo-Saxon texts and ideas that 
possess similarities with aspects of modern empathy theory, in order to “throw into relief” the 
possibility of an Anglo-Saxon concept of fellow-feeling that would have both points of 
continuity and departure from modern scholarly discussions of empathy. As Alice Jorgensen 
explains, “We need not be bound by our everyday, culturally instilled concepts, but it is only by 
applying them that we can begin to critique them, and get a sense of what our evidence is 
showing us instead.”32 This dissertation brings more of the evidence for empathetic reading into 
conversations about emotion in early medieval England. 
A growing body of scholarship in Anglo-Saxon Studies explores the cultural construction 
of emotions such as fear, shame, anger, and happiness.33 Another considers how Anglo-Saxons 
                                                
31 Mary Garrison, “The Study of Emotions in Early Medieval History: Some Starting Points,” Early Medieval 
Europe 10.2 (2001): 243-50, at 248. 
32 Jorgensen, “Introduction,” 4. 
33 Selected examples include Erik Carlson, The Old English Language of Fear, PhD Diss., University of Minnesota 
2012; Harris, Stephen J. “Happiness and the Psalms,” In Old English Literature and the Old Testament, edited by 
Michael Fox and Manish Sharma, Toronto Anglo-Saxon Series (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012): 292-





might have learned about emotions from texts or responded affectively to texts.34 Antonina 
Harbus has written at length on emotion and empathy in Anglo-Saxon poetry from the 
perspective of cognitive science.35 Still other scholarship invokes empathy in passing while 
discussing other aspects of Anglo-Saxon texts and sometimes argues that a text invites empathy 
without necessarily providing a detailed rationale.36 My dissertation extends discussion of 
specific Anglo-Saxon emotions to consider how and why texts sought to stimulate and control 
the emotional responses of readers and listeners. I build on the work of Harbus by combining the 
cognitive linguistic work she champions with an interest in culturally-specific functions of 
empathy as they play out in particular reading contexts. Further, I seek to contribute to Anglo-
Saxon studies not only by elucidating qualitative evidence for how texts invite empathy but also 
by exploring possible quantitative methods for assessing the empathic potential of a text based 
on the tools that Harbus offers. While the results of such quantitative methods still need to be 
                                                                                                                                                       
edited by C. Biggam, C. Hough, and D. Izdebska (Tempe: ACMRS, 2018), 187-203; many of the studies in Anglo-
Saxon Emotions; Javier E. Díaz-Vera and Teodoro Manrique Antón, “‘Better Shamed before One than Shamed 
before All’: Shaping Shame in Old English and Old Norse Texts, in Metaphor and Metonymy across Time and 
Cultures: Perspectives on the Sociohistorical Linguistics of Figurative Language (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 
2015), 225-64; Javíer E. Díaz-Vera, “From Cognitive Linguistics to Historical Sociolinguistics: The Evolution of 
Old English Expressions of Shame and Guilt,” Cognitive Linguistic Studies 1.1 (2014): 55-83. 
34 Some examples are Alice Jorgensen’s reading of the Old English prose Psalms in terms of script theory in 
“Learning About Emotion from the Old English Prose Psalms of the Paris Psalter,” in Anglo-Saxon Emotions, ed. 
Alice Jorgensen, Frances McCormack and Jonathan Wilcox (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), 127-141 and Patricia 
Dailey’s survey of the Old English riddles in terms of “responsiveness” in “Riddles, Wonder and Responsiveness in 
Anglo-Saxon Literature,” in The Cambridge History of Early Medieval English Literature, ed. Clare A. Lees 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 451-72. 
35 See Antonina Harbus, Cognitive Approaches to Old English Poetry (Cambidge: D.S. Brewer, 2012), 162-76. 
Harbus also discusses emotions in parts of The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002). 
See also ‘Affective Poetics: The Cognitive Basis of Emotion in Old English Poetry” to Anglo-Saxon Emotions: 
Reading the Heart in Old English Language, Literature and Culture, 19-34; “Medieval English Texts and Affects: 
Narratives as Tools for Feeling,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Affect Studies and Textual Criticism, edited by D.R. 
Wehrs and T. Blake (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 545-76; “The Long View: Cognitive Poetic 
Approaches to ‘Dynamic Affect’ in Early English Verse,” in Expressive Minds and Artistic Creations: Studies in 
Cognitive Poetics, edited by S. Csabi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 159-79). She has a forthcoming article on 
“The Old English Vocabulary of Emotions: Glossing Affectus,” in Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling (400-
1800), edited by J. Feros Ruys, M. Champion, and K. Essary (London: Routledge, 2018). I will discuss Harbus more 
in Chapter 2. 
36 For example, Gale Owen-Crocker argues that readers empathize with Hildeburg in the “Lay of Finnsburg” 
episode of Beowulf; see Gale Owen-Crocker, The Four Funerals in Beowulf: And the Structure of the Poem 





rigorously assessed, these methods present new avenues for assessing how readers might respond 
to texts. 
My work also moves beyond the emphasis on affective piety that often dominates 
medieval histories of emotion. Studies of affective piety often present the Anglo-Saxon period as 
a precursor to the more compassionate, sympathetic emotion of the high Middle Ages,37 while 
scholars in Anglo-Saxon studies have challenged this narrative by showing how authors such as 
Bede were interested in affective spirituality.38 While both groups show how texts transmit 
emotion and how individuals are encouraged to identify emotionally with suffering characters, a 
focus on the type of empathy represented by affective spirituality can detract attention from other 
reasons to engage empathetically: for example, to experience the process of consolation 
alongside an empathetic model that demonstrates appropriate emotion. A study of Anglo-Saxon 
empathy presents a larger picture of Anglo-Saxon spirituality and the role that emotions could 
play in subject formation. 
Chapter Overview 
The first three chapters lay a foundation for how we can discuss narrative empathy in 
Anglo-Saxon texts. My first chapter explores linguistic and cultural bases for a general concept 
of fellow-feeling in Anglo-Saxon England. Evidence from biblical exegesis and Old English 
                                                
37 See for example R. W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven, 1953), 209-44; André Vauchez, 
The Spirituality of the Medieval West: The Eighth to the Twelfth Century, trans. Colette Friedlander, Cistercian 
Studies 145, (Kalamazoo, 1993), 153-57. For key studies of affective piety, see Sarah McNamer, Affective 
Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); 
Caroline Walker Bynum, Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1982), 16–17, 77–81, 85–90, 129–35; Stephen J. Shoemaker, “Mary at the Cross, East and West: 
Maternal Compassion and Affective Piety in the Earliest Life of the Virgin and the High Middle Ages,” Journal of 
Theological Studies 62.2 (2011): 570-606; Rachel Fulton, From Judgment to Passion: Devotion to Christ and the 
Virgin Mary, 800-1200 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
38 See for example Allen Frantzen, “Spirituality and Devotion in Anglo-Saxon Penitentials,” Essays in Medieval 
Studies 22 (2005): 117-28, and Scott DeGregorio, “Affective Spirituality: Theory and Practice in Bede and Alfred 
the Great,” Essays in Medieval Studies 22 (2005): 129-39; Frances McCormack, “Those Bloody Trees: The 
Affectivity of Christ III,” in Anglo-Saxon Emotions, ed. Alice Jorgensen, Frances McCormack, and Jonathan Wilcox 





homilies reveals that Anglo-Saxons characteristically view empathy in the context of pastoral 
care and conceive of it as a skill that must be learned. They also link fellow-feeling to the 
doctrine of all Christians as “limbs” of Christ’s body, an image that connects Christians in an 
organic metaphor that emphasizes shared embodiment as the basis for empathy in a community. 
Further, typology – which sees past events as foreshadowing present and future significance – 
invited Anglo-Saxons to identify with past characters in liturgical reenactment, making empathy 
a vital part of religious observance. I argue for two specific types of fellow-feeling: a 
compassionate co-suffering with community members in tribulation, and an immersive 
educational or interpretive narrative empathy with exemplary figures, both with the ultimate goal 
of perfecting the individual Christian’s soul. This sets the stage for a more narrow consideration 
of narrative empathy in Anglo-Saxon texts that elicits such fellow-feeling from readers for 
narrative characters. 
I turn in Chapter 2 from what empathy is to how Anglo-Saxon texts elicit shared 
perspective and shared emotion, drawing on the work of historian Richard Morrison and 
cognitive linguists David Miall and Peter Stockwell to describe how linguistic patterns in texts 
invite increased mental and emotional engagement. The cognitive linguistic strategies described 
in this chapter offer new tools for medievalists to discern how texts invite and manage empathy. I 
apply these tools to analyses of several Old English homilies and elegies, showing how cognitive 
cues encourage empathy in culturally-specific ways. For example, Napier Homily 29, a sermon 
on the terrors of Judgment Day, invokes empathy for damned souls through Morrison’s 
“biological paradigm” that roots fellow-feeling in the shared bodily experience described in 
Chapter 1: readers are more likely to feel the terror and regret of the condemned because readers’ 





of shifts between points of view, times, and locations, which cognitive linguists argue leads to 
empathetic engagement. These fine-grained linguistic features work together with larger cultural 
patterns in Old English texts to enable a diversity of approaches for encouraging fellow-feeling, 
and they can be studied with quantitative methods that might help us discern how texts manage 
empathy. 
  Chapter 3 turns from how to why, examining the functions and effects of the two types of 
empathy discussed in Chapter 1. Empathy in Anglo-Saxon narratives frequently focuses on 
reforming individuals and communities by inculcating exemplary religious emotions such as 
compunction or righteous anger in readers. Anglo-Saxon texts that invite empathy can also fulfill 
a pastoral function of “condescension of emotion,” enacting compassionate co-suffering as they 
prompt readers to empathize with a character’s worldly grief before redirecting them to 
religiously appropriate emotions. For example, the Life of Euphrosyne foregrounds the saint’s 
grieving father as an empathetic model for how to move from despair over loss of worldly wealth 
to desire for heaven. But in addition to teaching appropriate Christian emotions, narrative 
empathy can enable readers to interpret deeper meanings in texts, as Gregory the Great explains 
in the Moralia in Job. Old English texts often encourage empathy as an exegetical strategy, 
sometimes even with non-human subjects: for example, riddles invite empathy with objects such 
as a battle-weary shield or a motherly hedgehog both to solve the riddle and to unlock deeper 
understandings of the emotional life of human subjects. In this way my analysis provides new 
insight into the function of literacy in Anglo-Saxon England as a means of emotional education. 
After exploring empathy’s foundations, causes, and effects, I apply these insights in the 
last two chapters to case studies that illustrate narrative empathy in specific clusters of texts. 





Satan that invite sympathetic identification with the devil. The poem, however, carefully 
manipulates these conventions to move the reader toward counter-empathy, and in this way 
addresses anxieties about emotional identification with self-serving or even wicked characters 
through aesthetically-charged literary forms. This chapter reveals that Anglo-Saxon writers 
articulated nuanced representations of fellow-feeling as an emotion that could promote 
pernicious as well as salvific alignments. 
Chapter 5 examines Beowulf as a complex case study of interpretive empathy, exploring 
how the poem foregrounds empathy with fictional characters as a route to sensitive 
understanding of the flaws of the past. Rather than discussing the monsters (often the focus of 
scholarship on empathy in Beowulf), I consider how the poem treats its human protagonists. I 
focus on three moments of storytelling within the poem to show how Beowulf encourages 
empathic unsettlement with the poem’s many pagan characters, whom Anglo-Saxon readers 
could neither unequivocally celebrate nor completely forswear.39 The Lay of Finnsburg, the story 
of Freawaru, and the Father’s Lament all dramatize characters caught in emotionally and 
ethically paralyzing dilemmas. The poem invites empathy with these characters in order to help 
readers to think through complex problems from a critical distance, gain a deeper understanding 
of the failures of the heroic system, and interrogate their own affective attachments to people of 
the past. 
As a whole, the dissertation excavates Anglo-Saxon evidence for narrative empathy to 
enrich research both in contemporary empathy studies and in the study of emotions in Anglo-
Saxon England. As I demonstrate, Old English texts invite audiences to empathize with a variety 
                                                
39 Not all Anglo-Saxon audiences would roundly condemn these heroic characters because of their paganism; for 
arguments that they would be seen favorably even by Christian readers, Patrick Wormald, “Bede, ‘Beowulf’ and the 
Conversion of the Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy,” British Archaeological Reports 46 (1978): 32-95; see also Thomas D. 
Hill, “Beowulf and Conversion History,” in The Dating of Beowulf, edited by Leonard Neidorf, Anglo-Saxon 





of figures, using a variety of strategies, to shape individual and communal identity. In particular, 
narrative empathy reforms readers by helping them to acquire beneficial emotions and to 
interpret challenging texts. My project seeks to show how current models of fellow-feeling can 
help us understand past emotional communities, but also seeks to historicize empathy studies by 
showing how Anglo-Saxon expressions of fellow-feeling complicate models based narrowly on 






 CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTS OF EMPATHY  
 
This chapter considers textual evidence for the concept of “empathy,” defined as shared 
perspective and emotion, in Anglo-Saxon England. I begin with the Old English lexicon of 
empathy, with includes both native terms and loan-translations from Latin.  I then discuss 
biblical and patristic sources that may have informed Anglo-Saxon concepts of fellow-feeling, 
focusing on the doctrine of all Christians as limbs of Christ’s body (which connected believers to 
one another in an organic metaphor while emphasizing the shared experience of embodiment) 
and on typology (which encouraged imaginative and emotional engagement with biblical and 
historical characters in order to produce desired emotions). I will argue that two distinct types of 
fellow-feeling existed: a compassionate co-suffering with community members experiencing 
tribulation, and an immersive educational or interpretive narrative empathy with exemplary 
figures. 
 The evidence in this chapter is weighted on the side of Christian-Latin sources. A more 
complete picture of empathy in Anglo-Saxon England must take into account arguably native 
bases for fellow-feeling as well – for example, as Britt Mize has shown, traditional Old English 
poetics offered opportunities to imagine the mental spaces of others (even if, as Mize argues, 
these mental spaces are meant to present conventional wisdom rather than to present realistic 
psychological portraits).1 There is also evidence within Old English texts that poets sought to 
cultivate empathy by using other textual strategies, such as invoking affective genres like elegy. I 
will discuss some of these mechanisms in Chapter 2. Further, I will consider how some of these 
Latin ideas of fellow-feeling intersect with the emotional norms of an Anglo-Saxon noble 
                                                






moving in the secular sphere in Chapter 3 when I discuss Old English translations of 
hagiography and Psalm introductions that contextualize Christian norms of emotion for a secular 
audience. 
 At the outset a critical distinction also needs to be made between talking about empathy 
and actually empathizing. Some texts discuss the process, functions, and importance of empathy, 
or depict characters showing empathy. Other texts invite readers to empathize without explicitly 
discussing empathy as a concept. Most of the texts discussed in this chapter focus on describing 
or depicting empathy rather than actively inviting it. In chapter 2, however, I will consider the 
types of textual cues that may tell us how texts encourage fellow-feeling. 
The Vocabulary of Fellow-Feeling 
 There is no Old English word directly denoting empathy, at least not in the sense that 
many modern empathy theorists describe it of shared perspective and shared emotion.2 However, 
even if empathy was not specifically lexicalized, an investigation into the Latin and Old English 
vocabulary of compassion reveals words that could be used to express shared emotional 
experience. Whereas empathy involves sharing in the emotions of another whether these 
emotions are positive or negative, compassion has a more limited lexical range, generally 
denoting sharing the negative emotions of someone in pain. In a study of social laws in Anglo-
Saxon society, E.G. Stanley defines compassion via James Murray, the original primary editor of 
the Oxford English Dictionary, as “The feeling of emotion, when a person is moved by the 
suffering or distress of another, and by the desire to relieve it; pity that inclines one to spare or to 
succour.” Stanley adds, “There is, I think, nothing like it in Old English.”3 Indeed, at the 
conclusion of Stanley’s investigation as to whether Anglo-Saxon England possessed a sense of 
                                                
2 For a review of the concepts that modern scholars denote by empathy, see my discussion in the Introduction. 






“social conscience,” he reinforces a central tenet of history of emotions: “The unchanging human 
heart, that it feels the same everywhere and in all ages, is a Romantic fallacy. Far from it: the 
emotions are not identical from country to country, not constant from age to age.”4 Stanley 
concludes that although Anglo-Saxons were motivated to provide for the needs of the poor, it 
was less from a sense of pity for their suffering and more from a desire to obtain eternal 
reward—a salutary reminder that emotion terms such as pity and compassion frequently did not 
have the same meaning or function in the past as they do today.5 
Though I agree with Stanley’s conclusions about the lack of “social compassion” in 
Anglo-Saxon society as Stanley defines that term, I will argue that the Old English vocabulary of 
compassion does support the existence of an Anglo-Saxon concept of feeling with another and 
not just for another – the kind of convergent or contiguous emotion that modern empathy 
theorists find interest in. The evidence derives mainly from Old English loan-translations and 
semantic loans6 from Latin words such as compassio ‘compassion’, condolere ‘to sorrow with’, 
and derivative terms.7  Compassio and compati can be broken down as ‘experiencing-with,’ and 
the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources defines compassio as “participation in 
                                                
4 Stanley, “Did the Anglo-Saxons Have a Social Conscience,” 264. 
5 This is not to argue that certain fundamental emotions – or at least biological signs connected to emotions – do not 
exist across cultures. 
6 Loan-translations and semantic loans correspond to Helmut Gneuss’ terms Lehnbildungen and Lehnbedeutungen, 
respectively. See Gneuss, Lehnbildungen und Lehnbedeutungen im Altenglischen (Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 
1955), and Einar Haugen’s review in Language 32.4 (Oct.-Dec.1956), 761-766. A loan-translation is a word taken 
into another language by translating it into words or morphemes in the existing language: for example, by translating 
the Latin compassio as midþrowung. A semantic loan is made when a language extends the meaning of a word to 
include meanings that the word’s equivalent possesses in another language. For example, the English word pioneer 
originally derived from the Middle French word pionnier, which referred to a “labourer employed in digging,” but 
over time the word in English came to acquire the meaning of “an early colonist.” The French word pionnier later 
acquired this additional meaning as a semantic loan from English; see Philip Durkin, The Oxford Guide to 
Etymology, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 134.  
7 Another related virtue is misericordia, defined by the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources as 
“compassion, pity, mercy.” It was etymologized by Augustine and Isidore as the heart making itself miserable 
because of the misery of another (although Isidore adds that God could possess misericordia without miseria). It 
suggests emotional contagion in addition to the shared perspective of empathy. Misericordia is typically glossed by 





suffering…compassion, sympathy, fellow feeling,”8 connecting its verbal form, compati, with 
misereri. Forms of compati are used in the Vulgate to refer to instances in which one shares in 
the experience or afflictions of another person, either literally or vicariously.9 It is used to 
describe how Christians share in the sufferings of Christ, to describe the way that members of the 
body of Christ suffer when others suffer, and to describe Job’s pity for the affliction of paupers.10 
Condolere is used in Hebrews to describe Christ’s sympathy for human weakness and in 
Ecclesiasticus to describe (true or false) compassion for friends, including the compassion of a 
friend “cuius anima est secundum animam tuam” or “whose soul is according to their own 
soul.”11 
I consider Old English translations for compassio, compati, and condolere within the 
framework of semantic field studies. As Vic Strite explains, semantic field studies catalogues all 
of the vocabulary for a concept to look for areas of semantic overlap and divergence and discern 
what these overlaps reveal about Anglo-Saxon categories.12 Exploring the words for compassion 
using semantic field studies can help us consider to what extent fellow-feeling would be 
considered as a separate concept and to what extent words for fellow-feeling overlapped with 
other concepts of virtue or altruistic feelings. 
 The table below shows the Old English terms that translate forms of compassio, compati, 
and condolere. The first column provides the Latin term, the second and fourth columns provide 
                                                
8 Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources, s.v. “compassion.” 
9 Unless otherwise noted, all Latin scriptural citations are from Biblia Sacra Vulgata, ed. R. Weber and R. Gryson, 
6th ed. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2009). All English translations are from the Douay Rheims Bible 
Online. 
10 The relevant verses are Romans 8:17, 1 Corinthians 12:26 (to be discussed below), and Job 30:25. Forms of 
compassio or compati also appear in 1 Peter 3:8 and Hebrews 10:24. 
11 Ecclesiasticus 37:16. 
12 Or, as Strite puts it, what we can learn about “an Anglo-Saxon writer’s perception of a particular notion or object 
(as opposed to our own perception).” Strite, Old English Semantic-Field Studies, American University Studies 





the OE terms used to gloss it, and the third and fifth columns provide the Cameron numbers for 
the sources of these translations: 
Table 1: Old English terms for compassio, compati, and condolere 
Latin Old English 1 Text Old English 2 Text 
compassio besargung HyGl 2, HyGl 3   
conpassio midþrowung LibSc   
conpassione efenþrowunge LibSc   
conpassionem efenþrowunge LibSc midþrowunge LibSc 
conpassionis midþrowunge LibSc   
conpati midþolian LibSc giðrovia DurRitGl 
conpatiendo midþoligende LibSc   
conpatiens efenðio OccGl   
conpatiendis besargiendes AldV1, AldV þo. [probably 
þoliende] 
AldV 
conpatior besargige ÆGram     
condolens besargiende HyGl 2 samodsargiende HyGl 3 
condolere <besargian> LibSc   
 
As translations for Latin words, each of these citations occurs in a religious text: glosses on 
hymns, the Benedictine Rule, the Cura Pastoralis, Aldhelm’s de Virginitate, the Liber 
Scintillarum, a collect in the Durham Ritual, and Ælfric’s Excerptiones de Arte Grammatica 
Anglice. Almost all of these Old English translations appear to be loan-translations rather than 





experience or emotion, such as þrowian, sargian, þolian, and hreowsian. This highlights the 
original words’ emphases on mutual or proximate experience.  
These Old English calques unsurprisingly translate Latin terms in religious texts. 
Besargung appears in two separate glosses on the same hymn calling on St. James to show 
compassio to the supplicant.13 An Old English gloss on the Benedictine Rule uses besargode to 
describe how Christ the Good Shepherd has compassion on lost sheep, and how the abbot must 
imitate this example in dealing with excommunicated brothers.14 To translate “compassus est” in 
the parable of the Lost Sheep, the gloss offers “besargode oððe mænde” as options, suggesting 
that mænan ‘to sorrow, grieve’ could have its meaning extended to include a fellow-suffering 
that is morphologically expressed in besargian.15 Beruwsiendes and behreowsiendes occur in 
Old English glosses on Aldhelm’s prose De Virginitate. Both gloss compatientis to describe how 
Judith is affected by compassion for the people of Bethulia: “pro contribulibus dolitura 
compatientis affectu.”16 Forms of efenþrowunge, midðrowian, and midðolian appear exclusively 
                                                
13 Helmut Gneuss, Hymnar und Hymnen im englischen Mittelalter, Buchreihe der Anglia 12 (Tübingen, M. 
Niemeyer, 1968), 265-413, Hymn 108, p. 389; Inge B. Milfull, The Hymns of the Anglo-Saxon Church: A Study and 
Edition of the Durham Hymnal, Cambridge Studies in Anglo-Saxon England 17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 379, Hymn 108, verse 1. 
14 The Latin text: “Et pastoris boni pium imitetur exemplum qui relictis nonaginta novem in montibus abiit unam 
ovem que erraverat querere cujus infirmitate in tantum compassus est ut eam in sacris humeris suis dignaretur 
imponere et sic reportare ad gregem” [And the pious example of the good shepherd is imitated which left the 
remaining ninety-nine in the mountains, to seek one sheep which had strayed, whose infirmity [he] has 
compassionated to such an extent that he thought fit to place it on his sacred shoulders and thus to return [it] to the 
flock]. The gloss text:“& he geafæn godes hyrdas ærfæste læce bysene forlætenum nygon & hundnigonti sceapum 
on dunum se ðe gode þæt þe dwelede secan untrumnesse swa midlum he besargode oððe mænde hit on his halgum 
eaxlum þæt he gemedemode onasettan & ægen bringan to heorde” [and he equally sought the faithful example of the 
Good Shepherd, he who went forsaking ninety-nine sheep in the hills to seek the one which erred so greatly he 
compassionated or lamented the infirmity, that he deemed to set it on his holy shoulders and bring his own to the 
enclosure”], H. Logeman, The Rule of St. Benet, EETS 90 (London, 1888) [repr. 1973], 58. 
15 Another possibility is that mænan is a nonce-extension used to clarify besargode as outwardly-directed. Mænan is 
attested elsewhere to refer to sorrowing for others; for example, Ælfric uses bemænan to indicate sorrow for others 
in Catholic Homily 1.28; Ælfric's Catholic Homilies: The First Series, ed. Clemoes, EETS s.s. 17 (Oxford: EETS, 
1997), 413. 
16 “grieving for her kinsfolk with the affection of compassion”; The Old English Glosses of MS. Brussels, Royal 
Library 1650, ed. Louis Goossens, Brussels Verhandelingen van de koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, 
Letteren en schone Kunsten van Belgie, Klasse der Letteren, 36 (Paleis der Academiën, 1974), 476; Old English 





in the gloss to the Liber Scintillarum, a late seventh- or early eighth-century florilegium that was 
used in Anglo-Saxon England and glossed in Old English in one surviving manuscript.17 Most 
instances of these words occur in the chapter de compassione proximi (be efenðrowunge 
nihstan), on compassion for one’s neighbor. One instance occurs in chapter 44, de misericordia 
(on mildheortnysse), and another in chapter 49, de elemosina (on ælmyssan). Both passages 
translate quotations attributed to Isidore. In chapter 44, the word appears in Isidore’s definition 
of misericordia: “mildheortnyss fram midþoligende fremedre yrmþe nama gehlet nan soðlice on 
oþrum beon mildheort mæg se þwyrlice lybbende on him mildheort nys” [mercy is allotted a 
name from suffering with the misery of the stranger; nobody truly may be merciful to another 
who, living crookedly, does not have mercy in himself]. The quotation in chapter 49 extends 
almsgiving to include compassionate action: “se þe feond lufað & se heofigendum lufe 
midþrowunge & frofre forgyfð oþþe on sumum neodum geþeaht gegearwað ælmyssan buton 
twyon deð” [he who loves an enemy and who with lamenting love gives compassion and comfort 
or supplies covering for a needy one [or] gives alms without hesitation]. The Durham Collectar 
uses giðrovia to translate conpati in Hebrews 4:15, which describes how Christ can sympathize 
with others because he has shared in the experience of temptation, making him an ideal high 
priest.18 Efenðio appears in a gloss on Gregory’s Pastoral Care that speaks of how the bishop 
must treat anxious sinners with compassio while engaging in correction, showing kindness by 
                                                                                                                                                       
Virginitate Cum Glosa Latina Atque Anglosaxonica, ed. Scott Gwara, CCSL 124 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), 
ch.LVII, p.731; translation from Aldhelm: The Prose Works, trans. Michael Lapidge and Michael Herren 
(Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1979), p.127. 
17Defensor’s Liber Scintillarum, with an Interlinear Anglo-Saxon Version Made Early in the Eleventh Century, 
edited by Ernest Wood Rhodes (London: Early English Text Society, 1889). See also Rolf Bremmer,  “The 
Reception of Defensor’s Liber Scintillarum in Anglo-Saxon England,” in un tuo serto di fiori in man recando scritti 
in onore di Maria Amalia D'Aronco, edited by Patrizia Lendinara (Udine, Udine University Press, 2008), 75-89. 
18For the Old English, see A. Hamilton Thomson and Uno Lorenz Lindelöf, Rituale Ecclesiae Dunelmensis: The 
Durham Collectar, A New and Revised Edition of the Latin Text with the Interlinear Anglo-Saxon Version, Surtees 
Society 140 (Durham: Andrews, 1927), 91. For a newer edition of the Latin see The Durham Collectar, edited by 





their rebuke (for example, Paul is said to have quasi compatiens reprehendit, ‘rebuked as if 
compassionating’).19 Besargiendes and þo. (presumably an abbreviation for þoliendes) both gloss 
compatientis in a passage in the prose De Virginitate where David is said to compose a dirge for 
sinful church members while “compatientis affectu” [in a mood of compassion].20 Finally, Ælfric 
provides besargige as an Old English translation of conpatior, which he uses as an example of a 
deponent verb in the Grammatica.21 
Many of the Latin sources associate compassio with pastoral care. The chapter De 
compassione proximi in the Liber Scintillarum compares the virtue to bearing a cross of mental 
rather than physical suffering. The Durham Collectar’s citation of Hebrews 4:15 points to 
Christ’s compassion as a reason that he is suited to be a high priest for humanity, and the 
Benedictine Rule calls on the abbot to imitate Christ’s example by treating fallen brothers with 
compassio. In each case, the ability to exercise compassio and suffer with the afflicted is a sign 
that one has spiritual authority. As I will argue later, one of the key functions of empathy was as 
a precursor to pastoral exercises of rebuke and consolation. In other examples, the pastoral figure 
need not be a pastor but a morally superior individual (such as David and Judith in the prose De 
Virginitate). These instances also depict compassion being shown to a community rather than to 
a single person. 
The evidence suggests that many terms for compassio are highly specialized in nature – 
loan-translations that emphasize the morphemes of the Latin original, largely restricted to Latin 
                                                
19H.D. Meritt, “Old English Glosses to Gregory, Ambrose, and Prudentius,” JEGP 56 (1957): 65-8, 65; Latin text 
Gregory the Great. Regulae pastoralis liber, edited by Bruno Judic, Floribert Romel, and Charles Morel, Régle 
pastorale, trans. Charles Morel, SC 381-82 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992), III.7.21-22, p.288. 
20 Prosa de Virginitate Cum Glosa Latina Atque Anglosaxonica, ed. Gwara, ch.13, p.149; trans. Lapidge and Herren, 
Aldhelm: The Prose Works, 70. 





and religious contexts,22 often referring to the fellow-feeling that a pastoral figure exhibits for 
other Christians. Efenðrowian is a particularly interesting word. It appears to be of earlier origin, 
unlike some of the glosses of later provenance, occurring as early as the translation of the 
Pastoral Care where it refers to how a teacher should be compassionate to all and should 
specifically co-suffer with students in their geswincum or labors.23 In Blickling Homily 2, it 
refers to God having compassion for those who confess their sins and ask for forgiveness, while 
in Blickling 6 it indicates that those who show compassion for the afflictions of others can 
spiritually anoint Christ’s feet.24 The word also appears in two hagiographies. In the anonymous 
Life of St. Mary of Egypt, it describes how the saint has compassion on the steadfastness of 
Zosimus and answers his request for a blessing.25 In the Blickling homily on Peter and Paul, the 
word appears after Peter rebukes a crowd trying to prevent his martyrdom. Peter makes a final 
triumphant prayer of praise to God, thanking him that the Christians formerly under Peter’s care 
now efenþrowiaþ him in his sufferings.26 Given that Peter is currently being crucified, the co-
suffering element of efenþrowiaþ has stronger overtones; this is not merely feeling sad for Peter 
but perhaps suffering with him. It presents a reversal of the typical context in which a pastoral 
figure suffers with a weaker Christian, suggesting reciprocity of compassion in the church. 
Another citation of particular interest is the gloss of Matthew 9:36 in the Rushworth Gospels 
describing Jesus’ pity for the perturbed crowds: “geseah he þa se hælend þa mengu efnþrowade 
                                                
22 In texts where these words are not presented as direct translations of Latin sources, it is likely that their Latin 
source simply has not been identified yet. 
23 Stanley discusses this; see “Did the Anglo-Saxons Have a Social Conscience,” 250: “Ac sie se lareow eallum 
monnum se niehsta eallum monnum efndrowiende on hira gesuincum [Moreover let the teacher be the person 
closest to all, and the one sharing with all in their toilsome difficulties.]” Efenþrowian also appears in the Old 
English Pastoral Care as the heading to chapter 16, “hu se lariow sceal bion eallum monnum efnðrowiende & 
foreðencende on hira earfeðum”; King Alfred’s West-Saxon Version of Gregory’s Pastoral Care, ed. Henry Sweet, 
Early English Text Society 45, 50 (London: N. Trübner and Co., 1871), 12, 13. 
24 The Blickling Homilies, ed. Morris, 15-25, 64-86. 
25 This text uses the variant form emn-þrowigan: “ða ongan heo hire on-emn-þrowigan þæs ealdan witan 
staðolfæstnysse” [then she began to sympathize with the steadfastness of the old wise man] Ælfric’s Lives of Saints, 
ed. Walter Skeat, vol. 2 (London: Early English Text Society, 1881), 16. 





þæm þe hie weron gewælde & liccende swa scep heordeleas” [When he the Savior saw the 
crowd he suffered-with them because they were afflicted and reclining like shepherdless 
sheep.]27 It seems like a textbook example of empathy in Coplan’s terms, suggesting both 
understanding of the afflicted internal state of the people and shared emotion with them 
emphasized by efenðrowian. Some of these texts might have been preached or read to laypeople, 
suggesting that efenðrowian was a term that would be recognizable to them or worth 
communicating as a technical concept.28 
In addition to being translated with calques using mid- and efen-, occasionally compassio 
is translated by words with wider attestation across the Old English corpus that had their 
meaning extended to compassion. Forms of behreowsian are much more prevalent in Old 
English, referring to lamentation or sorrow, often penitential sorrow for one’s own sins as when 
Ælfric writes that “Se man þe nele his synna behreowsian on his life. ne begyt he nane 
forgyfennysse on þam toweardan” [the one who does not wish to sorrow at his sins in this life, he 
will receive no forgiveness in the future].29 As Stanley writes, “in the Modern English words, as 
in the Old English hreow and derivatives, there is a strongly retrospective note of regret, 
compunction, and penitence, as well as of sorrow and grief, but not of compassion.”30 Forms of 
besargung and besargian are also prevalent, but as Stanley notes, they appear after the tenth 
century primarily in Ælfric’s writings, and can refer to feeling grief at one’s own sins or 
misfortunes as well as feeling grief for others. In some of these cases, grieving for another is not 
empathetic: for example, one can grieve for the sins of another even when the other person does 
                                                
27 The Lindisfarne and Rushworth Gospels, Part 1, eds. Joseph Stevenson and George Waring (London, 1854), 92. 
28 The implied audience for Blickling 2 could include laypeople and/or secular clerics, since the homilist enjoins 
people not to pray for worldly wealth, which would not even be an option if they were truly observant monks; see 
Morris, The Blickling Homilies, 21. Blickling 6 is a homily for Palm Sunday, a liturgical season in which laypeople 
frequently participated, and so might have been preached to laypeople.  
29 Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies, the First Series, ed. Clemoes, 332. 





not grieve at these sins; in this case, there is not shared emotion. Context must determine whether 
besargung, besargian, or behreowsian refer to empathy.31 
Terms for condolere are similarly limited. Samodsargiende appears in a hymn gloss 
which describes God as “samodsargiende weorulde on forwyrd deaðes,” sorrowing jointly with 
the world in the perdition of death. Besargiende glosses the same hymn in a different manuscript, 
and besargian occurs in chapter 45 of the Liber Scintillarum paraphrasing the command of 
Romans 12:15 to “<besargian> on fremedum yrmþum” – sorrow in others’ miseries. In all of 
these instances, the word does seem to refer to being sorry for another rather than for oneself, but 
also being sorry with another. Empathy vocabulary is often nonspecific as to target or 
directionality. 
The Thesaurus of Old English offers an additional source for locating words for fellow-
feeling; by gathering all of the Old English words that have been associated with the concept, it 
provides a base for semantic field studies that can articulate the overlapping or diverging senses 
of these. The evidence of the Thesaurus offers a few additional words for compassion or fellow-
feeling, in particular words from Old English whose meanings are extended to refer to 
compassion, evidence that is consistent with the semantic range of compassio presented by the 
Old English loan-translations. The table below lists the words associated with compassion in the 
Thesaurus: 
Table 2: words associated with compassion in the Thesaurus of Old English 
compassion besargung, earming, efensargung, efenðrowung, midðrowung, 
(ge)miltsung, ofearmung, geðoht 
compassionate efensarig, mildheort 
 
                                                











behreowsian, bemanan, besargian (be/for), efensargian, efensorgian, 
efenðrowian, midðolian, gemiltsian, ofearmian, onemnðrowigan, 
geðrowian 
 
to remember with 
compassion/kindness 
gemyndgian 




In many cases, the Thesaurus entries appear to be based on attested translations or on the 
compilers’ interpretation of the context of OE attestations that do not involve a translation from 
Latin. E.G. Stanley writes of the Thesaurus’ entries on compassion that “There is little point in 
listing all the words that have been discarded as not truly in Anglo-Saxon usage, as far as we can 
tell, or as not truly expressive of pity or compassion.”32 Indeed, not all of these words truly seem 
to be definitively associated with compassion, and some may have been included in the 
Thesaurus based on the interpretive choices of the drafters of the entries. For example, 
gemiltsian frequently means ‘to show mercy’ rather than compassion, and Stanley suggests that 
it is associated with compassion in the Thesaurus primarily because of Bosworth and Toller’s 
dictionary.33 Sarian seems to refer to sorrowing in general rather than empathetic sorrow in 
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particular. Similarly, mildheort and related terms can refer to mercy or pity as well as 
compassion. Other words such as ofearmung are found exclusively in glosses and as such are 
unlikely to represent terms prevalent in Anglo-Saxon consciousness. Efensargung appears once, 
in the Old English translation of Gregory’s Dialogues, and describes a moment of pastoral 
empathy when the bishop Paulinus has compassion on a widow whose son has been sold into 
slavery.34 Forms of efensargian and the related efensorgian also occur in the Dialogues to 
translate the compassion that Quadragesimus feels for another bereft widow before he heals her 
son and the sadness Gregory feels for a monk who has died in sin.35 Efensargian also appears 
twice in the Life of Euphrosyne, both times to describe the abbot lamenting with the sorrowing 
Paphnutius – first when his wife is barren and then when he is disconsolate at the disappearance 
of his daughter.36 These instances do seem to move beyond showing mercy to indicate empathy. 
Efensargian is also used negatively in the Dialogues, to indicate an instance in which 
holy men should not sympathize. It occurs in the context of a wider discussion in Book IV about 
how the saved will see the damned in torment and be filled with gratitude toward God. Gregory 
explains that holy men will not pray for the damned at that time, just as they do not pray in this 
life for those who have died to damnation. By this account, says Gregory, if even holy men do 
not efnsargiað the damned, how much more will justice cause them not to be sorry for the 
damned in the next life?37 Gregory’s explanation highlights that fellow-feeling was not to be 
universally applied to all those suffering – a reminder that empathy can also exclude others. In 
Chapters 3 and 4, I will discuss Anglo-Saxon texts that seem to diverge from Gregory’s position 
                                                
34 Bischofs Waerferth von Worcester Übersetzung der Dialoge Gregors des Grossen über das Leben und die 
Wunderthaten italienischer Väter und über die Unsterblichkeit der Seelen, ed. Hans Hecht, Bibliothek der 
Angelsächsischen Prosa (Leipzig, 1900), 216. 
35 Bischofs Waerferth von Worcester, ed. Hecht, 216, 345. However, given Gregory’s comment discussed below 
about the righteous not compassionating the damned, the word here may refer to pity rather than compassionate 
fellow-feeling. 
36 Ælfric’s Lives of Saints, ed. Walter Skeat (London, Early English Text Society, 1881), XXXIII.336. 





by inviting limited empathy with the damned and even with Satan, a reminder that different 
perspectives on empathy existed within Anglo-Saxon England.   
Two other words not connected with compassio in the Dictionary of Old English Corpus 
or the Thesaurus of Old English appear in places that suggest empathy. In Book 5, chapter 2 of 
the Old English translation of Bede’s Ecclesiastical History, the bishop John 
“wæs…eefengefeonde” after miraculously healing a leper of muteness.38 Before noting that the 
bishop was eefengefeonde, the passage tells of how the newly-healed man runs about speaking to 
others like the lame man that Peter and John heal in Acts 3. It is small wonder, Bede says, that 
the beggar in Acts was gefeonde in the use of his feet. The narrative continues to explain that the 
bishop was eefengefeonde in the healing of the mute man. Eefengefeonde echoes gefeonde, 
which refers to the mute man of the story and to the lame man of Acts. The word appears to be a 
direct translation of congaudens in the Latin version of the story.39 It shows that vocabulary 
existed to describe empathizing in specific states, including positive emotion as well as negative 
emotion. 
The second word is gefelan, which the Dictionary of Old English defines in one sense as 
“to feel, sense, empathize with (someone else’s suffering acc.).”40 Typically the word refers to 
sensory perception, especially feeling (including pain), taste, or sight. The one citation provided 
for gefelan as empathizing occurs in Christ III: 
gesegun þa dumban gesceaft, 
eorðan ealgrene     ond uprodor, 
forhte gefelan     frean þrowinga, 
                                                
38 The Old English Version of Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People, ed. Thomas Miller (London: 
Early English Text Society, 1890), 390.  
39 Bede’s Ecclesiastical History, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
458-59. 





ond mid cearum cwiðdun,     þeah hi cwice næron, 
þa <hyra> scyppend     sceaþan onfengon 
syngum hondum.41 
[ll. 1127, 1129-1132; I saw the mute creation, green earth and upper heavens, feel 
in fear the sufferings of the Lord, and lament with sorrows, although they were 
not alive, when harmful ones seized their Creator with sinful hands.] 
The poem continues to elaborate on what gefelan means: the sun is hidden, rocks and stones 
burst, the earth shakes “egsan myrde” [l. 1143; disturbed by fear], the sea rushes onto the land, 
the stars fall, trees weep bloody tears.42 The passage concludes with an envelope statement that 
no one can tell “hu fela þa onfunden þa gefelan ne magun / dryhtnes þrowinga, deade gesceafte” 
[ll. 1178-79; how many things they perceived of the sufferings of the lord, dead creatures which 
may not feel], making a clever verbal play on fela and gefelan. The poem’s description of an 
emotionally responsive creation dilates dramatically on its source, Gregory’s Homiliae in 
Evangelia X.43 The environment responds to the sufferings of Christ through emotion that 
                                                
41 The Exeter Book, ed. George Philip Krapp and Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie, The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records 3 
(Columbia U. Press, 1936). All poems from the Exeter Book are cited parenthetically by line number from this 
edition. 
42 For a reading of these tears as empathetic, see Frances McCormack, “Those Bloody Trees: The Affectivity of 
Christ III,” in Anglo-Saxon Emotions, ed. Alice Jorgensen, Frances McCormack, and Jonathan Wilcox (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2015), 143-61. 
43 Gregory writes, “Sed in omnibus signis quae uel nascente Domino, uel moriente monstrata sunt, considerandum 
nobis est quanta fuerit in quorumdam Iudaeorum corde duritia, quae hunc nec per prophetiae donum, nec per 
miracula agnouit. Omnia quippe elementa autorem suum uenisse testata sunt. Vt enim de eis quiddam usu humano 
loaquar, Deum hunc caeli esse cognouerunt, quia protinus stellam miserunt. Mare cognouit, quia sub plantis eius se 
calcabile praebuit. Terra cognouit, quia eo moriente contremuit. Sol cognouit, quia lucis suae radios abscondit. Saxa 
et parietes cognouerunt, quia tempore mortis eius scissa sunt. Infernus agnouit, quia hos qus tenebat mortuos 
reddidit. Et tamen hunc quem Deum omnia insensibilia elementa senserutn, adhuc infidelium Iudaeorum corda 
Deum esse minime cognoscunt, et duriora saxis scindi ad paenitendum nolunt, eumque confiteri abnegant, quem 
elementa, ut diximus, aut signis ut scissionibus Deum clamant,” [But with all these signs that were manifested either 
when the Lord was born of when he died, we must note the great hardness of heart of some of the Jewish people. 
They failed to recognize him etiher by the gift of prophecy or by his miracles. In truth all the elements bore witness 
that their creator had come. Indeed, to speak of them in a human way, the heavens knew that he was God because 
they immediately sent forth a star, the sea knew him because it allowed him to walk upon it; the earth knew him 
because it trembled when he died; the sun knew him because it hid the rays of its light; the stones and walls of 





manifests physically by breaking objects, exceeding bounds, producing unnatural tears, and 
shaking with fear. The poet indicates the oddity of this response from an entity that is not alive 
and cannot gefelan in the sense of sensory perception. Given the prevalence of emotion words 
used in this passage, gefelan must indicate an emotional solidarity that creation shows with 
Christ, filling in for the empathy that humans ought to be showing for his suffering. Gefelan here 
does not seem to directly lexicalize empathy; however, there seems to be a kind of unexpressed 
cause-and effect link between feeling and lamentation requiring a concept of empathy to be 
supplied in order to connect the two. This example of gefelan being used in a situation where 
creation shows empathy reveals how a concept of fellow-feeling exists, even if empathy was not 
directly lexicalized. 
 Thus, the OE lexicon of empathy represents an ambiguous body of evidence for the 
concept of fellow-feeling in Anglo-Saxon England. It suggests two approaches to 
communicating fellow-feeling: using loan-translations, particularly when translating Latin texts, 
or using more general emotion words such as sarian or behreowian in contexts that indicate 
feeling with another. Unfortunately, many terms such as efenðrowian and eefengefeonde when 
interpreted in context are ambiguous. Yet what we can determine from context suggests a wide 
range of applications for empathy: it can be exercised by and for individuals and communities, 
general types of people or specific individuals, superiors and inferiors (although it is often 
exercised by a pastoral or exemplary figure for someone beneath them). The use of words such 
as gefelan and efenðrowian to apply to both physical and emotional states suggests that empathy 
                                                                                                                                                       
up the dead it was holding; and yet the hearts of the Jews remained full of unbelief, and did not know that hew as 
God, although all the dumb elements perceived him as Lord. Harder than stones, they were unwilling to be broken 
for repentance, and they refused to acknowledge him whom, as I have said, the elements proclaimed to be God 
either by their signs or being broken]; Homiliae in Evangelium, ed. R. Etaix, CCSL 141 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 
X.2.20-35, p. 66-67; translation Gregory the Great: Forty Gospel Homilies, trans. Dom David Hurst (Kalamazoo, 





could be associated with bodily experience and involve sharing physical states. This is a more 
tentative suggestion, but consonant with work such as Leslie Lockett’s on how the Anglo-Saxons 
conceived of emotions as embodied.44 Some Latin texts known to the Anglo-Saxons that portray 
examples of fellow-feeling (often exhibited by a pastoral or exemplary figure for the less 
fortunate), however, do offer a basis for fellow-feeling and can shed light on the role of empathy 
in Anglo-Saxon England. 
Biblical Bases 
 The Bible is another important source for concepts of empathy that might have been 
taken up in Anglo-Saxon England. As noted, forms of compassio or compati appear relatively 
rarely in the Vulgate. However, a few key Scriptural passages speak to the importance of fellow-
feeling in early Christianity. These scriptural bases for a concept of empathy show that 
recognizing and sharing in the emotions of other believers was part of being a good Christian and 
a mark of the bond between members of the church. These passages also point to Christ’s 
incarnation as one of the key bases enabling fellow-feeling among believers. While they are 
directly invoked only sporadically in Anglo-Saxon writings, they would nonetheless have been 
widely available. 
 One of the most well-known incitements to altruistic action in Christianity (and other 
religions) is the Golden Rule, which is formulated in Matthew 7:12 as “omnia ergo quaecumque 
vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite eis haec est enim lex et prophetae” [All things 
therefore whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the 
law and the prophets]. Three versions of this rule appear in Christian Scriptures: Matthew 7:12; 
Luke 6:31, “et prout vultis ut faciant vobis homines et vos facite illis similiter” [And as you 
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would that men should do to you, do you also to them in like manner]; and a negative 
formulation in Tobit 4:16, “quod ab alio odis fieri tibi vide ne alteri tu aliquando facias” [See 
thou never do to another what thou wouldst hate to have done to thee by another].45 The negative 
formulation of the rule in particular also appears in Western additions to Acts, and in many 
patristic sources.46 The Golden Rule is cited proverbially in letters and other texts, and 
commented on by patristic heavyweights such as Augustine, Gregory, and Isidore, the latter two 
particularly well-known in Anglo-Saxon England.47 In the Liber Scintillarum, it appears as one 
of the first quotations to comment on the virtue of compassione proximi or ‘compassion for a 
neighbor.’ It was also discussed by Carolingian commentators such as Hrabanus Maurus, who 
related the Golden Rule to the commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself.48 In the Anglo-
Latin corpus, Bede discusses Luke 6:31 in his commentary on Luke, commenting on how it was 
not to be directed only toward good neighbors.49 It appears in the Rule of St. Benedict as 
Benedict describes how abbots should not take in monks who have left another recognized 
monastery without permission from the monk’s former abbot, and one late manuscript with 
English ties contains marginal glossing that highlights how the Golden Rule applies to other 
aspects of the Rule of St. Benedict.50 In its negative formulation it also explains why a monk 
                                                
45 Sadly, Bede’s commentary on Tobit does not gloss any of chapter 4, so we do not know what this exegete would 
have said about the Golden Rule in this book. See also E. Cuthbert Butler, “The Rule of St. Benedict,” The Journal 
of Theological Studies 11.42 (January 1910), 279-88, and “The Rule of Benedict. III: The Instruments of Good 
Works,” The Journal of Theological Studies 12.46 (January 1911), 261-68. 
46 Butler, “The Rule of St. Benedict,” 283-85. 
47 Ibid. 
48 “Dum uero expressius ab hominibus dictum est ‘Omnia quaecumque uultis ut faciant uobis homines, ita et uos 
facite illis’, nihil aliud dictum uidetur quam Diliges proximum tuum sicut te ipsum” [But while more prominently 
concerning men it has been said, ‘whatever you desire men to do for you, consequently you do for them,’ nothing 
else seems to have been said than love your neighbor as yourself.] Hrabanus Maurus, Expositio in Matthaeum, 
edited by Bengt Löfstedt, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis 174, Book 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000) 
210, lines 44-46. Hrabanus draws here on Augustine’s De Sermone Domini in Monte II.22.75, ed. A. Mutzenberger, 
CCSL 35 (Turnhout: Bepols, 1967), p.173, l.1725-29. 
49 Bede, In Lucae Evangelium Expositio, ed. D. Hurst, CCSL 120 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1960), 144-45. 
50 RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict in Latin and English with Notes, trans. Timothy Fry (Collegeville, MN: 





should not harshly treat a brother without the abbot’s permission.51 Other references to the 
Golden Rule in Old English present it as a foundational law: it appears in the preface to Alfred’s 
law code as one of the bases of law, in Napier 51 at the beginning of Wulfstan’s list of laws to be 
obeyed, in Bethurum Xc as one of the key rules of the Mosaic law, and in Assmann 11 as part of 
the foundational commands that Christians must follow to attain eternal life and that teachers 
must instruct them in.52 In the Ecclesiastical Institutes, it is provided as a reason why priests 
should be satisfied with the tithes they receive from their church,53 and Ælfric describes it as 
“gecyndelic æ,” the natural law, at the conclusion of his homily on the Forty Soldiers.54 Given its 
prevalence and its citation in legal texts, one might expect the Golden Rule to also be a 
foundation for empathetic feeling in Anglo-Saxon England. 
However, closer inspection of the Rule and of these Old English instances suggests that it 
reflects less a sense of empathy and more of a self-centered outlook. First, the Old English 
citations emphasize the Rule in non-empathetic contexts: Alfred quotes it in its negative 
formulation in a way that emphasizes ‘do no harm’ rather than ‘show empathy,’ and Napier 51 
focuses on the need to command rules to others that one would want to follow. Though the 
Golden Rule might be a moral basis for law, it does not seem to be a fruitful basis for empathy in 
Anglo-Saxon England. Further, Bill Puka points out that the Golden Rule is not particularly 
empathetic in itself: 
                                                                                                                                                       
Activity? Post-Conquest Old English Readers and their Notes,” in Saints and Scholars: New Perspectives on Anglo-
Saxon Literature and Culture, edited by Stuart McWilliams (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2012), 224-33. 
51 RB 1980, p.292-93. 
52 The philosophy that the Golden Rule is a precept of natural law extends at least to early Christianity. For a 
discussion of the Golden Rule in late antiquity and early Christianity, see Albrecht Dihle, Die Goldene Regel: Eine 
Enführung in die Geschichte der antiken und frühchristlichen Vulgärethik (Göttingen, 1962), esp. 103-108. The 
Homilies of Wulfstan, ed. Dorothy Bethurum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 201; Wulfstan: Sammlung der ihm 
zugeschriebenen Homilien nebst Untersuchungen über ihre Echtheit, ed. Napier, 274; Die Gesetze der 
Angelsachsen, edited by Felix Lieberman, (Halle a.S., M. Niemeyer, 1903-16) [Reprinted Aalen 1960], 26-46, 49.5; 
Angelsächsische Homilien und Heiligenleben, ed. Bruno Assmann (Kassel, 1889), 139: “ðæt is on urum geðeode: 
Don ge oðrum mannum ælc ðara ðinga, ðe ge willan, ðæt hy eow don.” 
53 See Benjamin Thorpe, ed., Ancient Laws and Institutes of England (London, 1840), 474. 





The golden rule’s (emotional) empathy component is as unclear as its role-taking 
component. . . . More, in any relevant context, the golden rule urges to think before we 
act, then imagine how we would feel, not how the other would. Thus any empathy 
involved would involve imaginatively ‘feeling with’ myself, at a future time, recipient of 
another’s similar action. The point here is to supplant the other’s perspective and 
imagined reaction with our own. This is not how one empathizes.55 
As Puka emphasizes, the Golden Rule enjoins people to focus on their own response, to do for 
others as they themselves would want rather than as the other might want. It need not require 
imagining the emotions of others. 
 But if the Golden Rule does not require fellow-feeling, there are other Biblical passages 
that do reference and even encourage empathy more explicitly. 1 Peter 3:8 calls on Christians to 
be conpatientes, or co-suffering, in a list of others-oriented virtues that Christians are to show to 
one another. A more well-known passage is Romans 12:15, which enjoins Christians to “gaudere 
cum gaudentibus; flere cum flentibus” [rejoice with them that rejoice; weep with them that 
weep]. As a command to believers to share in the emotions of others, this verse indicates that 
sharing in emotions is not only possible but also necessary. One might be able to rejoice or weep 
without understanding or sharing the perspective of the other, but one would still have to display 
convergent emotion, reflected by using the same verbs to express the reaction required. The 
command also suggests an element of performance because it requires actions rather than states 
(although one could move from performing the emotion to acquiring the emotional disposition). 
It presents a biblical basis for sharing in the emotions of others (typically other Christians), one 
                                                






based not on personal gain but on obedience. Its interpretation in Anglo-Saxon England may say 
much about how the Anglo-Saxons viewed the Latin ethic of compassion. 
 Romans 12:15 is referenced in several works produced by or known to the Anglo-Saxons. 
It is cited in some major patristic works known in Anglo-Saxon England, including Isidore’s 
Synonyma and Cassiodorus’ Expositio Psalmorum. It also serves as one of the opening scriptural 
citations in the chapter of the Liber Scintillarum devoted to compassio proximi, immediately 
following the Golden Rule as one of the foundational commandments on compassio.56 Bede 
quotes the verse in Homiliae Evangelii 2.12: 
habent sancti etiam in praesenti gaudium de spe caelestium bonorum cum pro domino 
terrenis exercentur aduersis habent gaudium cum amore fraternitatis suadente discunt 
gaudere cum gaudentibus flere cum flentibus. 57  
[Even in the present [life] the saints possess joy from their hope of heavenly goods when 
they are harassed by earthly adversities for the Lord’s sake; they possess joy when, 
persuaded by love for their brothers, they learn to rejoice with those who rejoice, to weep 
with those who weep.] 
Bede presents empathy as an ability that can be learned or acquired by training – particularly, the 
training of hardships and the persuasion of brotherly love – rather than as a state that 
spontaneously occurs when observing someone who is rejoicing or weeping. This view of 
fellow-feeling as a skill is notably also found in Gregory, as I will develop in Chapter 3. 
                                                
56 Defensor’s Liber Scintillarum, ed. Rhodes, 147. In addition, this chapter cites the Golden Rule, which could 
suggest that, despite Puka’s reservations, some in the Middle Ages may have seen it as a foundation for empathy. 
57 Bede, Homiliarum euangelii libri ii, ed. D. Hurst, CCSL 122 (Turnhout, Brepols, 1955), 1-378; Book 2, Homily 
12, p. 262. Translation is from Bede the Venerable, Homilies on the Gospels Book Two, translated by Lawrence T. 
Martin and David Hurst (Kalamazoo, Cistercian Publications, 1991), 110. Bede continues here to say that the joy 
described in this verse “is not full joy, because it is intermingled with alternating weeping. Full joy occurs when no 
one weeps, when it is given to rejoice with those who only rejoice,” Bede the Venerable, 110. It suggests that 





Romans 12:15 also appears to be adapted as a trope in episcopal letters associated with 
Anglo-Saxon missionary activity on the Continent. For example, when several bishops wrote a 
letter to King Æthelbald of Mercia c. 745 to rebuke his behavior, they softened the blow by 
expressing emotional solidarity with him in his fortunes: “gaudio vestro in Dei voluntate 
congaudemus et adversitate contristamur.”58 Further, the English archbishop Cuthbert writes in a 
letter to bishop Lul, “Quando autem aliqua religioni vestrae iniuria facta aut aliquod inrogatum 
narratur damnum, meror et tristitia nos cruciat, quia nimirum, sicut gaudio vestro in Christo 
congaudemus, ita et adversitate pro Christo contristati conpatimur.”59 If this formula is 
conventional, it nevertheless represents an understanding about fellow-feeling as a virtue, as well 
as the sense that appealing to fellow-feeling can be used as a rhetorical strategy to establish 
solidarity whether as a preface to rebuke (in the case of the letter to Æthelbald) or as a preamble 
to consolation (in the case of Cuthbert’s letter to Lul).60 It represents an example of fellow-
feeling as a unifying strategy, one which brings together a Christian body that is scattered across 
space, as a preface to instruction. In this way it reflects strategies I will later discuss in homilies 
that employ the homiletic we to build a sense of community.  
There is also an explicit evocation of Romans 12:15 in an Old English text: in Blickling 
6, a homily for Palm Sunday. The homily interprets the early events of Holy Week with a heavy 
moral emphasis; for example, at Jesus’ dinner at Mary and Martha’s house, Martha represents 
                                                
58 “in the will of God we co-rejoice over your happiness and are co-saddened by your adversity,” M. Tangl, Die 
Briefe des heiligen Bonifatius (Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1916) Letter 73, p.147. This letter includes 
similar language to Letter 111 cited below, including the statement that “meror et tristitia nos cruciat” when they 
hear of misfortune befalling them, suggesting that this could be formulaic (although a search of Tangl’s edition in 
MGH reveals that only these two letters have the phrase “tristitia nos cruciat”). 
59 “Moreover, when some injury to your religious self has been done or some loss inflicted is told, sorrow and 
sadness torment us, because without doubt, just as we co-rejoice with your joy in Christ, so we co-suffer, co-
saddened in adversity for Christ.” Tangl, Die Briefe des heiligen Bonifatius, Letter 111, p. 239.   
60 See Barbara Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 135-36 for a discussion of conventional emotional formula in “late antique” letters and 27-29 on why such 





holy church, and the individual believer imitates her by preparing a clean heart in which Christ 
can dwell. The homilist glosses Mary’s act of anointing Jesus’ feet as an example of correct 
living and correct teaching, before moving into an application that cites Romans 12:15: 
Nu we sceolan onherian Marian þære þe smerede Hælendes fet, & mid hire locum 
drygde; þæt is þonne, þæt we sceolan god weorc wyricean, & rihtlice libban, þonne fylge 
we Drihtnes swæþe, þæt is gif we oþre men teala læraþ, & hie be urum larum rihtlice for 
Gode libbaþ, þonne bringe we Drihtne swetne stenc on urum dædum & larum. Swa 
Paulus se apostol cwæþ, ‘Drihtnes fet we magon smerian, gif we willaþ oþrum 
geleaffullum teala don, & helpan þas earman se þe bet mæge, & beon symle 
efenþrowgende oþres earfoþum, swylce eac on oþres gode beon swiþe gefeonde.61 
[Now we ought to imitate Mary who anointed the feet of the Savior, and dried with her 
locks; that is then, that we must work good works, and live rightly; then we follow the 
track of the Lord, that is if we teach other men well, and they live rightly for God because 
of our teaching, then we bring to the Lord a sweet odor in our deeds and teaching. So 
Paul the apostle said, “We may anoint the Lord’s feet if we will do well to other believing 
ones, and help the wretched (he who best may), and be always co-suffering with the 
afflictions of the other, and so also be exceedingly rejoicing in the good of the other.] 
Obedience here equals imitation not only of Mary but also of Christ, following in his swæþ or 
track. But imitation does not require empathizing with Mary’s point of view; rather, the audience 
is called through Paul’s quotation to show empathy for suffering believers. This sympathy with 
other members of the church – suffering with the suffering, rejoicing with the successful – is 
equivalent to anointing the body of Christ himself, and although the homily does not spell out the 
familiar exegetical equation of Christ’s body and the church (an equation I will discuss further 
                                                





below), it would be implicit to more educated readers. For some exegetes, Christ’s feet were 
associated with his humanity, adding another layer of complexity to this image: if empathy for 
the suffering was a way of anointing Christ’s feet, it was also a way of acknowledging Christ’s 
human connection to the suffering humans who made up the body of Christ.62 If the implied 
audience of Blickling 6 included laypeople, then this citation would show that fellow-feeling was 
not only an esoteric Latin concept studied and discussed by clerics and monks, but a practical 
virtue commanded to laypeople. As Milton C. McGatch points out, the audience of the Blickling 
Homilies in general seems unknowable, and one can only speculate if the sermon was intended 
for laypeople or to be preached at all.63 However, since Blickling 6 was a homily for Palm 
Sunday, a festival that may have included lay participation, it seems more possible that Blickling 
6 could have been read to a mixed audience.64 
 This passage from Blickling 6 connects fellow-feeling for other believers with bodily 
care (in this case, for Christ), placing it in a complex web of associations between sympathy, the 
physical body of Christ, and the mystical body of Christ’s church, in which individuals possess 
differing roles as limbs. The association of Christians with Christ’s body appears throughout the 
New Testament but is developed most thoroughly in 1 Corinthians 12:24b-27, in a chapter which 
also uses a form of compatior in a discussion of how each member of the body is affected by the 
others: 
sed Deus temperavit corpus ei cui deerat abundantiorem tribuendo honorem ut non sit 
scisma in corpore sed id ipsum pro invicem sollicita sint membra et si quid patitur unum 
                                                
62 For example, Bede glosses Christ’s feet this way in In Lucae Evangelium Expositio, ed. D. Hurst, 167: “quidem 
incarnationis eius quae pedum nomine designatur”  [certainly his incarnation is designated by the name of feet]. See 
also Thomas D. Hill, “Byrht word and Hælendes heafod: Christological Allusion in the OE Christ and Satan,” 
English Language Notes 8 (1970-71): 6-9. 
63 See McGatch, “The Unknowable Audience of the Blickling Homilies.” 
64 For a discussion of the possibility of lay participation in Palm Sunday processions, see M. Bradford Bedingfield, 





membrum conpatiuntur omnia membra sive gloriatur unum membrum congaudent omnia 
membra vos autem estis corpus Christi et membra de membro. 
[but God hath tempered the body together, giving to that which wanted the more 
abundant honour, That there might be no schism in the body; but the members might be 
mutually careful one for another. And if one member suffer any thing, all the members 
suffer with it; or if one member glory, all the members rejoice with it. Now you are the 
body of Christ, and members of member.] 
The passage builds up to the assertion that the audience (and by extension, all Christians) are 
members of a universal body and parts of one another as much as they are of a unitary whole, 
membra de membro. Working in reverse, the text explains the corollaries of this identity before 
stating it as the summation. As members of the body, Christians have been joined by a divine 
purpose that accords differing abilities, roles, and honors (justifying religious hierarchy); scisma 
or schism is contrary to this purpose and would be equivalent in this image to rending the body 
of Christ, a blasphemous act. Instead, believers are to be ‘mutually careful’ or sollicita, which 
could also be rendered ‘mutually concerned’ or even ‘mutually disturbed,’ suggesting a sense of 
motion (or emotion) affecting one because of the other. The actions that accompany sollicita are 
elaborated afterward: suffering with the suffering and rejoicing with the rejoicing, as in Romans 
12:16, reflected in conpatiuntur and congaudent. This passage presents empathy as a natural 
corollary of belonging to a larger, connected system; to sympathize with another Christian is to 
prove that one is part of the body of the universal church. Yet it also complicates the idea of 
empathy by implying that empathizing with another is fundamentally egocentric, empathizing 
with a part of oneself. Archbishop Fulk of Rheims draws on this topos in a letter to Alfred, 





patiente compatiuntur caetera membra” [“the members are mutually careful one for another, and 
if one member rejoices, all rejoice, or if one suffers, all members suffer”].65 He uses it as 
justification for requiring Alfred to allow Grimbald to teach unhindered and to punish those who 
disobey him – in order words, to join civil authority to the ecclesiastical authority of Grimbald. 
The bodily image could thus unite not only members of the church but secular and spiritual 
concerns as limbs of the same entity. 
The concept of Christians as limbs of the body appears throughout the Old English 
homiletic corpus, although the idea for this image occurs throughout the Bible and the homiletic 
references cannot always be directly attributed to 1 Corinthians 12. The body imagery could be 
implicit, as in the earlier quotation from Blickling 6 that referred to caring for the needy as 
anointing Christ’s feet, since indigent Christians were part of the mystical body. It also appears 
in the writings of Ælfric and Wulfstan. In particular, Ælfric uses the metaphor of Christians as 
limbs of Christ for a variety of purposes, from explaining finer theological points (as in Catholic 
Homilies 2:28) to enjoining brotherly love (as in Catholic Homilies 1:19) to encouraging bodily 
purity (as in Catholic Homilies 2:32). Ælfric even applies the head and limbs analogy to the 
wicked as the limbs of the devil and to the limbs described in Matthew 5 as friends and family 
who lead one astray from obedience and need to be amputated. 
Catholic Homilies 1:19, an explanation of the Paternoster, uses the head-and-limb 
analogy at length while connecting it to empathy. First, in interpreting the “ure fæder” clause of 
the Paternoster, Ælfric explains that Christians are sons of God and brothers of Christ if their 
conduct honors him. Then he writes, 
Crist is ure heafod & we sind his lima: he is mid ure menniscnysse befangen & he hæfð 
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urne lichaman. þone ðe he of þam halgan mædene marian genam; for þi we magon 
cuðlice to him clypian swa swa to urum breþer. gif we þa broðerrædene swa healdað swa 
swa he us tæhte. þæt is þæt we ne sceolon na geþafian. þæt deofol mid ænigum 
unþeawum us geweme fram cristes broþorrædene.”66 
[Christ is our head, and we are his limbs: he is enclosed with our humanity, and he has 
our body, which he received from the holy maiden Mary; therefore we may certainly call 
to him, just as to our brother, if we thus hold the brotherly-fellowship just as he taught us; 
that is, that we should not permit that the devil with any sins should turn us from Christ’s 
brotherly-fellowship]. 
Thus Christians are not only brothers but also limbs because Christ took menniscnysse, including 
a body. His possession of a body – specifically, urne lichaman – enables his connection with 
humanity and allows humans to call to him; shared bodily experience is a mark of brotherhood 
just as shared purity of conduct is the mark of broþorrædene. To hold this fellowship with Christ 
is to hold fellowship according to Christ’s teachings, suggesting that the body is also joined in 
obedience. Ælfric goes on to stress the equality of rich and poor as limbs within the body and 
children of one Father. Later, he uses the head-and-limbs connection to support hierarchical 
relations within the church and between Christians and Christ, drawing on ideas of the church-
as-body presented in 1 Corinthians 12: 
Se bið ðin hand. oððe þin fot. se þe ðe þine neoda deð; Se bið ðin eage se þe ðe wisdom 
tæcð. & on rihtum wege ðe gebrincð; Se þe ðe mundað. swa swa fæder. he bið swilce he 
þin heafod sy; Eallswa wel behofað þæt heafod þæra oðra lima. swa swa þa lymu 
behofiað þæs heafdes; Gif an lim bið untrum ealle þa oðre þrowiað mid þam anum; Swa 
we sceolon eac gif bið án ure geferena on sumere earfoðnysse. ealle we sceolon his yfel 
                                                





besargian. & hogian ymbe þa bote gif we hit gebetan magon.67 
[He is your hand or your foot who supplies your needs. He is your eye who teaches you 
wisdom, and brings you on the right way. He who reminds you just as a father, he is as 
though he were your head. Just as well as the head needs the other limbs, just so the limbs 
need the head. If one limb is unsound, all the others suffer with the one. So we must also, 
if one of our companions is in some affliction, we must all commiserate his evil, and 
consider the remedy, if we may improve it.] 
The limbs share in sickness and þrowiað together as parts united in a corporeal whole, serving as 
an analogy for the way that believers should commiserate with and actively seek to remedy one 
another’s troubles. However, although the body imagery naturalizes the idea of fellow-feeling 
(the body parts cannot prevent themselves from sharing in the sickness of another part) and of 
hierarchical obedience (the other parts of the body must serve the head), the homily itself must 
turn to enjoining fellow-feeling rather than expecting it to exist, suggesting that fellow-feeling is 
not a natural state for humans, but one that Christians must actively cultivate. In the call to 
besargian, the homily suggests that convergent emotion can be elicited (or else it would not be 
commanded) and that it is a necessary corollary of being a united community.  
 The first lyric of Christ I employs the head-and-limbs metaphor in poetry, invoking it in 
the context of petition to Christ to have pity on humanity: 
  He þæt hra gescop, 
 leomo læmena;     nu sceal liffrea 
 þone wergan heap     wraþum ahreddan, 
 earme from egsan,     swa he oft dyde. 
[ll. 14-17, He shaped that body, the limbs from clay; now the Lord of life shall save the 
                                                





weary multitude from wrath, the wretched from terror, as he often did] 
Earlier in the lyric, Christ is described as the “heafod . . . healle mærre” [l.4; head . . . of the great 
hall, 4] referring directly to the headstone of the source text68 but anticipating the head and limbs 
analogy that follows. The lyric playfully situates church both as building and body, structurally 
and biologically dependent on a Head whom they ask to save them out of creatorly compassion. 
 This topos of the head-and-limbs enabling empathy is related to what Richard Morrison 
describes as the “biological paradigm” of empathy, which sees a basis for fellow-feeling in a 
metonymic relationship between part and whole.69 Morrison’s metaphor turns “fellow” feeling 
into feeling for oneself, since feeling for another part of the same body is to feel for oneself as a 
member of this body. Thus, in a move similar to the Golden Rule, the biological paradigm 
complicates the lines between empathetic compassion and self-serving behavior demarcated by 
contemporary empathy theorists. The head-and-limbs topos also relates to the concept of the 
communion of saints bound together into a community across space and time – a concept that 
influences everything from the design of churches to liturgical reenactment.70 
In addition to offering instruction and commands about sharing others’ emotions, the 
Bible contains exempla of people who showed compassionate fellow-feeling. Unsurprisingly, the 
                                                
68 For discussions of the antiphonal sources, see Albert Stanburrough Cook, The Christ of Cynewulf (Boston: 
Athenaeum Press, 1900), xxxv–xliii; Jackson Campbell, The Advent Lyrics of the Exeter Book (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 6–34; Dom Edward Burgart, The Dependence of Part I of Cynewulf’s Christ upon the 
Antiphonary (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1921). For other key readings, see Sarah Larratt Keefer, 
“The ‘Techne’ of the Christ I Poet,” Neophilologus 62 (1978): 447-54; Johanna Kramer, “‘Ðu eart se weallstan’: 
Architectural Metaphor and Christological Imagery in the Old English Christ I and the Book of Kells,” in Source of 
Wisdom: Old English and Early Medieval Latin Studies in Honour of Thomas D. Hill, eds. Charles D. Wright, 
Frederick M. Biggs, and Thomas N. Hall (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 90-112; and Mercedes 
Salvador-Bello, “Architectural Metaphors and Christological Imagery in the Advent Lyrics: Benedictine Propaganda 
in the Exeter Book?” in Conversion and Colonization in Anglo-Saxon England, eds. Catherine E. Karkov and 
Nicholas Howe (Tempe, Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2006), 169-211. 
69 Morrison, ‘I Am You’: The Hermeneutics of Empathy in Western Literature, Theology, and Art (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 6-7. See also my discussion of Morrison in Chapter 2. 
70 On this concept as an architectural influence, see Helen Gittos, Liturgy, Architecture, and Sacred Places in Anglo-
Saxon England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 96: “[Anglo-Saxon] imitation of Roman dedications is 
probably best understood as a manifestation of the concept of the communion of saints, a unity made manifest 





most important example was Christ, who was described as a fitting high priest for Christians in 
part because he could sympathize with their afflictions. One of the key texts for this doctrine is 
found in Hebrews 2:14-18: 
quia ergo pueri communicaverunt sanguini et carni et ipse similiter participavit hisdem ut 
per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium id est diabolum et liberaret eos 
qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant servituti nusquam enim angelos 
adprehendit sed semen Abrahae adprehendit unde debuit per omnia fratribus similare ut 
misericors fieret et fidelis pontifex ad Deum ut repropitiaret delicta populi in eo enim in 
quo passus est ipse temptatus potens est eis qui temptantur auxiliari 
[Therefore because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself in like 
manner hath been partaker of the same: that, through death, he might destroy him who 
had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil: And might deliver them, who through 
the fear of death were all their lifetime subject to servitude. For no where doth he take 
hold of the angels: but of the seed of Abraham he taketh hold. Wherefore it behoved him 
in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might become a merciful and 
faithful priest before God, that he might be a propitiation for the sins of the people. For in 
that, wherein he himself hath suffered and been tempted, he is able to succour them also 
that are tempted.] 
This passage asserts that Christ’s participation in the experience of “flesh and blood” joins him 
to humanity, making him like them “in all things” even as he rescues and takes hold of them. In 
fact, this congruency of human experience was obligatory for Christ – expressed in the Latin 
through debuit – in order for him to become high priest. Verse 18 extends this shared experience 





aid those who are tempted. Hebrews 4:15 develops this idea: “non enim habemus pontificem qui 
non possit conpati infirmitatibus nostris temptatum autem per omnia pro similitudine absque 
peccato” [For we have not a high priest, who can not have compassion on our infirmities: but one 
tempted in all things like as we are, without sin.] Although the passage in chapter 2 does not 
directly reference empathy, Hebrews 4:15 indicates that shared experience enables fellow-
feeling. Further, Hebrews 2 again presents fellow-feeling as something that must be acquired or 
practiced – a skill as much as a state – since even Jesus must be made like his brethren in order 
to become a sympathetic high priest. 
Although John Chrysostom had preached a series of homilies on Hebrews, there is no 
surviving Latin commentary on the book before Alcuin wrote a partial commentary in the eighth 
century.71 Alcuin largely drew from Chrysostom’s homilies on Hebrews, transmitted via a Latin 
translation by Mutianus.72 Alcuin explains in his exposition of Hebrews 2:18 that the incarnation 
meant that Christ was susceptible to sensation in a way that divinity was typically immune to: 
“Licet Deus in sua natura sit impassibilis; tamen in nostra quam assumpsit, idem Dei Filius 
passibilis fuit, nostrae naturae consimilis” [It befits God in his nature to be incapable of feeling; 
nevertheless in our nature which he assumed, the same Son of God was capable of feeling, 
similar in all respects to our nature.]73 This sensation extends to emotion, a quality that in some 
                                                
71Alcuin’s commentary survives in fifteen manuscripts, five of them dated earlier than the eleventh century. See 
Clavis Scriptorum Latinorum Medii Aevi: Auctores Galliae 735-987, edited by Marie-Hélène Jullien and Françoise 
Perelman, with the help of Philippe Bernard (Turnhout: Brepols, 1994, 2010) II, 375-377. See also Eduard 
Riggenbach,  Die ältesten lateinischen Kommentare zum Hebräerbrief: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Exegese und 
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Hebrews and a discussion of Alcuin’s commentary. 
72 For a discussion of Chrysostom’s homilies, Mutianus’ translation, and their influence on Anglo-Saxon texts, see 
Samantha Zacher, “The Source of Vercelli VII: An Address to Women,” in New Readings in the Vercelli Book, eds. 
Samantha Zacher and Andy Orchard (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 98-149. 
73 Alcuin, Expositio in Epistolam Apostoli Pauli ad Hebraeos, Patrologia Latina 100, ed. J.P. Migne, col. 1031D-





patristic traditions is ascribed to God only in a limited sense.74 Hebrews 4:15 appears in the 
Durham Collectar among other passages from Hebrews discussing Christ as high priest.75 
Several medieval mass prefaces draw on Hebrews 4:15 or 2:14-17, although none of them 
particularly highlights the connection between Christ’s compassion and embodiment.76 
Otherwise there is little evidence that these passages from Hebrews held wide circulation in 
Anglo-Saxon England.77 
However, even if Old English texts do not directly quote from these passages or prescribe 
their reading, a number of homilies draw on ideas presented in these passages by connecting 
Christ’s embodiment and human experience to fellow-feeling and sympathy, whether it is 
Christ’s sympathy for believers or the sympathy that believers should have for one another. For 
example, Blickling Homily 2, on the healing of a blind beggar, argues that Christ presently has 
fellow-feeling because of his experience of human embodiment. The homily explains that the 
beggar’s healing “us tacna þæt he þurh þa menniscan gecynd ure stefne blindnesse gehyreþ; 
þonne we ure synna ondettaþ & us forgifnessa biddaþ, þonne biþ he sona us efen-þrowiende, & 
hraþe miltsiende & forgifende ure synna” [betokens to us that he (Christ) through human nature 
hears our blind voice; when we confess our sins and ourselves pray for forgiveness, then he is 
                                                
74 For example, Cassiodorus states in the Expositio Psalmorum that “Deus et cum tranquillitate iudicat et seruata 
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Marc Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 1958), II.6.136-140, p.43. Translation my own. 
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Helmut Gneuss,” in Learning and Literature in Anglo-Saxon England: Studies Presented to Peter Clemoes on the 
Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, edited by Michael Lapidge and Helmut Gneuss (Cambridge: Cambridge 





immediately equally-suffering with us, and quickly showing mercy and forgiving our sins].78 
Blickling 2 largely paraphrases Gregory the Great’s Homilia in Evangelia 2, and this calque 
translates “compatiendo misertus est” in the source, according to Fontes Anglosaxonici, 
explaining the use of efen-þrowiende..79 As a calque, the word highlights the potentially foreign 
nature of this concept. Yet a reader could still perceive in the word the concepts of its constituent 
morphemes – equal suffering, a shared experience of emotional intensity made possible because 
Christ chose to experience life through the limitations of “mennisce gecynd.” In Blickling 2 the 
reader is called to empathize with (and imitate) the beggar, but Christ empathizes with all 
penitent humans. 
A passage in Ælfric supplementary homily 25 further develops the theme of Christ’s 
humanity enabling empathy, arguing that the ascended Christ presently experiences what his 
saints feel: 
Ure Hælend, and he gefret swa hwæt swa us gelimpð ðe hys lima syndon, swa swa he 
clypode to Saule ðe nu is Paulus, ða ða he ehte ðæra Cristenra manna, ðus cweðende: 
“Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris? ðæt is on Englisc: Saule, Saule, hwi ehtst ðu min? 
Ne cwæð he na, hwi ehtst ðu minra manna, ac hwi ehtst ðu min, for ðam ðe he gefredde 
hys halgena sarnyssa. Eft he cwæð: Esuriui enim, et dedistis mihi manducare: Me 
hingrode, and ge sealdon me etan. Him hingrað on hys ðearfum, and swa hwæt swa we 
doð Godes ðearfum on Godes naman, ðæt we doð Gode sylfum. Eac ðonne we ymbe God 
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smeagað, and to hym hopiað, we beoð mid him, swa swa Paulus cwæð: Ure drohtnung is 
on heofonum.80 
[Our Savior sits in heaven now with our body, and he experiences whatever befalls us 
who are his limbs, just as he called to Saul who now is Paul, then when he persecuted the 
Christian men, saying thus: “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?” That is in English: 
Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? Nor did he say, why do you persecute my men, but 
why do you persecute me, because he experienced the sorrows of his holy ones. 
Afterward he said: “For I hungered, and you gave me to eat”: I hungered, and you gave 
me to eat. He hungers in his need, and whatever we do to the needy of God in the name 
of God, that we do to God himself. Also when we think about God, and hope in him, we 
are with him, even as Paul said: our manner-of-life is in heaven] 
Here empathy is again based on Morrison’s “biological paradigm” relating part to whole.81 
Because individual Christians are the lima of Christ, he shares in their experiences, including 
their sorrows. This enables Christ to feel the pain of Saul’s persecution and to feel the 
satisfaction when a hungry believer is fed. Christ’s empathy is not only based on his mystical 
connection to believers, but also on his assumption of a human body, on the fact that he presently 
exists in heaven “mid urum lichaman.”82 Shared humanity, common embodiment, is the grounds 
for Christ’s shared experience.83 But Ælfric moves a step beyond this statement about Christ’s 
empathic connection to believers to argue that believers can experience a similar connection to 
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Christ if they are mindful of him. Our drohtnung – a rich word suggesting one’s entire way of 
life – can also be present with Christ if we have the correct thoughts (ymbe God smeagað) and 
values (and to hym hopiað). Empathy is possible both ways here, binding individuals not only to 
God but also to one another as limbs of one body. And indeed, altruistic action is encouraged 
here toward the hungry, because it is altruistic action for Christ, whose hunger we are expected 
to wish to remedy. This is a rare moment in the homilies where sympathy for someone is 
connected to altruism.  
Several passages in the gospels depict Christ showing sympathy for people in distress. 
Most of these, however, use the noun misericordia or a form of miseror rather than compassio.84 
The Old English word typically used to translate this in the Old English gospels is a form of 
mildheortness or gemiltsian, which includes the broader semantic range of pity or sympathy 
rather than fellow-feeling.85 However, as noted earlier, the Rushworth Gospels include an 
unusual translation for Jesus’ compassion in Matthew 9:36, which describes how “Uidens autem 
iesus turbas misertus est eis qui erant uexati et iacentes sicut oues non habentes pastorem” [and 
seeing the multitudes, he had compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like 
sheep that have no shepherd]. In this manuscript misertus is glossed as efnþrowade, which more 
closely evokes the shared emotion of empathy.86 The verse presents both an understanding of the 
people’s distress, including the reasons for their state, and an emotional response convergent 
with their distress. Other versions of Matthew 9:36 do not appear to use this – the Lindisfarne 
gospels use gemilsade and the Old English Gospel manuscripts consulted by Liuzza for his 
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edition use gemiltsude.87 It may be that efnþrowade reflects the Mercian dialect of Farman, who 
produced the gloss of Matthew for the Rushworth Gospels,88 or that it translates an Old Latin 
version of Matthew that uses a form of compati rather than miseri.89 Regardless, it shows that 
one could interpret Christ’s suffering in a manner that suggests shared suffering as much as pity. 
Surprisingly, another biblical example of fellow-feeling is Job’s friends when they first 
see him in his newly-abject state. Gregory the Great explains their positive fellow-feeling in his 
Moralia in Job, a commentary which has much to say about sympathy for the suffering.90 Noting 
how Job’s friends initially weep, tear their clothes, and strew themselves with dust, Gregory 
comments that the appropriate sequence of consolation is to first join (concordare) with the 
suffering person in grief. A sufferer will never be consoled by someone who is experiencing 
different emotions, and Gregory illustrates this with two analogies – one referring to metallurgy 
and one to posture: 
Sed emolliri prius debet animus ut afflicto congruat, congruens inhaereat, inhaerens 
trahat. Neque enim ferrum ferro coniungitur, si non utrumque exustione ignis liquetur; et 
durum molli non adhaeret nisi prius eius duritia temperate mollescat ut quasi hoc ipsum 
fiat, quod curator ut teneat. Sic nec iacentes erigimus, nisi a rigore nostri status 
inclinemur, quia dum rectitude stantis a iacente discrepant eum, cui condescendere 
neglegit, nequaquam leuat.91 
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[But first the mind must be softened, that it may accord with the distressed, and by 
according inhere, and by inhering draw.  For iron is not joined with iron, if each is not 
liquefied by the burning of fire, and the hard does not adhere to the soft, unless first its 
hardness is softened by mildness, as if it should become the thing, which the overseer 
might possess. Thus we do not raise the fallen, unless from the rigor of our standing we 
incline, because while the uprightness of the standing differs from him who is lying, the 
one who neglects to condescend, will never comfort.] 
The metallurgic process represents first a change of mental state (emolliri) until one has reached 
the point where they are in agreement (congruat) and then able to actually join with the afflicted 
(inhaereat). It emphasizes fellow-feeling as a process which must occur in the mind rather than a 
spontaneous state. The image of posture emphasizes that empathy is not an end in itself, 
however, but a precursor to lifting up (leuat) the distressed. It is effective because it is a form of 
mirroring: Job’s friends joined him in weeping “quatenus afflictus uir tanto facilius eorum uerba 
reciperet, quanto in eis suum aliquid de afflictione cognouisset” [that the afflicted man might the 
more readily give ear to their words, that he recognised in them somewhat of his own in the way 
of affliction].92 However, Gregory continues, the friends err by going too far in their grief 
because they “percussi mentem nesciunt,” [are strangers to the mind of him that was smitten].93 
Thus, although they share his emotion, they are poor comforters because they fail to share his 
perspective, leading to empathetic inaccuracy and excessive sorrow.94 Gregory presents empathy 
as a process, but further suggests that the process can be incomplete or even dangerous if one 
lacks spiritual knowledge or over-empathizes. This description fits into Gregory’s larger 
treatment of fellow-feeling as a pastoral skill, a point to which I will return later. But Gregory’s 
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description is not carried over into extant Old English. Out of the three Old English texts that 
refer to the story of Job, only one – Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies 2.30 - references Job’s friends.95 
As Robert Bjork points out, Ælfric uses the Moralia in Job liberally in the sermon; however, 
with reference to the display of grief made by Job’s friends, Ælfric merely says that “Hit wæs 
swa gewunelic on ealdum dagum, þæt gif hwam sum færlic sar become, þæt he his reaf totære, 
swa swa Iob dyde, and eac ðas ðry cyningas” [it was thus customary in old days, that if suffering 
should ever suddenly befall someone, that he should tear his clothing, just as Job did, and also 
these three kings].96 Thus, we do not know if Job’s friends were ever regarded as a positive or 
negative exemplar of fellow-feeling in Anglo-Saxon England outside of the Moralia. 
In addition to these Scriptural characters who show empathy, saints also exhibit empathy 
and participate in the pain of other Christians. Although their fellow-feeling is presented as 
virtuous, the reader is not necessarily explicitly urged to imitate it.97 As noted earlier, some of 
the examples of empathy words in Old English refer to saints including Mary of Egypt, 
Quadragesimus, and another bishop in Gregory’s Dialogues. In Catholic Homilies 1:30, Mary is 
said to suffer when Christ suffers, to such an extent that Ælfric calls her empathetic sharing in 
Christ’s affliction a form of martyrdom: “Heo lufode Crist ofer ealle oðre men, and forðy wæs 
eac hire sarnys be him toforan oðra manna, and heo dyde his deað hire agenne deað, forðan ðe 
his ðrowung swa swa swurd ðurhferde hire sawle” [She loved Christ over all other men, and 
therefore her sorrow for him was also above other men’s, and she made his death her own death, 
because his suffering just like a sword pierced through her soul.] One might argue that making 
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Christ’s death one’s own does not necessarily require sharing emotion. But “ðrowung” suggests 
a special intensity, and the image of a sword penetrating the soul is not unlike other images of 
emotion penetrating from without.98 The reader is not necessarily invited to feel the same sorrow 
that Mary felt, but rather to be struck by and admire the intensity of her empathy and fellowship 
with Christ. In other homilies, male monastic saints show compassion. In Felix’s Vita Sancti 
Guthlaci, the saint’s willingness to heal all who come to him is described in quasi-empathetic 
terms: “sed vera caritate pollens, omnium labores cum omnibus unanimiter pertulerat” [but, as he 
abounded in true charity, he shared equally in the sufferings of them all].99 In Catholic Homilies 
2:10 Cuthbert displays fellow-feeling for a sorrowing widow (the text uses the word besargode, 
elsewhere used in Old English to translate compati) and heals her son in an episode that evokes 
Christ’s compassionate healing of a widow’s son in Luke 7.100  In Catholic Homilies 2:11, it is 
also said that Benedict “besargode” for his mother when she broke a vase, and his tearful prayers 
on her behalf caused the vase to miraculously reassemble.101 These instances show that sharing 
another’s sadness could be an exemplary trait, one that elicits God’s favor and leads to 
miraculous, altruistic action. These examples also fit the Gregorian pastoral model of empathy in 
which condescension of emotion enables a leader to give comfort to a sufferer in the flock.  
 Other scriptural passages could be referenced that command or illustrate altruistic action. 
However, not all of these acts are explicitly motivated by the fellow feeling of empathy. For 
example, one might cite the Good Samaritan who takes in his wounded neighbor as an example 
of altruism motivated by compassion. But in the Scripture, the Good Samaritan’s motives are not 
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described, although one could read between the lines that his action is compassionate. Yet one 
might also do good deeds out of desire for reward or fear of punishment rather than from 
compassion, or out of pity rather than empathy. Although there are many commands to altruistic 
behavior, there are fewer that also contain markers for empathy. There are patristic texts, 
however, that highlight the power of empathetic engagement with narrative, whether 
reinterpreting biblical texts to encourage empathy or describing the necessity of fellow-feeling in 
order to correctly interpret Scripture and exercise pastoral care. 
Patristic Bases for Empathy 
Patristic writers had much to say about the importance of empathy, both altruistic and 
aesthetic. Examples abound in the Liber Scintillarum, a collection which, although not patristic, 
heavily quotes patristic writers. The chapter on compassione proximi, compassion for a neighbor, 
describes fellow-feeling as one dimension of compassion alongside altruistic actions such as 
almsgiving and helping one’s neighbor. The chapter quotes Romans 12:15 and cites Gregory the 
Great’s description of compassion as a mental cross in which one reckons the need of a neighbor 
as their own. A quotation attributed to Basil calls on individuals to “condolere in alienis 
calamitatibus sociare fletibus in alienis meroribus: in tribulatione alterius. Et tu esto tristis; Talis 
esto aliis. Quales optas esse circa te alios; Quod non vis pati. Non facias” [co-sorrow in the 
calamities of another, share in weeping in others’ sorrows: in another’s tribulation, you be sad; 
such be to the other, as you desire others to be around you; what you do not wish to experience, 
do not do].102 As noted earlier, Isidore also glosses misericordia as sharing in another’s 
suffering. The chapter also provides a quotation attributed to Ephraem the Syrian that when 
“invicem onera nostra portamus” [we carry one another’s burdens],103 the community achieves 
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spiritual victory over the devil. These texts confirm the idea that sharing a neighbor’s suffering, 
including their emotional suffering, is a morally beneficial act.  
Gregory the Great discusses fellow-feeling frequently across his works, encapsulated in 
the concept of condescensio passionis, which Barbara Rosenwein translates as “condescension of 
emotion” in her analysis of Gregory’s emotional community.104 This concept appears frequently 
in the Moralia in Job and Pastoral Care and is illustrated in the Dialogues, all texts known to the 
Anglo-Saxons.105 In the Moralia, Gregory describes condescension of emotion as a deliberate 
lowering of oneself to conform to the emotional state of a suffering person, as a precursor to 
lifting them up to consolation. It is a necessary skill for pastors, enabling them to reprove and 
comfort the suffering by first understanding their state. Seeing oneself in another, or recognizing 
another’s similarity to oneself, is one precursor to the consolation of suffering, as Gregory 
explains in his exegesis of Job 5:24: 
Speciem ergo suam uisitat, quisquis ad eum quem sibi similem per naturam conspicit, 
passibus amoris tendit; ut in altero sua considerans, ex se ipso colligat, qualiter infirmanti 
alteri condescendat. Speciem suam uisitat qui ut in se alterum reficiat, se in altero 
pensat.106  
[Accordingly those who direct their loving steps to the people whom they see to be like 
themselves by nature visit their own likeness. Just as they see themselves in the others, so 
let them gather from themselves the knowledge of how to conform themselves to the 
weaknesses of the other people. Those who consider themselves in others so that they may 
remodel the others in themselves visit their own likeness.] 
In order to change others for the better, one must first recognize one’s similarity to these others, 
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leading to insight into how to empathize with these others in a way that conforms to their 
weakness. This also suggests an egocentric function for empathizing with another, in that it gives 
understanding both of others and of oneself.  
Gregory further explains that seeing oneself in another is a basis of the Golden Rule, and 
is exemplified in the condescension of Paul, who uses empathetic imagination to understand 
what others should want: 
Neque enim egregius praedicator ut quasi Iudaeus fieret, ad perfidiam erupit; neque ut 
quasi sub lege esset ad carnale sacrificium rediit; neque ut omnibus omnia fieret, 
simplicitatem mentis in erroris uarietatem commutauit; sed condenscendendo 
appropinquauit infidelibus, non cadendo; ut uidelicet singulos in se suscipiens et se in 
singulis transfigurans, compatiendo colligeret, si ita ipse, ut illi, esset quid impendi sibi 
ab aliis recte uoluisset; et tanto uerius unicuique erranti concurreret, quanto salutis eius 
modum ex propria consideratione didicisset.107 
[Now the famous preacher did not break faith so as to become a Jew, nor did he return to 
the sacrifice of animal flesh so as to be under the law, nor did he exchange the simplicity 
of his commitment for the variety of error so as to become all things to all men. Rather, 
he drew near to those without faith by condescension, though not by failing, so as to 
welcome them all in himself and transform himself into all of them; he wanted to be like 
them by compassion, in order that he might be what he rightly wished they would 
become. Thus he would the more truly hasten to the aid of any wanderer all the more 
effectively if he had learned his way of salvation from consideration of his own case.] 
Empathy is not complete identification, but rather an assumption of another’s weakness based on 
interpretation of their situation. Empathy as Gregory describes it is a precursor to interpretation 
                                                





and consolation, allowing one in a pastoral context to care for the suffering appropriately and 
interpret what they truly need. As noted earlier, Gregory also believed that the condescension of 
emotion could be demonstrated inappropriately, as in the case of Job’s friends. Contrastingly, 
Gregory presented examples of positive emotional condescension. For example, in the 
Dialogues, a holy man raises a widow’s husband from the dead after first weeping with the 
widow.108 The man does resort to somewhat shocking behavior in desecrating the dead body in 
order to raise him, but before this he lowers himself emotionally to share in the widow’s grief. 
This example reinforces Gregory’s presentation of empathy as a precursor to other morally 
beneficial action rather than as an end in itself. 
These examples primarily describe compassion for other people existing in the world. In 
the remainder of this section I wish to focus on a subset of patristic literature on fellow-feeling: 
evidence for narrative empathy, or fellow-feeling for real or fictional characters in narratives. 
From Late Antiquity, the church recognized the importance of fellow-feeling and the potential 
for texts to facilitate it. Paul Blowers suggests in a study of “moral compassion” in Late-Antique 
homilies how the early church harnessed the affective power of narrative to promote sympathy 
for other subjects.109 Early Christian leaders faced the difficulties of encouraging altruistic action 
and compassion in a climate of envy and rivalry. Yet they describe compassion in terms 
reminiscent of empathy, even if there is no term with this precise meaning in the Late-Antique 
world.110 In particular, homilists encouraged compassion by reinterpreting biblical narratives in 
the tragic mode, enabling the audience to identify with and pity the tragic subjects just as they 
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might the tragic heroes of the theater. Blowers describes these reworked tragedies as “scripts” 
created “in the service of generating compassion and engrossing audiences in their portrayals of 
the drama of redemption that was unfolding precisely, they believed, in the ‘spectacle’ of 
suffering bodies.”111 To early preachers, the sight of suffering was a learning opportunity and 
classic Old Testament narratives reinscribed in the tragic mode could train the listener in 
empathy for others. According to Blowers, the narrative targets of tragic pity in early Christianity 
included not only biblical characters but also other Christians and even the beggars and destitute, 
who became “heroes and…potential spiritual patrons.”112 Thus, sermons telling stories about 
these heroes were sites for teaching empathy at the very beginning of the history of Christianity. 
They worked by acts of “appropriation,” reinterpreting existing narratives as blueprints for 
compassion, and as acts of spectacle, presenting a vivid, affective image to the imagination.113 In 
Chrysostom’s homilies Saul was inscribed as the tragic victim of his own envy and target of 
pity,114 while the pauper Lazarus was presented as a heroic example of fortitude in the misery of 
poverty.115 Such strategies invited narrative empathy with characters in order to encourage 
empathy with the troubled and downcast in the present. Anglo-Saxon readers might have been 
familiar with some of these empathetic texts, such as Chrysostom’s homilies translated by 
Mutianus,116 although many of these tragic scripts were likely unknown to them. As I will 
discuss further in Chapter 3, Anglo-Saxon homilies do not typically use narrative empathy as a 
means of encouraging altruism toward the poor; however, Old English homilies and biblical 
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poetry do rescript biblical stories in an affective mode that invites an emotional response and 
presents an exemplum of appropriate emotion. Unlike some more complex attempts to evoke 
empathy as a trained skill, these rescriptings could be more accessible to Anglo-Saxon laypeople, 
and often suggest deliberate attempts to be more accessible, for example by highlighting as 
targets of empathy characters more similar to the target audience. 
In addition to seeing biblical and historical stories as sites of affective exempla, the 
Church Fathers were attuned to the potential for fictional texts to elicit emotion. In the 
Confessions, Augustine admits to hating his grammar school lessons in reading and writing 
Latin, while loving his literary lessons, in which “tenere cogebar Aeneae nescio cuius errores 
oblitus errorum meorum et plorare Didonem mortuam, quia se occidit ab amore, cum interea me 
ipsum in his a te morientem, deus, uita mea, siccis oculis ferrem miserrimus” [I was forced to 
learn the wanderings of one Æneas, forgetful of my own, and to weep for dead Dido, because she 
killed herself for love; the while, with dry eyes, I endured my miserable self dying among these 
things, far from Thee, O God my life.]117 Whereas the early Christian homilists Blowers 
discusses harnessed narrative as a tool to encourage compassion, Augustine represents the 
affective power of literature as a spiritual danger, leading him to experience emotion on behalf of 
fictional characters while oblivious to his own spiritual peril. These poles (not unlike those of 
contemporary apologists and critics of narrative empathy)118 represent the range of patristic 
views on narrative empathy. 
                                                
117 Augustine, Confessionum Libri XIII, ed. L. Verheijen, CCSL 27 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1981), 1.13.20, p.11. See 
also William Werpehowski’s discussion of this passage in “Weeping at the Death of Dido: Sorrow, Virtue, and 
Augustine’s Confessions,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 19.1 (Spring 1991): 175-91. 
118 For a description of the apologists and critics of empathy as a tool for reform, see Ann Jurecic, “Empathy and the 





The Anglo-Saxons had only a limited knowledge of the Confessions or the earliest 
homilies discussed by Blowers.119 However, Gregory also speaks of narrative empathy. Gregory 
saw a more individual value to empathy in addition to its pastoral significance, arguing for the 
interpretive use of narrative empathy in the Moralia in Job. Gregory discusses narrative empathy 
as a tangent to a discourse on interpretive difficulties in the book of Job. In the Preface, Gregory 
notes that readers might be confused by the statement in the book of Job that Job “sinned not 
with his lips,” even when the patriarch frequently makes impassioned and bewildering 
proclamations. Gregory explains, 
Et quidem quaedam uerba responsionum illius imperitis lectoribus aspera resonant quia 
sanctorum dicta pie intellegere sicut dicuntur, ignorant; et quia animum dolentis et iusti in 
semetipsis assumere nesciunt ideo doloris uerba bene interpretari non possunt. Mentem 
quippe patientis bene pensare nouit condescensio passionis.120 
[Some of the language in his answers may indeed sound bitter to ignorant readers who do 
not know enough to understand the words of saints in the pious way in which they were 
spoken. They are unable to interiorize the sentiments of the suffering just man, and so 
they are unable to interpret the words of pain correctly. Only the compassionate person 
can in truth know the mind of the sufferer.] 
Gregory’s comments suggest important connections with contemporary debates on narrative 
empathy. First, Gregory suggests that a reader’s emotional evaluation of Scripture is affected by 
their experience and training. Job’s words “aspera resonant” or sound harsh to readers who are 
imperitis, that is “unskilled” or “inexperienced,” because these readers are ignorant or do not 
know how to interpret properly. Gregory thus presents empathy as a skill that can be learned 
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rather than an event that occurs at the moment of reading. Gregory’s narrative empathy must be 
trained in readers so that it can be brought to bear on the text, and suggests a discipline that one 
can learn to exercise regardless of personality – more akin to later medieval ideas of affective 
piety. Gregory indicates that one of the skills unempathetic readers lack is the ability “animum 
dolentis et iusti in semetipsis assumere,” to assume within themselves the spirit of the sorrowful 
and take on their emotion. Their failure is essentially a failure to respond with narrative empathy, 
which hinders them from understanding the statements that the sorrowful make. Because they 
cannot personalize and feel Job’s emotions, they cannot recognize the true significance of his 
words. Gregory reinforces this connection between empathy and interpretation in the Epistle to 
the Moralia when he tells Leander that his own sickness has afforded him insight into the 
meaning of Job’s suffering, giving him a shared experience that helps him interpret Job’s 
emotions: 
Et fortasse hoc diuinae prouidentiae consilium fuit, ut percussum Iob percussus 
exponerem, et flagellati mentem melius per flagella sentirem.121 
[Perhaps this [i.e. the sickness] was a plan of Divine Providence so that I might comment 
on the stricken Job after having been stricken myself, and so that I might the better 
understand the soul of the one whipped through the lashes I myself received.] 
Although this primarily refers to physical experience rather than purely emotional experience, it 
incorporates an emotional aspect. Gregory goes so far as to say that his shared suffering helps 
him understand the soul of the speaker as well as his words.  
If Gregory is the patristic writer who states most overtly that empathy with a character 
could aid in interpretation, this idea is implicit in commentaries that discuss the emotional states 
of scriptural characters and tie these states to application. For example, Cassiodorus’ Expositio 
                                                





Psalmorum, a Psalm commentary known to the Anglo-Saxons,122 often discusses the emotions 
felt by the Psalm speakers even when these speakers are clearly allegorical, such as the Church. 
Psalm 37, a penitential psalm, is said to be in the voice of Job, who falls in a long train of 
scriptural examples of suffering intended “tironis inde animus efficacius imbuatur” [that from 
them the spirits of novices may be more effectively initiated], prompting Cassiodorus to urge 
readers, “in afflictionibus asperis gaudeamus” [let us rejoice in harsh afflictions].123 The 
movements of penitence in the psalm end with joy and relief “ut manifeste doceatur in spe 
certissima collocatus, qui tantae laetitiae participatione ditatus est” [in order that the one 
established in most certain hope, who has been enriched in sharing such happiness, might clearly 
be taught].124 Thus to follow Job’s lead is to learn from his emotional reactions to suffering, and 
to learn how to set one’s own suffering in perspective. The notes on individual verses consider 
the specific reasons of Job’s various emotions, providing the reader with a clearer picture. 
Understanding and feeling appropriate emotion is an important part of a reader’s reaction to 
Psalm 37. In Psalm 11, on the other hand, Cassiodorus describes David’s fear in verse 2 without 
connecting it to an overarching moral for the psalm. Instead, understanding David’s fear helps 
the reader understand David’s response to God and the degree of calamity in the world 
prompting his fear.125 Understanding emotion can thus clarify other aspects of the narrative even 
when the emotion does not have an immediate moral application. 
Bede’s commentary on Ezra and Nehemiah reveals the complicated roles that emotion 
and empathy could play in hermeneutics. Bede glosses the return from exile depicted in these 
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two books as the process by which penitents rejoin the church through good works, which 
enables him to allegorize exemplary emotions from even fairly flat narrative passages, as when 
the sacrifices offered by the returned penitents are seen as a sign that the penitent “totos se ab 
infimis abstractos cupiditatibus flamma desiderii caelestis ad superna accedunt” [have removed 
themselves from the lowest passions and burn completely with the flame of heavenly desire for 
things above.]126 Readers might be encouraged to aspire for this feeling if they do not 
immediately empathize with the returned exiles. Yet although Bede discusses the emotions of 
characters as they directly arise in the text (as when Nehemiah shows dramatic sorrow at the 
damaged state of Jerusalem) and sometimes extols these emotions, his applications sometimes 
downplay empathy. For example, in describing how Ezra tears his clothes and plucks his hair to 
move others to repentance, Bede interprets the significance of his actions allegorically by 
glossing his torn clothing as evil works and the torn hair as wicked thoughts, shifting the reader 
away from his sorrow to explain that Ezra’s extreme behavior was a lesson to the people that 
they needed to repent.127 Thus Bede directs readers not toward empathy with Ezra but toward the 
action of personal reform. Ezra’s emotion is efficacious and draws around him a community of 
people who listen to his message because they are affected by his grief; however, Bede seems to 
avoid presenting Ezra himself as a subject of empathy, perhaps because Ezra allegorically 
represents the leaders of the church and might thus not be an appropriate exemplum for some 
laypeople.128 Bede’s exegesis thus suggests that the role of emotion and empathy in patristic 
interpretation can be complex and contradictory. 
                                                
126 In Ezram et Neemiam, ed. D. Hurst, CCSL 119A (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), 325. Footnote references are by 
section number. Translations from Scott DeGregorio, Bede: On Ezra and Nehemiah, Translated Texts for Historians 
47 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2006). 
127 In Ezram et Neemiam, ed. Hurst, 327-28. 
128 “Possumus sane personam Ezrae non solum ad dominum Christum sed etiam ad aliquem praesulem siue 
doctorem ecclesiae figuraliter referre quibus saepe reges ac principes litteras pro fidelium statu miserunt meritoque 





The value of narrative empathy is not only implicit in some biblical commentary but also 
in discussions of rhetoric that indicate the importance of engaging the audience’s emotion. These 
discussions present empathy not only as important to understanding a text’s meaning but to 
persuading listeners to obey the truth. In De Doctrina Christiana Augustine describes the 
importance of moving an audience emotionally, encouraging them to rejoice and grieve at the 
appropriate targets.129 He explains that although the rhetor should be more concerned about 
instruction than moving their audience emotionally, it is still necessary for the rhetor to delight 
and persuade audiences “cum scierint, quid agendum sit, non agunt” [when those who know 
what they ought to do, do not do it].130 Thus, although eloquence can be used in the service of 
terrible ends, it is also a valuable means of moving the emotions. The Anglo-Saxons were not 
heirs to an extensive body of classical rhetoric, although Gabriele Knappe has shown how 
knowledge of some rhetorical tropes and figures was communicated as part of the discipline of 
grammatica.131  However, Knappe suggests that some Anglo-Saxons were familiar with 
Augustine’s statements about the value of eloquence in sermons,132 and many Old English 
homilies certainly seek to move the emotions. Narrative empathy is one type of emotional 
response to a text and thus inviting narrative empathy is one tool in the rhetor’s toolkit to 
persuade readers to obedience. In the Expositio Psalmorum, Cassiodorus describes multiple 
rhetorical devices that can affect the reader’s emotion, including “emphasis, quod gradatim 
crescit ad motum animi concitandum” [emphasis, which gradually grows for the purpose of 
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stirring up the mental emotion]133 and “idea, cum speciem rei futurae uelut oculis offerentes, 
motum animi concitamus” [idea, when as if presenting to the eyes the sight of a future event, we 
stir up mental emotion].134 He builds on the work of other classical rhetoricians to consider the 
value of emotional appeals, which can include appeals to narrative empathy. Not all rhetoricians 
or grammarians known to the Anglo-Saxons emphasized the emotional aspects of literary 
figures; Bede, for example, in De Schematibus et Tropis, describes the various ways that 
language can be used to stylistic effect, but does not discuss the particular emotional effects of 
these tropes. Perhaps this is because schemes and tropes might accomplish different effects in 
different contexts. However, rhetoric’s explicit aim of persuasion implicitly contained the need 
to move the emotions of audiences on some occasions, and stylistic features were one means of 
doing so. Isidore, in Book 2 of the Etymologiae, connected high, low, and moderate style to the 
emotional import of the subject matter and the emotional effect a rhetorician hoped to achieve in 
their audience.135 Form and vocabulary were thus yoked to the emotional content of an utterance, 
and could invite empathy as well as other affective responses.  
These patristic examples suggest various reasons for and means of considering empathy, 
whether with suffering Christians or exemplary characters. Gregory reveals an interest in 
empathy as an interpretive key, while Augustine, Cassiodorus, and other commentators display 
an interest in how eloquence can move the emotions of readers to feel with particular characters 
and in how to categorize the structures and styles that allowed language to have such effect. 
Anglo-Saxon readers with a grammatical education might have encountered these ideas in their 
schooling through exposure to texts such as the Moralia in Job or the Expositio Psalmorum, 
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which they could have applied to their reading of grammatical treatises that codified the 
ornamental features of language and to their interpretation of texts that employed such features. 
It is unlikely that a large subset of readers had access to these texts, and this might thus be a 
fairly sophisticated reading strategy. But in addition to these texts, Anglo-Saxon religious could 
look to the concept of typology, pervasively demonstrated in liturgy, as a justification for 
identifying with characters of the distant past. It is to the concept of typology and its expression 
in liturgy that I now turn. 
Typology and Liturgy 
 Typology provided a popular and enduring lens for understanding the frequently 
confusing events of the Old Testament. Readers faced with the cultural and historical distance of 
the Old Testament had to decide how to interpret its significance. Was it a Jewish history and 
law book, now unimportant? Was it a spiritual allegory for the moral progress of man? As Erich 
Auerbach points out in his classic essay “Figura,” typological interpretation saw both a historical 
and spiritual meaning within the text. Auerbach defines typology through the concept of the 
figura, which is “something real and historical which announces something else that is also real 
and historical. The relation between the two events is revealed by an accord or similarity.”136 
Typological interpretation was principally used to read Old Testament people and events as 
precursors of New Testament people and events. For example, Joshua was a figura of Jesus, as 
one could see from their similar names (both meaning “God saves”) and their similar role in 
bringing a special people into a promised mode of existence. The crossing of the Red Sea 
prefigured the Christian’s salvation through the waters of baptism.137 Typology could be 
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considered a species of allegory;138 however, typology moves beyond this category. Allegory 
proper frequently refers to abstract or spiritualized qualities, such as the human soul or virtues 
and vices; the historical location of these qualities is unimportant. Typology, however, requires 
concrete events whose historicity is asserted as fact. Because these historical events truly 
happened, they lend credence to the equally historical New Testament fulfillment, showing it 
was always designed. In contrast to the timelessness of allegory, typology has a relentless focus 
on particular moments in time, whether in the past, present, or future. Reading the Bible 
typologically would thus allow individuals to see themselves connected to real people who 
experienced real emotions. 
Although the figurae of typology were frequently found in the Old Testament, they could 
come from other periods as well: in fact, Auerbach argues that typology often follows a three-
stage process in which Old Testament events foreshadow the life of Christ, the life of Christ 
fulfills these promises but points to future ones, and the Last Judgment fulfills all promises. Such 
a move unites three of the four traditional modes of exegesis, linking the historical, 
Christological, and eschatological interpretations.139 But typology need not be restricted to 
biblical history; historical characters outside Scripture might be seen as prefiguring events at the 
end of time, expanding the range of events and people that held spiritual as well as historical 
significance. Friedrich Ohly describes a mode of thought which he calls “ausserbiblische 
Typologie,” in which extrabiblical historical events are seen as imbued with typological 
significance because they are presided over by the same God.140  Such a view means that a 
typological interpreter holds a different relationship to history than the positivist historian who 
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sees established previous events as documented and finished facts. Instead, since everything 
awaits final fulfillment, Auerbach writes that “history, with all its concrete force, remains forever 
a figure, cloaked and needful of interpretation.”141 There were many methods and strategies of 
interpreting this history. One of them was to empathize with characters of the past in order to 
unlock the meaning of their experiences. Indeed, as Jean Leclercq notes, one of the prominent 
moods of the Old Testament is “desire,” whether “for the Promised Land or desire for the 
Messiah interpreted spontaneously by the medieval monks as desire for Heaven and for Jesus 
contemplated in His glory.”142 Thus, to read with a view to typology was to link oneself to 
figures who were yearning for an eschatological fulfillment, and thus to identify with the 
emotions that accompany yearning. 
But even if empathy is not absolutely necessary to interpret the past typologically, 
typology gives religious justification for empathy with people of the past because it collapses 
temporality, bringing the past or future into the present and bridging the temporal gap that 
separates historical events from their true significance. Indeed, to God these events have always-
already been present.143 This temporal conflation offers the opportunity for emotional 
identification across time, emphasizing the particularity of the historical moment to be 
experienced while suggesting its significance need not be bound to that moment. Further, it 
encourages individuals to see people of the past as figurae that are connected to them, just as 
they see other Christians in the present as members of a mystical body to which they are linked. 
This connection was emphasized in the organization of the liturgy and sacraments, which invited 
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participants and spectators to consider the historical events that foreshadowed feasts such as 
Easter and sacraments such as the Mass. 
Indeed, liturgical practice and explication of that practice could easily encourage 
emotional identification with biblical figures. M. Bradford Bedingfield, in an analysis of later 
Anglo-Saxon liturgy and its explication in vernacular homilies, argues that Anglo-Saxon liturgy 
is often configured to heighten the sense of sympathy and participation where possible, between 
the participants (sometimes more narrowly the cleric and monastic celebrants, sometimes 
tentatively laypeople) and the biblical figures commemorated in the liturgy.144 He never suggests 
that the liturgy invites empathy with Christ; rather, participants assume the roles of biblical 
characters, usually figures surrounding the events of Christ’s life and interacting with him, 
whether the crowd at the Triumphal entry during Palm Sunday, the magi bringing gifts to the 
Child, or Simeon raising the infant Christ in his arms. One of Bedingfield’s key arguments is that 
an action need not be realistic to be dramatic and participatory. In fact, he suggests that symbolic 
reenactment would be more effective than realism at drawing in those involved in the liturgy, 
invoking “the ability of liturgical symbolism to personalize commemoration” and make it 
poignant to the individual reenacting these events through symbols.145 Where a realistic 
depiction of an event might present cultural and historical differences that would be distancing, 
symbolism could mediate this distance for participants, allowing them to grasp the key spiritual 
meaning of an event like Candlemas but also to take part in the event, identifying with Simeon as 
recipients of God’s promise to see the Messiah and experiencing what they think he might have 
felt. Some have critiqued Bedingfield’s thesis, particularly in the somewhat arbitrary line he 
                                                
144 Bedingfield, The Dramatic Liturgy of Anglo-Saxon England, 11. 





draws between dramatic liturgical performance and ‘real’ drama.146 It is also unclear how close 
Bedingfield’s “sympathetic participation” is to empathy. It doesn’t seem to indicate Coplan’s 
sense of “self-other distinction,” but rather assumes the identity of the character being imitated. 
Finally, Bedingfield occasionally over-reads the degree of empathetic participation encouraged 
by particular liturgical passages – for example, when he suggests that the congregation would 
have realized that they should identify with the shepherds in the Christmas liturgy, when the 
shepherds are primarily glossed as teachers.147 But Bedingfield’s detailed discussion of the 
Temporale highlights many events in which the liturgy does appear to place those involved in the 
position of witnesses or participants in the major events of Christian history, suggesting that 
participants might have imagined the mental state of someone like Simeon holding the infant 
Christ and felt this emotion. Further, Bedingfield’s point about the symbolic efficacy of the 
liturgy suggests that realistic depiction of characters is not the only way to promote empathy.148 
A stylized figure with whom a reader is called to feel a connection could elicit emotion as much 
as a realistic depiction of a literary character; indeed, if cultural scripts imbued the stylized figure 
with emotional potency, the pull toward empathy could be even stronger. In subsequent chapters, 
I will suggest how this pull might have worked in texts describing biblical and saintly figures. 
Initial Conclusions 
The preceding evidence indicates sufficient basis to argue for two types of empathy in 
Anglo-Saxon England. The first, an externally-directed fellow-feeling, was associated in the 
Latin tradition with pastoral and exemplary figures showing compassion for individuals. 
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Transmitted largely through Gregory the Great but also through hagiography and texts such as 
the Rule of Benedict, it presented compassion as a necessary but intermediate step in the process 
of consolation, a religious rather than secular skill. It was also not necessarily meant for all to 
practice in its most rarified sense, although the Liber Scintillarum suggests that sharing in 
another’s suffering is a way to care for one’s neighbor. The second type of empathy is a narrative 
empathy with multiple functions. Anglo-Saxons did recognize the potential for affective 
identification with fictional and/or textual characters, and in some cases seem to have harnessed 
this potential for identification to encourage their readers to beneficial emotions. In a similar way 
to the Late-Antique homilists that Blowers discusses, Anglo-Saxon texts appropriate biblical, 
hagiographic, and literary stories to elicit empathy and train the reader in fellow-feeling. The first 
type of compassion was more likely to be viewed as a discrete concept, described with the 
vocabulary noted above. The second, narrative type of empathy is not described by a stable Latin 
or Old English term, but the evidence presented for it suggests its implicit place in Anglo-Saxon 
society. I will build on this evidence in Chapters 2-5 to consider how and why Anglo-Saxon 
writers might employ these Latin bases to invite empathy in different types of texts. 
The evidence presented in this chapter raises the question of who would be versed in 
these bases for empathy. Just because there was empathetic potential in the liturgy did not mean 
that all clergy would be used to thinking about the liturgy in an empathetic way. Even 
Bedingfield points out that reenacting biblical stories through ritual is powerful only “when those 
raised on this symbolic, liturgical language have been educated about the significance of the 
individual elements.”149 Indeed, Ælfric’s injunction that secular clergy should learn the meaning 
of the Palm Sunday procession suggests at least a perception that not all clergy understood the 
                                                





significance behind the elements.150 Particularly in foundations farther from large cathedrals with 
well-equipped libraries, the intellectual milieu might not encourage monks and clerics to view 
the liturgy as a reenactment, much less lay people who participated in the events of the liturgy.151 
However, as Bedingfield points out throughout his study, vernacular homilies also often 
reinforced the identifications suggested by the liturgy in their explanations of the liturgical texts 
for a given day, perhaps in an attempt to teach less learned Anglo-Saxons the significance of 
these texts and rituals. Further, the sources presented in this chapter indicate that empathetic 
participation was one way of viewing the events of the liturgy, and one that might have made its 
mark on other texts dealing with events in biblical history or significant to liturgical observance. 
Certainly, less-educated audiences would be less familiar with biblical and patristic texts 
providing a basis for empathy, although they might hear passages like Hebrews 2 read in the 
liturgy in the unlikely event that they attended church regularly. I discuss typology as a basis 
because it offers an explicitly religious justification for empathy, because it is prevalent in 
monastic culture, and because it is expressed in liturgy and art, two media that religious and lay 
people could have experienced. But typology is not necessary to encourage identification with 
characters; indeed, any narrative of past events, including a completely fictional history, can 
arouse empathy for figures in the past. 
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The evidence also suggests that empathy is primarily religious in nature: it is a skill for 
pastors and also laypeople, one that encourages readers to identify with the body of the 
Church.152 However, empathy may only seem exclusively religious because of the limited 
number of texts that survive and how many of these texts are explicitly religious in nature. 
Nevertheless, even if Anglo-Saxon concepts of empathy were primarily Christian, religious 
concepts could be applied to secular contexts. Some Old English elegies such as the Wife’s 
Lament and Wulf and Eadwacer invite empathy with characters who are not explicitly religious, 
for ambiguous purposes. This may suggest that Anglo-Saxon readers could also feel empathy for 
less explicitly religious reasons, although more evidence would be needed to support this 
assertion. 
This chapter has attempted to heed Ralf Schneider’s encouragement to excavate “the 
structures of knowledge and habitual strategies of evaluation available to historical readers”153 by 
exploring the Latinate discourses of empathy as a cultural concept and interpretive tool. 
Schneider acknowledges that such a task is “a formidable challenge,” but reflects that “if by a 
recontextualization of readers in cultural history we can single out discourses that were valid for 
certain groups, it should be possible to reach at least an approximation to historical reading 
processes,”154 particularly if audiences are more homogeneous (arguably the case for Old English 
texts with limited circulation). As I will argue in the next chapter, these Latin bases for fellow-
feeling were combined with a rich stock of affective textual strategies that illustrate the 
flexibility of these doctrines of compassion and emotional identification, extending empathy’s 
potential to create communities, affect individual identity, and train readers in appropriate 
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emotions and actions. Chapter 2 will begin to flesh out examples of how these cultural contexts 
might promote empathy in specific texts, asking what tools and topoi could encourage shared 






CHAPTER 2: THE MECHANICS OF NARRATIVE EMPATHY 
 
I begin this chapter by returning to Suzanne Keen’s definition of narrative empathy as 
“the sharing of feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or 
imagining narratives of another’s situation and condition.”1 Keen’s definition emphasizes that 
narrative empathy is  “induced,” suggesting an interaction between the mechanics of the text and 
the reader to produce a sense of shared perspective and emotion. The first chapter’s discussion of 
narrative empathy focused on cultural elements that might encourage a reader to approach a text 
empathetically, including vocabulary, texts, and concepts describing shared emotion and 
approaches to empathetic reading. This chapter shifts from the reader to the text, considering 
mechanisms by which Anglo-Saxon texts elicit emotional identification, or, perhaps better stated, 
the clues that might reveal to us where and how Anglo-Saxon texts encourage fellow-feeling. 
Excavating these mechanisms is particularly challenging because, as Keen is quick to note in her 
work, we have little evidence-based analysis of what textual elements induce empathy even for 
contemporary literature.2 Thus, it is more challenging to make a convincing case that some 
elements of a text are more empathetic than others. I approach this challenge by using a diversity 
of approaches – cognitive and cultural – in addition to the bases for empathy discussed in the 
previous chapter. Taken together, these approaches present a multidimensional description of 
how and why a text might invite empathy from Anglo-Saxon readers, and offer a more nuanced 
vocabulary for articulating mechanics of empathy that are often assumed by critics but not 
                                                
1 Keen, “Narrative Empathy,” The Living Handbook of Narratology, Interdisciplinary Center for Narratology, 
University of Hamburg, 14 September 2013, http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/narrative-empathy. 





always described in detail by them.3 
 In particular, I argue from the work of cognitive linguists David Miall, Don Kuiken, and 
Peter Stockwell that empathy is likely to occur in moments of special linguistic complexity, 
when texts manipulate linguistic features to control the reading experience, then induce moments 
of shock or defamiliarization that prompt readers to engage on a more emotional level with the 
text. In particular, by producing shifts in “text-worlds,” or the mental models that readers 
construct as they decode a text, a text can invite the kind of emotional engagement that leads 
readers to empathize with a character. In combination with these cognitive linguistic strategies, I 
explore two key philosophical or structural paradigms that Anglo-Saxon texts use to invite 
empathy, based on the work of historian Richard Morrison: a biological paradigm of unity that 
encourages fellow-feeling among parts of a larger community, and an aesthetic paradigm of 
opposition in which one reads themselves into the mind of another to experience fellow-feeling 
with someone unlike them. I illustrate each paradigm with an example drawn from a genre that 
particularly suits the strategies of each paradigm: Blickling Homily 10 represents how the 
homily often draws on the biological paradigm, while The Wife’s Lament demonstrates the 
suitedness of elegy to the aesthetic paradigm. In each case, I consider how the detailed linguistic 
features described by Stockwell, Miall, and Kuiken work in tandem with a particular empathic 
paradigm to invite empathy. My two examples offer opportunities to consider literary empathy in 
texts from different genres with contrasting purposes, audiences, and occasions. In particular, the 
edifying purpose and occasion of homilies lend them to the biological paradigm that emphasizes 
                                                
3 This is not to say that no scholars have explored the mechanics of empathy in specific texts. Some critics do 
attempt to explain how a text invites empathy – for example, Alain Renoir performs a New Critical reading of the 
Wife’s Lament in terms of empathy in “A Reading of The Wife’s Lament,” English Studies 58 (1977): 4-19. 
Antonina Harbus has also offered readings of portions of Old English poetry, for example in “The Long View: 
Cognitive Poetic Approaches to ‘Dynamic Affect’ in Early English Verse,” in Expressive Minds and Artistic 





Christian unity, while the imaginative tension of elegy lends itself to the aesthetic paradigm of 
unity in contrast. While an exhaustive survey of empathetic strategies in homilies and elegies is 
beyond the scope of this project, I also briefly consider for each example how other texts in their 
genre use similar or divergent strategies. My readings of various texts in Chapters 3-5 will 
demonstrate how the principles and mechanisms described here can also be found in other Old 
English genres, including heroic poetry and hagiography. 
 Many methodological challenges exist when discussing emotional responses to texts that 
are a thousand years old. First, we face the danger of projecting onto the past modern affective 
responses based on our own cultures and emotional communities. Medieval texts are targeted to 
specific medieval audiences with their own values and expectations, and their affective responses 
may overlap with ours in limited ways. Because empathetic appeals are often produced with 
particular audiences in mind, it is also important not to assume that a text that contemporary 
readers find alienating would have a similar effect on medieval readers. Recent work in Anglo-
Saxon studies has called attention to the importance of interrogating the desires that we bring to 
medieval texts, from the “desire for origins” posited by Allen Frantzen4 to the queer desires 
described by Carolyn Dinshaw in How Soon is Now.5 Others, such as Pauline Head6 and Renée 
Trilling,7 have considered the challenges of responding to Anglo-Saxon texts from a twenty-first 
century remove, drawing respectively on reader-response theory and Walter Benjamin’s concept 
of the constellation to address these challenges. Our emotional stances toward texts affect how 
we read the emotions of characters. Some scholars may read with a more suspicious, professional 
                                                
4 Allen Frantzen, Desire for Origins: New Language, Old English, and Teaching the Tradition (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1990). 
5 Carolyn Dinshaw, How Soon is Now?: Medieval Texts, Amateur Readers, and the Queerness of Time (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012). 
6 Pauline Head, Representation and Design: Tracing a Hermeneutics of Old English Poetry (Albany: State Univ. of 
New York Press, 1997). 
7 Renée R. Trilling, “Ruins in the Realm of Thoughts: Reading as Constellation in Anglo-Saxon Poetry,” Journal of 





distance, while others, acting on enthusiasm for the period or identifying with an idea, may find 
an empathetic stance easier to take. I do not wish to pass judgment on either position, but only to 
suggest that in both cases we must be careful not to confuse our emotions with those the text may 
have tried to elicit from its original readers. 
Further, modern readers often have difficulties interpreting the reactions and emotions of 
medieval characters and audiences in certain contexts. For example, readers may be rebuffed by 
Beowulf’s injunction that it is better to take vengeance for a friend than to mourn excessively, 
even though critics argue that the poem intends for readers to approve of this sentiment rather 
than be troubled by it.8 In other cases, simple comprehension of an emotion may be at stake, as 
in the difficulty of determining emotional states from litotes.9 The potential to anachronistically 
misread empathy will always exist,10 but careful scholarship can at least help us to proceed with 
awareness of how our position affects our readings. Study of medieval emotional communities, 
with their varying definitions, scripts,11 and norms, draws attention to where our reactions to a 
character or idea might differ from an Anglo-Saxon audience’s, or how various Anglo-Saxon 
audiences differ from each other. At other times, covert or overt emotional instructions in texts 
                                                
8 “Ne sorga, snotor guma. Selre bið æghwæm / þæt he his freond wrece þonne he fela murne” [Do not sorrow, wise 
man. It is better for each that he avenge his friend than that he excessively mourn]; Beowulf ll.1384-85. For 
approving readings of this sentiment, see Hill, The Cultural World in Beowulf, 26-37 and the footnote on these lines 
in Richard D. Fulk, Robert E. Bjork, and John D. Niles, eds., Klaeber’s Beowulf, 4th ed. (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 2008), p.202, n.1384b f. For a nuanced exploration of the role of grief in this episode and in revenge 
more generally in Beowulf, see Erin Sebo, “Ne Sorga: Grief and Revenge in Beowulf,” in Anglo-Saxon Emotions: 
Reading the Heart in Old English Language, Literature and Culture, edited by Alice Jorgensen, Frances 
McCormack and Jonathan Wilcox (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), 177-92. 
9 For the challenges of interpreting emotion in litotes, see Stephen Graham, “‘So What Did the Danes Feel?’: 
Emotion and Litotes in Old English Poetry,” in Anglo-Saxon Emotions: Reading the Heart in Old English 
Language, Literature and Culture, edited by Alice Jorgensen, Frances McCormack and Jonathan Wilcox (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2015), 75-90. 
10 See, for example, W.F. Bolton, Alcuin and Beowulf: An Eighth-Century View (New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press, 1978). 
11 In using the term “scripts,” I follow Sarah McNamer’s description of scripts as “the loosely affiliated cultural 
prescripts that aid in establishing and maintaining what cultural historians have termed ‘emotional regimes’ or 
‘emotional communities,’” Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion (Philadelphia, 





offer clues as to how authors wanted their texts to be understood. For example, when the homilist 
of Blickling 7 instructs the congregation to “habban godcunde blisse & eac worldcunde” [have 
spiritual and worldly bliss],12 this is an easy direction to interpret. On the other hand, when 
Ælfric explains in detail in Catholic Homilies ii.32 why the saved will have joy at the torment of 
the damned, this exposition suggests concern that his readers might have a different emotional 
reaction to reading about hell. Attention to these details, combined with cultural knowledge, is 
one means of guarding against anachronistic empathetic responses.13 Although we cannot predict 
how all readers will respond to a text, such details suggest at least how a text invites responses, 
even if readers do not reciprocate these responses. 
 While culturally-specific data are useful, research into how the mind processes texts can 
also provide complementary insights into how aesthetic artifacts can stimulate emotional and 
cognitive reactions. Since the biological component of emotion is common to humans, using 
cognitive linguistics in tandem with other cultural approaches may help describe why particular 
patterns in medieval texts could encourage emotional identification. Antonina Harbus’s work 
suggests a wide variety of possible applications for cognitive science in the study of Old English 
poetry, using ideas such as conceptual metaphors, conceptual blending, text-world theory, 
cognitive cultural studies, and cognitive emotional studies to explore how poems produce 
striking effects on readers.14 One chapter of Harbus’ book Cognitive Approaches to Old English 
Poetry focuses on methodologies for examining how Old English poetry represents and elicits 
                                                
12 The Blickling Homilies of the Tenth Century, ed. Richard Morris, Early English Text Society (London, 1880), 83. 
13 This is not to say that anachronistic empathy is wrong or does not constitute a valid object of study, only that it 
should not be uncritically mapped onto medieval emotional responses. See Carolyn Dinshaw, How Soon is Now? for 
one fruitful study of emotional reactions to the past. 
14See Harbus, Cognitive Approaches to Old English Poetry, Anglo-Saxon Studies 18 (Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 
2012); “Affective Poetics: The Cognitive Basis of Emotion in Old English Poetry,” in Anglo-Saxon Emotions: 
Reading the Heart in Old English Language, Literaure, and Culture, eds. Alice Jorgensen, Frances McCormack and 





emotions, including empathy.15 She calls for using a combination of approaches ranging from 
neuroscience to poetics to cultural studies to “literary approaches to the role of emotion in the 
aesthetics of reading,”16 and offers two brief examples considering Wulf and Eadwacer and 
Beowulf from the perspective of history of emotions.17 Further, Harbus considers how these Old 
English poems elicit empathy in modern readers who lack the cultural background of Anglo-
Saxons but possess a biological similarity to them: as the reader attempts to make sense of a text 
such as Wulf and Eadwacer with its repeated emphasis on biologically common emotions such 
as anger or sadness, the reader must imagine these emotions, leading to empathy. 
The value in cognitive research should be combined with studies of emotions in 
particular cultures for a more nuanced picture. Harbus’ readings – understandably brief given the 
constraints of a book providing an exploratory survey – rely primarily on the assumption that 
readers who see an emotion depicted in a text will feel that emotion via simulation and embodied 
experience, so that reading about grief produces grief, etc. This may be true in a wide variety of 
cases, but culturally-conditioned aspects of emotion also shade our experience and evaluation of 
emotion.18 William Miller, writing about emotions in medieval Icelandic society, considers the 
shock that present-day readers often register at the display of emotions in many sagas of 
Icelanders in which a character may smile at her husband’s murderers or swell to bursting with 
fury.19 He argues that even biological emotions are affected by cultural norms that determine 
appropriate reactions, accompanying emotions, and value judgments, and that consciousness of 
                                                
15 See in particular Harbus, Cognitive Approaches to Old English Poetry, 168-169 for her survey of cognitive 
science research related to empathy. 
16 Ibid., 169. 
17 Ibid., 172, 174. 
18 Harbus acknowledges this in her more recent work; see “Embodied Emotion, Conceptual Metaphor, and the 
Aesthetics of Reading Old English Poetry,” in Understanding Emotions in Early Europe, eds. Michael Champion 
and Andrew Lynch (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 127-49; and “The Long View.” 
19 William Ian Miller, “Emotions and the Sagas,” in From Sagas to Society: Comparative Approaches to Early 





an emotion affects our perception of it. Further, cognitive narratologist Ralf Schneider points out 
that cultural categories affect the way that we build characters in our mind from the information 
in texts; to this we might add the way that we evaluate these characters on ethical, social, and 
aesthetic scales.20 As Daniel Anlezark emphasizes, classical and patristic theories of emotion can 
diverge dramatically from ours; for example, Anlezark reads a Stoic suspicion of intense emotion 
(based on the philosophy of church fathers such as Augustine and Cassian) into The Wanderer 
where contemporary readers might be inclined to feel sympathy for the anguished exile.21 On 
this analogy, even if we share certain biological features with Anglo-Saxon readers that might 
sometimes cause us to feel similar emotions, our initial emotional response to a text like Wulf 
and Eadwacer is unlikely to truly reflect the complex array of judgments and activities bundled 
with these emotions for original readers, putting us at risk of mislabeling the emotions in a text 
based on anachronistic emotional assumptions. For this reason, linguistic and cultural analysis is 
crucial to history of emotions scholarship. 
In addition to this caveat, cognitive linguistics is far from a unitary body of knowledge 
that can be uncritically applied to Old English texts. Theorists disagree about issues as basic as 
the reading process. For example, Keith Oatley joins Harbus in viewing literary reading as an act 
of “simulation” in which readers place themselves in the position of a character: “the central 
process is that the reader runs the actions of the character on his own planning processes, taking 
on the character’s goals, and experiencing emotions as these plans meet vicissitudes.”22 On the 
other hand, proponents of “theory-theory” believe that a reader can understand the mind of a 
                                                
20 Schneider, “Toward a Cognitive Theory of Literary Character.” 
21 Daniel Anlezark, “From Elegy to Lyric: Changing Emotion in Early English Poetry,” in Understanding Emotions 
in Early Europe, eds. Michael Champion and Andrew Lynch (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 73-98, esp. 93-94. See also 
Thomas D. Hill, “The Unchanging Hero: A Stoic Maxim in The Wanderer and Its Contexts,” Studies in Philology 
101.3 (Summer 2004): 233-249. 
22 Keith Oatley, “A Taxonomy of the Emotions of Literary Response and a Theory of Identification in Fictional 





character by constructing a folk psychology of how they act.23 Further, lack of empirical 
evidence cautions against uncritically accepting hypotheses raised; as Keen pointed out in 2006, 
there are far more people who have asserted that textual features promote empathy than there are 
well-supported explanatory mechanisms for how these features promote empathy.24 Finally, no 
cognitive linguistic theory can universally explain the aesthetic reactions of any reader, and 
people might read against the affective grain of a text because of personality or for any number 
of idiosyncratic reasons.25 In an appendix to her work, Keen provides a list of hypotheses about 
narrative empathy, generated by Keen and others, to encourage further research; many of these 
hypotheses emphasize the potential for empathy to be based on random features that may not 
have been deliberately inserted into a text, such as chance similarity to other historical events.26 
Given these caveats, cognitive linguistics might not seem to be a useful tool. But these 
limitations only caution against uncritical reliance on cognitive linguistics, not against testing its 
insights in tandem with what we know about medieval emotional communities and their 
strategies of reading and composing texts. Where overlap exists between our theories and those 
of medieval readers, we have greater reason to suspect that a text might have elicited empathy 
from readers of the past. At the very least, it can lead to new hypotheses about how emotion 
functioned in Old English texts. With this in mind, I turn to a few modern bases to add to the 
medieval ones presented in chapter one, beginning with a historian of ideas and his theories 
about philosophical bases for empathy in the Western world, which suggest an underlying 
cultural basis for fellow-feeling that is replicated in the patterns of texts that invite such 
emotional identification.  
                                                
23 See Adam Morton, Frames of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
24 Keen, Empathy and the Novel, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93.  
25 See also Keen’s discussion of personality and empathy in “Readers’ Temperaments and Fictional Character,” New 






Cultural Paradigms: Morrison’s Biological and Aesthetic Models 
 “The history of compassion is yet to be written,” Karl Morrison writes at the beginning of 
his work ‘I Am You’: The Hermeneutics of Empathy in Western Literature, Theology, and Art.27 
In this book, Morrison takes on the daring task of sketching this history, theorizing the bases that 
enabled empathetic identification in western culture from late antiquity through modernity and 
employing several examples from Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, including the writings of 
Augustine and the medieval iconoclasm controversy. Although a historian of ideas, Morrison 
often disregards strict chronicity,28 juxtaposing artifacts from widely disparate times and 
cultures. Yet Morrison’s work is useful because he identifies prevailing patterns associated with 
fellow-feeling that had common cultural understandings attached to them. Morrison settles 
primarily on two paradigms that facilitated empathy in western culture, which he calls 
“biological” and “aesthetic.” The biological paradigm is based on models within the natural 
world such as biological reproduction, the sexual union of two beings, and the organic unity of 
part to whole. It found a ready base in the scriptural and patristic doctrines of humanity being 
made in the image of God, and in the ecclesiological doctrine of Christians as the body of Christ, 
which has already been discussed in the first chapter as a basis for Anglo-Saxon empathy. The 
aesthetic paradigm derives its form in part from theories of aesthetics in which various shades 
and shapes unite to form an artistic whole, and in part from the role of the viewer participating in 
a work of art. Both paradigms provide intelligible analogies for empathetic identification.29 
                                                
27 Karl Morrison,‘I Am You’: The Hermeneutics of Empathy in Western Literature, Theology, and Art (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1988), xix. 
28 See for example James O. Duke’s review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1991): 127-28. 
29 Morrison also cautions that within both patterns, power dynamics are at play that make empathy far from the 
union of equals. If the biological paradigm presents a schema for unity, it also suggests the dominance of one 
creature over another in such relationships. For example, Christians have fellow-feeling with Christ as the mystical 
body of the Church, but Christ has precedence as the head of the organism. If the aesthetic paradigm suggests how 
contrasting elements can combine into a greater artistic whole, it also suggests the imposition of pattern on chaos, 





 Morrison’s paradigms are valuable for interrogating the mechanisms of empathy because 
they work not only on the level of thought, but also at the level of language, where structural 
patterns can replicate biological unity through relationships such as synecdoche and mis-en-
abyme or aesthetic unity through relationships of contrast. Perhaps this is most obvious in 
Morrison’s discussion of “malevolent sympathy,”30 a fellow-feeling rooted in opposition and 
based on the aesthetic paradigm of empathy that sees artistic unity in opposing concepts. As a 
case study of how opposites attract, Morrison describes Augustine’s exegesis of Jacob and Esau. 
Through a complex transferal of identities, Augustine imbues the literal story of Jacob and Esau 
with a multiplicity of significations in which Jacob represents both flesh and spirit, a type of 
Christ (with Jacob’s deception mirroring the Crucifixion) and of sinful humanity – evil and good 
merged in one person. The reader could connect and interpret these opposing sides only if they 
read between the lines and filled in the concepts that would enable association but are left 
unspecified in the text.31 Yet this uniting of opposite concepts works not only typologically but 
linguistically in the movements of rhetorical tropes, for as Augustine argues in Contra 
mendacium, the contrary images of metaphor or antiphrasis can produce aesthetic and 
epistemological closure, revealing truth through an apparent lie.32 
                                                                                                                                                       
pointing out the power relations inherent in these mechanisms of empathy, Morrison reminds us to attend to the 
ideological dimensions of virtue such as compassion and the mechanisms that encourage them. 
30 Morrison, I Am You, 69. 
31 Morrison, I Am You, 82. 
32 “Quae si mendacia dixerimus, omnes etiam parabolae ac figurae significandarum quarumque rerum, quae non ad 
proprietatem accipiendae sunt, sed in eis aliud ex alio est intellegendum, dicentur esse mendacia: quod absit omnino. 
Nam qui hoc putat, tropicis etiam tam multis locutionibus omnibus potest hanc inportare calumniam, ita ut et ipsa 
quae appellatur metaphora, hoc est de re propria ad rem non propriam uerbi alicuius usurpata translatio, possit ista 
ratione mendacium nuncupari” [The which if we shall call lies, all parables also, and figures designed for the 
signifying of any things soever, which are not to be taken according to their proper meaning, but in them is one thing 
to be understood from another, shall be said to be lies: which be far from us altogether. For he who thinks this, may 
also in regard of tropical expressions of which there are so many, bring in upon all of them this calumny; so that 
even metaphor, as it is called, that is, the usurped transferring of any word from its proper object to an object not 
proper, may at this rate be called a lie]; Augustine, Contra mendacium, ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL 41 (Vienna, 1900), 
ch. 10, para 24, 499; translation H. Browne, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3, edited by Philip 





Augustine’s Sermo 5, on Jacob’s wrestling match with the angel, exemplifies the 
aesthetic paradigm in uniting contraries through typological and literary features.33 On a thematic 
level, the sermon invokes opposites in its message that the church must bear with the sins of its 
wicked members until they are sorted out at the Judgment. On a symbolic level, Jacob possesses 
contrasting significations, standing both for the true Church in his conflict with Esau and for bad 
Christians in his conflict with the angel. At the level of language, Augustine unites opposites 
through metaphor and linguistic patterning. For example, the passage describing how Jacob 
steals Esau’s birthright uses tricks of language to bring together disparate concepts: 
Hirsutus natus erat et pilosus Esau, id est plenus peccatis; haerebant in illo peccata. Ille 
autem ut acciperet primatum, accepit pelles haedorum in brachiis, et sic illum benedixit 
pater, palpans brachia ipsius et inueniens hirsutum. Sed illi capilli et peccata portabantur 
a Iacob, non haerebant in Iacob. 
[Esau was born shaggy and hairy, that is full of sin; sins were clinging to him. Moreover 
that he [Jacob] might receive the primacy, he received the skins of young goats on his 
arms, and so the father blessed him, touching his arms and finding shagginess. But these 
furs and sins were being carried by Jacob, not clinging to Jacob; V.4.146-151] 
Augustine invites empathy with Jacob and Esau as attracting opposites by using a complex set of 
metaphors and associations. For example, he employs hair as a metaphor for sins that unites 
Jacob and Esau but with a key difference.34 Both men are hairy at least for a time, but Esau is 
“pilosus” by nature whereas Jacob carries “capilli”; it is fur rather than human hair, but the word 
                                                
33 Augustine, Sermones de vetere testamento (1-50), ed. Lambot, CCSL 41 (Turnhout, Brepols, 1961), 50-60. 
Morrison references Sermo 5 in his discussion of malevolent sympathy, but the close readings in this section are my 
own. 
34 Although Augustine does not make this connection explicit in the text, it seems likely that hairiness can reflect sin 
because Jacob is wearing hairy goat skins, and goats represent sinners on Judgment Day in Matthew 25:33. See, for 
example, Edmund Hill’s note in Sermons 1-19, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century 





contains the root “pilus” that binds it with Esau. The passage also uses patterns such as the p-
alliteration and parallelism of balanced phrases to link descriptions of Jacob and Esau. Augustine 
then moves a step further to equate Jacob’s hairy arms with the church that carries (“portat”) the 
sins of others and with Jesus who carries the sins of others (including, of course, the sins of the 
church), an identification that moves outward to incorporate larger and larger groups as language 
smooths over fissures to create a coherent whole so that readers come to see themselves in both 
Jacob and Esau.35 The Church Fathers recognized the potential of linguistic structures such as 
metaphor to unite opposites in a deeper spiritual meaning, and utilized this potential by 
describing the soul’s progress toward God with the contrary language of spheres that they 
condemned, as when they described martyrs as gladiators or compared liturgical participation to 
the theater.36 A deeper truth could be achieved by identifying with the features of something 
abhorrent, transforming its signification. 
While the example above potentially lacks the aspect of emotional identification,37 
Morrison takes his argument further to claim that the aesthetic contrast of malevolent sympathy 
could allow a reader to empathize with the damned, because “awareness of one’s own sinfulness 
and of the small number of the predestined rendered the agonies of the damned a potential mirror 
for each Christian, the object of empathetic participation, not merely monstrous.”38 Readers who 
remembered their own capacity for damnation while reading depictions of the damned, 
supplying the “negative values” omitted in the depiction, might feel empathy as well as 
                                                
35 In Sermo 5, Augustine appears to deflect potential sympathy for Esau in two primary ways. First, he emphasizes 
the figural meaning of the story, and in particular its nature as a mysterium, drawing attention away from Esau as a 
historical figure who is cheated of his birthright. But even at the historical level, Augustine points out that the curse 
on Esau that he will serve his younger brother does not come true for him during his life; instead, he lives a life of 
wealth while Jacob works as a shepherd. See Sermones de vetere testamento (1-50), ed. Lambot, p. 54-55. 
36 Morrison, I Am You, 74-78. 
37 One could argue that the aesthetic patterning could lead to artifact-emotions that may become reanalyzed as 
fiction-emotions, but this would stretch the evidence we possess. 





revulsion. For readers who are able to feel conflicting emotions simultaneously and keep in 
tension multiple possibilities, the aesthetic paradigm enables a complex shared emotion. In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I will discuss texts that employ the apposite emotions of the aesthetic paradigm 
in particularly sophisticated ways. 
Although Morrison’s work is not without weaknesses, and his broad-brushed approach 
should not be uncritically mapped on to Anglo-Saxon readings, his findings suggest two critical 
ideas: first, that empathy could be based on analogies; and second, that these analogies could 
play out in the structural and linguistic features of texts. His references to Augustine and other 
Church Fathers suggest that these concepts were tenets of patristic exegesis. Further, his concept 
of empathy by contrast suggests a basis for empathy with groups that are outside the social norm 
or even antithetical to it – an idea to which I will return later. Viewed as a whole, Morrison’s 
approach to empathy provides philosophical and historical evidence that structural and linguistic 
features can provide bases for patterns of emotional identification. Next, I will discuss evidence 
from cognitive science that provides additional vocabulary for describing how linguistic patterns 
influence cognition and emotion. 
Cognitive Stylistics and Foregrounding: Miall, Kuiken, and Stockwell 
 The first two cognitive linguists that I turn to are particularly associated with the 
discipline of cognitive stylistics, which focuses on how fine-grained stylistic patterns affect 
reader response. David Miall has conducted several studies into users’ immediate reactions to 
texts, many of these in collaboration with Don Kuiken.39 They draw on the concept of 
foregrounding, developed from the work of Czech theorist Jan Mukarovský, which describes 
                                                





how particular stylistic elements arrest reader attention.40 Such devices cause defamiliarization, 
which slows down reading time, leads readers to pay more attention to a text, and elicits 
emotions. In one study,41 Miall and Kuiken assessed reader reactions to a short story that testers 
agreed contained foregrounding; they discovered that readers tended to report more emotional 
responses when they encountered passages with foregrounding, whether the readers had more or 
less exposure to literature. In a later study that measured how reading time slowed when readers 
encountered foregrounding, Miall and Kuiken suggested a three-step model of reading to explain 
how individuals reacted to foregrounded passages.42 First, a reader would encounter 
defamiliarizing elements, which would evoke emotions. Next, the reader would attempt to 
understand how these emotions fit into the story. In the final step, the reader would figure out 
how to interpret the defamiliarization in the larger context of the story, leading them to 
reinterpret the story as well as the defamiliarizing episode. Miall and Kuiken’s model describes 
responding to emotion as a part of interpretation, with the potential to change how readers 
understand a work. 
Peter Stockwell approaches similar issues in reader response from the perspective of 
cognitive stylistics. Instead of using the language of defamiliarization and foregrounding, 
Stockwell posits that texts draw emotional investment using attractors, textual features that 
receive the reader’s primary attention because they possess qualities such as size or movement.43 
The concept of attractors is similar to foregrounding in its focus on what draws the reader’s 
focus, but Stockwell’s model focuses on what sustains attention at any given moment rather than 
                                                
40 David S. Miall and Don Kuiken, “Foregrounding, Defamiliarization, and Affect: Response to Literary Stories.” 
Poetics 22 (1994): 389-407, 390. 
41 Miall and Kuiken, “Foregrounding, Defamiliarization, and Affect.” 
42 David S. Miall and Don Kuiken, “Shifting Perspectives: Readers’ Feelings and Literary Responses,” in New 
Perspectives on Narrative Perspective: ed. W. Van Peer and S. Chatman (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), 289-301. 





what disrupts attention through the play of language, and attractors are “conceptual” rather than 
“purely linguistic.”44 Stockwell also provides more technical detail than Miall and Kuiken in 
suggesting what might make a linguistic feature an attractor, including qualities such as newness, 
agency (with nouns in the active position functioning as better attractors than passive nouns), 
subject position, similarity to humans, definiteness, activeness, brightness, fullness, largeness, 
height, noisiness, and aesthetic distance from a norm (either excessively beautiful or ugly). 
Attractors can either be maintained if focus is kept on them, or neglected as new attractors come 
into play.45 Manipulating the reader’s attention through patterns of attractors leads to a sense of 
resonance, which Stockwell defines as “the readerly feeling that certain powerful literary texts 
leave a long-lasting and ineffable sense of significance.”46 Resonance might be compared to a 
sense of literariness, or to a sustained emotional response. Such a phenomenon is possible to 
achieve because, as Harbus explains in her evaluation of Stockwell’s work, “the human mind is 
primed to notice changes and to perceive edges,” so that changes and boundary-crossings 
produce more dramatic responses from the reader.47 When attractors are suddenly brought to the 
foreground or switched, we notice these changes, leading to an interpretive response similar to 
that envisioned by Miall and Kuiken in their work on defamiliarization. 
In order to describe the types of boundary crossings that lead to a sense of resonance and 
increased emotional engagement, it is necessary to draw on the concept of deixis from the field 
of pragmatics. Peter Matthews defines deixis as “the way in which the reference of certain 
elements in a sentence is determined in relation to a specific speaker and addressee and a specific 
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time and place of utterance.”48 For example, in the sentence ‘I carried that over there,’ “I,” 
“that,” and “there” can only be determined by their relationship to the speaker. S. C. Levinson 
categorizes five types of deixis: person (using pronouns such as I and you), place (including 
demonstratives such as this, that, and there), time (using words such as then, now, before), 
discourse (referring to other sections within a discourse), and social (referring to relative social 
positions).49 As a minor sixth category Levinson mentions empathetic deixis, which indicates a 
speaker’s emotional proximity or distance from a subject, for example by using “that” to indicate 
emotional distance in the sentence “I would never do that.”50 The central point of deictic 
reference is called the origo, which is often the time and place of the speaker or the protagonist 
of a text. According to Stockwell, shifts in deictic referents affect whether a reader processes a 
text as resonant. A deictic shift deeper into the world of a text (such as changing time or location 
from the speaker or shifting to a new deictic center within the text world) is called a push, while 
a deictic shift away from the text into the world of the reader (for example, through 
metanarrative comments or a homiletic aside in Old English texts) is called a pop.51 Pushes and 
pops engage attention and can serve as new attractors that reorient a discourse, requiring 
additional mental effort (and thus greater emotional engagement). 
In Texture: A Cognitive Aesthetics of Reading, Stockwell further suggests how this 
mental effort can lead to empathy.52 He bases his discussion on three metaphors often used to 
describe reading: reading as control, reading as transportation, and reading as investment. 
“Reading as control” refers to the empathetic investment encouraged by texts that manage series 
of attractors and match form to meaning, suggesting a high degree of control in textual patterns. 
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To describe how “reading as transportation” works as an empathetic model, Stockwell 
incorporates the tenets of text world theory, which assert that readers and writers “create a text 
world on the basis of perceived common ground knowledge that they seem to share.”53 This 
imagined construct of the world is populated both with elements from the text and elements from 
the reader’s experience or inferences. Text worlds change as the reader acquires new information 
and can multiply as the text “switches” into “sub-worlds” that are organized around deictic shifts 
in point of view, negation, changes in time, or hypothetical situations.54 The reader who moves 
across such textual worlds will feel a sense of movement or transportation while also working 
harder to process the text, and Stockwell argues that this “depth of effort” across world-switches 
can lead to empathy because they require more mental work, making it more likely that readers 
will cross the boundary into feeling with a character.55 He tests his hypothesis through close 
readings of poems that he has found to elicit particularly strong affective responses from 
audiences belonging to a variety of cultures, suggesting that this response may be more due to 
the effects of the poems’ patterns and disruption of cognitive processes than to cultural norms of 
emotion. One could argue from Stockwell’s research that his audience’s emotional reactions 
might be artifact-emotions rather than fiction-emotions, as they seem to be elicited by patterns in 
the text rather than events within the story-world. But emotions once elicited by a text might be 
reattributed to other features as a reader processes the text, so that artifact-emotions could be 
subconsciously reassigned to characters, leading one to interpret an emotion brought on by 
textual patterns as empathy. Stockwell’s third model for empathy, “reading as investment,” 
suggests that readers do choose to “invest” in characters by devoting the mental resources to 
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understanding them, which could promote this switch from artifact-emotion to fiction-emotion. 
Stockwell’s research is valuable because, in Harbus’ words, it contends “that readers of literary 
texts can have a cognitive affective response to that text that is susceptible to systematic 
scrutiny.”56 Both by making this methodological assertion and by suggesting specific means of 
scrutinizing affective responses to texts in terms of the elements within those texts, Stockwell 
opens up new ways to study how texts elicit emotions. 
Miall, Kuiken, and Stockwell suggest various linguistic features to attend to in a search 
for the mechanisms of empathy in Anglo-Saxon texts. Miall and Kuiken highlight features of 
language that could cause a reader to pause and devote additional time to making meaning. 
Stockwell suggests that empathy can come from places of aesthetic complexity where form is 
matched to content, as well as from world-switches – represented by changes in time, person, 
hypotheticality, or along other scales – that promote deeper investment. These fine-grained 
theories could be combined with knowledge of the norms of different Anglo-Saxon emotional 
communities to help us understand how Anglo-Saxon texts elicit empathy.  
The remainder of this chapter will attempt to do so by reading two examples of texts from 
contrasting genres to compare and contrast their strategies for eliciting empathy. Often the 
formal features of particular genres help us to excavate Anglo-Saxon emotional norms – for 
example, homilies employ the homiletic we to imply a unity between speaker/teacher and 
audience/learner, which further implies the need to share the speaker’s affective responses to 
good and evil targets. In addition to encoding different norms, genres typically address different 
audiences and occasions. For these reasons, we might expect texts of differing genres to employ 
different approaches to elicit empathy. Further, where we find similar strategies employed, this 
may tell us more about what empathy strategies were seen as effective across a variety of 
                                                





contexts. I have selected examples that particularly exemplify the biological and aesthetic 
paradigms to illustrate how these paradigms work out in the thematic and structural elements of 
specific texts and contexts. However, to avoid the perception that all homilies or elegies employ 
the features of my respective examples, I will also consider each example within their genre, 
briefly discussing how other examples within their genre employ similar or divergent strategies. 
The Biological Paradigm: Blickling 10 
  If, as Sara McNamer argues, emotions such as compassion are created through cultural 
“scripts,” then a discussion of empathy in Anglo-Saxon England cannot avoid homilies, which 
are key scripts of Anglo-Saxon culture.57 As repositories of doctrine and records of particular 
beliefs, homilies frequently describe appropriate and inappropriate emotions. They delineate the 
virtues and vices (which Theresa Brennan has called the earliest example of affect in the west),58 
depict the psychology of temptation, and explain the religious motivations for feelings such as 
compassion and compunction. Further, they attempt to elicit the feelings proper to Christian 
living, important in a belief system where feeling rightly is key to salvation. Eschatological 
homilies invoke the dread of Judgment Day that leads one to correct living, while narratives and 
exempla stir the audience to compassion. Homiletic saints’ lives present narratives of model 
figures, engaging the audience’s concern on their behalf and stoking a desire to imitate them. 
Indeed, regardless of the context in which homilies might have been delivered or heard,59 one 
could argue that homilies are heavily invested in producing and managing emotions. But finally, 
homilies themselves also stage emotional performances of outrage, terror, joy, and concern as 
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what Mary Swan calls “an emotional expression or enactment of belief.”60 Careful attention to 
the homilies, then, reveals much about the functions and mechanisms of Anglo-Saxon empathy 
and the place of emotion itself in Anglo-Saxon culture. 
While homilies are important to a study of empathy in Anglo-Saxon England, they do not 
rely on empathy as a primary mode of emotional engagement.61 Further, when they do invite 
empathy, this empathy can be surprising, elicited not only for beggars and saints but dead bodies 
and damned souls. But if fellow-feeling plays out in varied and unusual ways across the scripts 
of Old English homilies, it is often stimulated by genre-specific strategies, as when homilists 
employ the authority of the homiletic we to encourage audiences to share in particular emotions. 
As homilies modulate between exhortation and instruction or narrative, homilies frequently 
move the reader through a variety of text-worlds, introducing deictic shifts that require increased 
mental engagement to track. Ornamental rhetorical features such as alliteration, contrasting pairs, 
and other strategies create patterns of attractors for readers to track, setting them up for moments 
of defamiliarization when these patterns are shifted. In addition to cognitive linguistic strategies, 
homilies frequently invoke Morrison’s biological paradigm by focusing on community identity 
rooted in shared bodily experience. One can feel with beggars, saints, Christ, the dying, and the 
damned because all have shared at some point the experience of embodiment. Conversely, 
fellow-feeling for others can draw one in to identify with a community conceptualized as a body. 
In Chapter 1, I noted that Anglo-Saxon texts sometimes use Christ’s embodiment and union with 
other Christians to encourage fellow-feeling within the Church, an instance of Morrison’s 
biological paradigm of empathy “in which many members became one.”62 In that chapter, I 
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discussed homiletic instances in which embodiment and fellow-feeling are explicitly linked, as 
when Ælfric tells Christians to suffer with one another because they are members of the same 
mystical body.63 However, the biological paradigm can also be invoked implicitly as a basis for 
fellow-feeling by referring to experiences that all people have or will share in by virtue of their 
embodiment. For example, invoking the universality of the body’s dissolution at death could be a 
gateway to empathetic engagement. A person facing death (or speaking from the grave) in a 
homiletic exemplum can metonymically stand for all Christians to whom he is connected 
through the biological paradigm, reminding readers of their future experience of death and 
encouraging an emotionally congruent response. In this section, I focus on how Blickling 10 
invites readers to empathize with a dead man’s bones, in the process employing both cognitive 
linguistic strategies and Morrison’s biological paradigm on an implicitly topical level and a 
structural or linguistic level.64 
The cultural and liturgical contexts of Blickling 10 provide the first clues to how it 
encourages empathy. As a Rogationtide sermon,65 Blickling 10 was likely written for a diverse 
audience, who would have experienced the homily along with several other affective events.66 It 
was also more likely to be read to a mixed audience of people (including less educated people), 
as this liturgical season prescribed a high level of lay participation. During Rogationtide, 
laypeople were to fast until the ninth hour, attend church, process barefoot about the bounds of 
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the parish with relics, and pray at various stations –activities designed to emphasize the 
penitential themes of the season.67 Blickling 10 employs many themes common to Rogationtide 
to stimulate feelings and actions appropriate to the liturgical season.68 Rogation processions 
would reinforce remembrance of the biological paradigm of fellow-feeling that unites all 
Christians under Christ.69 This sense would be sharpened by an emphasis on the coming 
celebration of the Ascension, which commemorated Christ’s bodily ascent to heaven as the Head 
of the church.70 Bedingfield explains that the activities of Rogation also focus on penance, 
spurring people “to realize the danger of their sinful state by seeing themselves as one with the 
people of Ninevah and Vienne” who were believed to have instituted the Rogation Day 
traditions, a liturgical identification that might make empathy with penitent characters easier.71 
But this would be true only for those who truly accorded with the spirit of the event, and if the 
injunctions of the Council of Clofesho are any indication, many people treated these penitential 
days as festivals instead, with activities such as horse-racing.72 Perhaps the number of Rogation 
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homilies dealing with Judgment Day and vivid visions of torment73 were intended to shock such 
people into a spirit of seriousness about the occasion.  
Blickling 10 uses the biological paradigm and the technique of defamiliarization to 
encourage a somber emotional response, focusing on a central, empathetic exemplum about a 
man who hears the bones of his dead kinsman admonish him from the grave.74 In order to elicit 
empathy, the homily first builds to its emotional core by establishing a pattern of attractors and 
emphasizing the shared embodiment that forms the basis of the biological paradigm. Next, its 
exemplum creates a series of narrative text-worlds which it then collapses, encouraging the 
reader to bridge these text-world levels and empathize with a sorrowful kinsman at the heart of 
the story, who himself empathizes with the bones of his dead kin which speak to him. At the 
heart of this homily’s appeal to empathy is its emphasis on the biological paradigm, which unites 
humans in life and death and enables the crossing of text-worlds. 
First, the homily prepares the reader to empathize through its lengthy introduction, which 
emphasizes the need for penitential emotions and behavior in this season. This passage 
introduces various linguistic attractors for the mind to track, including antithesis, ornamental 
alliteration, and repetition of soþan (true) and gecyrran (turn) emphasizing penitential themes. 
As Stockwell argues, these patterns provide a track for mental engagement that can lead to 
increased investment if the track is shifted. In addition to recurring words and sounds, the 
introduction recurrently features the body as an attractor, whether dead, dying, or resurrected. On 
earth, each person is not to be “on his lichoman to strang” [too confident in his body], and is not 
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to expect “þæt his lichama mote oþþe mæge þa synbyrþenna on eorþscrafe gebetan” [that his 
body would or could atone for the burden of sin in the grave], where the body will only “on 
moldan gemolsnaþ” [decay to dust] until Judgment Day, at which time in the general 
resurrection “biþ þonne se flæschoma ascyred swa glæs, ne mæg ðæs unrihtes beon awiht 
bedigled” [the body will then be made clear as glass, nor may unrighteousness be concealed at 
all].75 The elegant figura etymologica “on moldan gemolsnaþ” [decay to dust] emphasizes the 
substance to which the body returns, burying it in the verb gemolsnaþ and the noun moldan, 
fixating the reader on the dirt. In response to their mortality, individuals must believe (among 
other things) in “lichoman æristes on domos dæg” [the resurrection of the body on Judgment 
Day].76 This relentless emphasis on the body points readers to their common end as embodied 
persons. 
As the introduction begins to pivot toward the central exemplum, the homily draws on an 
emotive literary trope that is engaging on both cognitive and cultural levels. The homilist 
describes the loss of all things after death, and the point of view lingers on the worm-eaten body 
as the narrator asks a series of rhetorical questions about where his riches, pride, clothing, and 
adornments have gone.77 These questions draw on the Latin ubi sunt tradition which features in 
the Synonyma of Isidore of Seville and appears in other Old English homilies and elegies (as well 
as in Christ and Satan, as I will discuss in chapter 4).78 As Di Sciacca notes, this trope has 
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particularly emotive effect, falling in the ornamental tradition of “conduplicatio, that is, word-
repetition expressive of sorrow, indignation, or love, which attains a heightened emotional effect 
insofar as the repeated rhetorical questions amplify the absence of their subject.”79 The ubi sunt 
trope also invites the reader’s engagement by suggesting interaction, gesturing at dialogue 
implied by a question even as readers clearly know the answer – the pomp and splendor of the 
dead have departed. In addition, ubi sunt questions introduce cognitive complexity through the 
tension they exhibit between two text-worlds – a past world in which the splendor exists and a 
present one in which it does not. Such questions also make the present text-world the reader 
shares with the questioner a proleptic version of the text-world that has vanished; we are 
implicitly in the subject position of those who once were. This identification with another’s 
subject position encourages empathy. Together, these features make the ubi sunt trope 
particularly emotive. 
As a whole, the introduction brings the body to the forefront as an attractor, playing into 
Rogationtide themes of the unity of humanity both with Christ and with one another as parts of a 
biological whole. In addition, by establishing particular thematic, rhythmic and syntactic 
patterns, the introduction produces a sense of literariness or aesthetic control that the following 
section manipulates by breaking these patterns. Further, the introduction presents a series of text-
world switches – between the homiletic “we” and David; between the present, death, and 
Judgment Day; between the splendor of the rich man and the vision of his rotting corpse, and 
between those in the past of the ubi sunt text-world and those in the present world who will be in 
that past – that promote cognitive engagement for those readers who choose to follow these 
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switches. According to Stockwell, these shifting text-worlds invite the kind of mental 
engagement that is likely to cross over into empathy. 
At this point, the homilist introduces the central empathetic exemplum, employing 
discourse deixis that combines person deixis we and temporal nu deixis, announcing “Magon we 
nu geheran [secg]gean be [sumum welegum men] & woruldricum” [we may now hear tell about 
a certain man, wealthy and worldly-rich].80 The complex nested deictic shifts of this statement 
pop the reader out of their previous narrative level, contemplating the end of all things, and 
signals to them to divert more cognitive energy to interpreting what will follow. The discourse 
deixis emphasizes the immediacy of the exemplum, as it unfolds nu for readers. The man lives a 
happy life with his material goods, described in a series of parallel phrases with m- and w- 
alliteration that mimics earlier patterns of alliteration in the homily to link his prosperous 
conditions and his joyous emotions. But then the story takes a sudden shift: 
Þa gelamp him þæt his lif wearð geendod, & færlic ende onbecom þisses lænan lifæs; þa 
wæs his negmaga sum & his worldfreonda þæt hine swyþor lufode þonne ænig oþor man, 
he þa for þære langunga & for þære geomrunga þæs oþres deaþes leng on þam lande 
gewunian ne mihte; ac he unrotmod of his cyþþe gewat & of his earde, & on þam lande 
feala wintra wunode, & him næfre seo langung ne geteorode, ac hine swiþe gehyrde & 
þreade. Þa ongan hine eft langian on his cyþþe, for þon þæt he wolde geseon eft & 
sceawian þa byrgenne, hwylc se wære þe he oft ær mid wlite & mid wæstmum fægerne . . 
. geseah;81 
[Then it happened to him that his life ended, and a sudden end came to this temporary 
life. Then a certain one of his close kinsmen and of his world-friends that loved him more 
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strongly than any other man, who then because of the longing and because of the sorrow 
at the death of the other might not dwell long in the land; but he sad at heart departed 
from his homeland and from his country, and dwelt in the land for many winters, and the 
longing never ceased, but severely oppressed and afflicted him. Then he began again to 
long for his homeland, because he wished again to see and inspect the grave, how he was 
whom he often before with splendor and with fair adornments . . . saw;] 
This section invites defamiliarization, and thus empathy, through its carefully-controlled 
switches from expected patterns. First, the rich man, the subject of the first sentence and 
seemingly established as the protagonist of the exemplum, dies in the following sentence, the 
impersonal report of his “færlic ende” mimicking the abruptness of his departure. In pragmatics, 
the topic empathy hierarchy hypothesizes that topics of sentences will be stronger attractors and 
more likely targets of empathy,82 but the news of the rich man’s death occludes empathy by its 
impersonal construction: “gelamp him þæt his lif wearð geendod.” Such an expectation-defying 
moment, shifting away from the anticipated protagonist, could induce defamiliarization, breaking 
established patterns and causing readers to reevaluate their understanding of the story thus far, 
recontextualizing the rich man not as the protagonist of the story but as one more reminder that 
death comes to all, no matter their prosperity on earth. By encouraging this reevaluation to make 
sense of the story, the exemplum requires an additional degree of mental engagement. A new 
series of l-alliteration appears now, linking “lif,” “lænan,”83 and “gelamp,” and the exemplum 
presents a new protagonist, defined by his relationship to the deceased – a friend and close 
kinsmen, united by familial relation and by friendship, and defined largely by what he feels: 
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love, sorrow, and longing. This man initiates a deictic shift at the level of subject but also a 
directional shift as he leaves his homeland to eke out existence elsewhere before returning to see 
the grave of his kinsman. This long-term voluntary exile resonates with Anglo-Saxons versed in 
the heroic tradition and in texts such as The Wife’s Lament or The Wanderer which equated 
separation from one’s friends and homeland with the worst of emotional distresses.84 Always 
longing propels the kinsman, emphasized by the repetition in “langunga,” “langung,” “langian,” 
picking up on the l-alliteration in the announcement of the rich man’s death.85 Bosworth-Toller 
glosses langung as “longing, desire, weariness, or grief that comes from unsatisfied desire”;86 
elsewhere it refers to desires for both positive and negative things, from God’s presence to the 
pleasures of earth.87 The unsatisfied element of this longing is in the forefront of Blickling 10 as 
a new attractor, a tireless force afflicting the kinsman and propelling him from place to place. 
Although the target of his longing is not explicitly specified, it seems to be for the person who 
has died, since the kinsman loved him more strongly than any other. In its persistence as an 
attractor, langung draws the reader into the emotional investment of empathy and through the 
journey taken by the grieving kinsman as he returns to gaze on the grave. 
Several factors make the kinsman particularly empathetic. First, his generic qualities – 
nameless and fairly non-descript – make him more flexible and easier to imagine in one’s own 
image. In terms of genre, the conventions of homilies encourage readers to view characters in 
exempla as models that instruct or warn. Narratologically, the kinsman is the primary focalizer of 
the exemplum, so that actions are reported through his eyes, and his emotions and thoughts are 
emphasized. Pragmatic principles suggest that humans and topics are more likely to attract 
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empathy, so he should be more empathetic. Further, because major patterns of linguistic 
attractors such as “langung” often apply to him, he becomes the focal point of the exemplum, 
encouraging a high level of investment in him as the narrative shifts through text worlds. 
 Here the homily undergoes its most dramatic shift when the dead bones call out to the 
kinsman and the theme of the body prominent earlier in the homily returns with a twist: 
him þa tocleopodan þæs deadan ban, & þus cwædon, ‘Forhwon come þu hider us to 
sceawigenne? Nu þu miht her geseon moldan dæl & wyrmes lafe, þær þu ær gesawe 
godweb mid golde gefagod. Sceawa þær nu dust & dryge ban, þær þær þu ær gesawe 
æfter flæsclicre gecynde fægre leomu on to seonne. Eala þu freond & min mæg, gemyne 
þis & ongyt þe sylfne, þæt þu eart nu þæt ic wæs io; & þu byst æfter fæce þæt ic nu eom; 
gemyne þis & oncnaw þæt mine welan þe ic io hæfde syndon ealle gewitene & 
gedrorene, & mine herewic syndon gebrosnode & gemolsnode. æc onwend þe to þe 
sylfum & þine heortan to ræde gecyr & geearna þæt þine bena syn Gode ælmihgtigum 
andfenge.   
[Then the bones of the dead man called to him, and spoke thus: ‘Why do you come hither 
to look upon us? Now you may see here a portion of earth and remnant of worms, where 
you previously saw purple cloth glittering with gold. Behold there now dust and dry 
bones, where previously according to carnal nature you saw limbs fair to look on. Alas 
you friend and my kinsman, remember this and perceive yourself, that you are now what 
I was before; and you will be made after what I now am; remember this and know that 
my weal which I previously had is all departed and perished, and my dwellings are 
decayed and moldered. But you change yourself and turn your heart to counsel and earn 





The shock of the impossible occurring – dead bones speaking – provokes another moment of 
reevaluation similar to defamiliarization.88 The rich man who began the story speaks again, 
returning the character arc to the beginning; however, now the story is focalized through the 
kinsman and the rich man is reduced to a pile of bones, a specific instantiation of the general 
dead body that the homily earlier described. The audience, drawn by repetition to share in the 
kinsman’s sense of longing, now shares in receiving the bones’ rebuke of that longing. At the 
same time, the rich man’s corpse is a striking image that the audience can sceawian or inspect 
alongside the kinsman, seeing it juxtaposed with recollections of former splendor presented with 
the same linked alliteration used earlier in the homily. In a skillful sleight of hand, an audience 
member who has felt the kinsman’s longing might be startled at the insinuation that their desire 
to see the corpse is wrong,89 questioning their motivation. Having identified with the kinsman, 
they are now encouraged with him to “ongyt þe sylfne” or perceive themselves in the dead body, 
particularly to perceive the fate of decay that they share in common with both the kinsman and 
the pile of bones. The various characters that have served as the center of focalization – the rich 
man, the kinsman, and the audience – unite here in an empathetically-enabled moment of 
recognition that collapses the text-worlds of the various characters who are united by the 
biological paradigm as embodied individuals who will one day suffer the death and decay of 
their bodies. The homily carefully manipulates attractors (narrators, patterns of alliteration, the 
recurrence of longing, the circular movement away from and back to the grave), creating various 
text-worlds that are here conflated into a unified whole based on the universality of death, 
reenacting the biological paradigm of fellow-feeling on a formal level to remind the reader of 
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unusual linguistic features. Nevertheless, it works in tandem with linguistic features in this passage. 
89 J.E. Cross reads this exemplum differently, arguing that the relative is virtuous and rather than being rebuked for 





their final end. The kinsman of the homily learns his lesson, begins to live an exemplary 
Christian life, and obtains both his own salvation and the salvation of his friend. The reader who 
empathizes with the kinsman should thus also respond with actions and emotions appropriate to 
the penitential season of Rogationtide. 
At the center of the dry bones’ address is the enigmatic assertion, “þæt þu eart nu þæt ic 
wæs io; & þu byst æfter fæce þat ic nu eom,” [you are now what I was before; and you will be 
made after what I now am]. This is an example of the “What I am, you will be” motif that occurs 
in multiple Old English homilies.90 The topos is an explicit example of “I am you” empathy 
highlighted as the bones collapse the distance between themselves and the living observer, 
declaring their common destinies. The observer (and readers) must project themselves not only 
into the past to picture the bones as a living person but also into the future to picture themselves 
as the bones. Inhabiting these multiple subject positions across times and states encourages a 
complex fellow-feeling that both shares in the bones’ sorrow and prompts the readers to evaluate 
their own lives in the present. Stockwell’s concept of association across boundaries offers 
vocabulary to explain why this move would produce empathy. 
 The central exemplum of this homily is an example of the “dry bones speak” topos 
described by Cross, but with a significant variation. In Caesarius of Arles’ De elemosinis and the 
instantiation of this topos in Vercelli 13, the bones speak directly to the reader, addressing them 
as ‘you.’ In this exemplum, however, the bones speak to the kinsman, presenting another layer 
between the bones’ message and the reader.91 Yet, as my reading shows, this additional deictic 
level need not dilute the affective force of the message – indeed, by encouraging the reader to 
                                                
90 See Cross, “The Dry Bones Speak,” for a discussion of Old English homilies that feature a statement like this, 
based on a passage in Caesarius of Arles’ homily De elemosinis in which bones adomish listeners with the 
statement, “quod tu es, ego fui; quod ego sum, tu eris.” 





identify with the sympathetic kinsman before delivering the rebuke, the force of it might be 
rendered even stronger. But if the rebuke is strong, its tone is softened by the terms of 
endearment used, (þu freond & min mæg), perhaps making it easier for the reader to identify 
with this subject position. 
 Blickling 10 demonstrates how a homily could elicit empathy via the biological paradigm 
by appeals to universal embodiment, as well as via linguistic strategies that build and shift 
patterns of attractors and focalization, and literary strategies that employ particularly resonant 
emotional tropes such as the ubi sunt tradition. Further, by inviting readers to shift across a 
variety of text worlds, Blickling 10 encourages a particularly complex mental engagement that 
enables readers to identify with the various bodies that conflate in the central exemplum. The 
linguistic terminology offered by Stockwell as well as the philosophical basis articulated by 
Morrison provides a vocabulary for considering how the text invites surprising emotional 
engagement with bones, based on the ability for Christian readers to recognize them as a marker 
of their own death one day.   
Other homilies employ similar strategies to build empathy – for example, many homilies 
use the homiletic we to invite shared emotion between homilist and audience. The authoritative 
persona of the homilist may directly command an emotion, as when Blickling 2 tells its auditors 
to imitate a blind beggar’s emotions: “Cleopian we nu in eglum mode & inneweardre heortan, 
swa se blinda dyde…” [Let us call now in sorrowful mind and with inward heart, as the blind 
man did].92 Or the homilist may declare that an emotion is normative for Christians, as when the 
narrator of Napier 29 exhorts, ““hwa is æfre, þæt hæbbe swa hearde heortan, þæt he ne mæge 
him ondrædon þa toweardan witu?” [who might there ever be, that has such a hard heart, that he 
                                                





may not dread the future torment?],93 encouraging listeners to hold a congruent emotional 
response with a character who exemplifies this dread. These mechanisms of emotional control 
are especially tailored to the homiletic genre and the relationship it creates between authoritative 
speaker and listening audience. 
In addition to inviting readers to share the emotions of the narrator or homilist, homilies 
also invite empathy with characters in exempla. In many cases, homilies prepare readers for such 
exempla by a variety of strategies. As noted, they could issue commands to feel particular 
emotions. They could also employ the biological paradigm by building on the culturally-
understood union of all Christians, the common experience of embodiment, and the common fate 
of death, encouraging readers to empathize with characters facing those experiences. Vercelli 9, 
for example, opens with a series of dramatic statements on the universality of death, before 
presenting readers with the empathic plight of damned souls who are completely alone after 
death.94 Homilies could also prepare readers by producing patterns of attractors that heighten 
emotional investment, especially deictic shifts – for example, before Napier 29 invites readers to 
empathy with damned souls, it takes them on a whirlwind tour of the last days, setting up 
attractors that mimic disorienting movement, and shifting between past, present, and future in a 
complexity that invites cognitive and emotional engagement. Further, empathetic exempla in 
homilies frequently foreground the the emotions and thoughts of a target with whom readers 
might easily identify either because of similarities or because of cultural predispositions to 
associate with such characters (an idea which I will explicate further when I analyze the Life of 
                                                
93 Wulfstan: Sammlung der ihm zugeschriebenen Homilien nebst Untersuchungen über ihre Echtheit, ed. Arthur S. 
Napier (Berlin, 1883), 134-43, at 140. Similar phrasing occurs in Vercelli Homily IV: “Eala ge, men þa leofestan; 
hwa is æfre, swa heardre heortan þæt he ne mæg wepan þa toweardan witu 7 him þa ondrædan?” [Lo you, dearest 
men, who ever might be so hard-hearted that he might not weep at the coming torments and then dread them?]; The 
Vercelli Homilies, ed. Scragg, IV.61-63. 






Swithun and the Life of Euphrosyne in Chapter 3). This is not to say that homiletic exempla 
always elicit empathy from readers, who might respond in a variety of ways. Further, not all 
homilies invite empathy; sometimes they seem to invite a different type of engagement, such as 
voyeurism or emotional contagion – for example, Vercelli homily 10 positions the reader as a 
spectator who watches a damned soul as it is led before God for judgment.95 However, many 
homiletic exempla do invite emotional identification, an invitation to which willing, trained 
readers might respond by taking on another’s emotion and experiencing personally salutary 
effects. 
While the biological paradigm was particularly useful for homilies because of its 
emphasis on the connection of all believers in Christian community and the connection of all 
people as embodied individuals, other homilies encourage empathy through the aesthetic 
paradigm of unity in contrast. Morrison suggests that the aesthetic paradigm would enable 
Christians to empathize with the damned if they saw their own potential to share in their fate, 
supplying the “negative values” omitted in the depiction. Some (though not all) Old English 
eschatological homilies employ such a tactic, reminding the audience of their risk of being 
condemned and exhorting them to keep in mind the terror that the damned will feel on 
Doomsday as a stimulus to compunction and repentance.96 This is not to say that vernacular 
homilies always portray the damned empathetically; they invite a range of affective relations to 
condemned souls, including counter-empathy or a feeling of pleasure. Attention to cultural and 
textual signals can help us to parse whether a text might be inviting empathy, counter-empathy, 
or a different affective relation. 
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96 See for example Vercelli 2, 20, and 21 in The Vercelli Homilies and Related Texts, ed. Scragg, and Napier 29 in 
Wulfstan: Sammlung der ihm zugeschriebenen Homilien nebst untersuchungen über ihre echtheit, ed. Arthur S. 





Homiletic empathy frequently relates to ideas of community, as shared emotion either 
unites individuals into a wider body of believers or leads them to separate from the body of the 
disobedient. This is congruent with the purpose of homilies to prescribe appropriate behavior for 
members of the Christian community, which is figured as the body of Christ. But empathy with 
more liminal members of this body could be more challenging, requiring different strategies for 
emotional identification. In the next section I explore how the aesthetic paradigm represents 
another way that thematic and linguistic patterns could combine to invite empathy. To offer a 
point of contrast to the communally-minded empathy of homilies, I focus on how the aesthetic 
paradigm is articulated in The Wife’s Lament, an important example of the Old English elegy 
tradition. 
The Aesthetic Paradigm: The Wife’s Lament 
In contrast to homily, much Old English poetry draws on resources related to lyric poetry 
rather than to narrative.97 As Eleonore de Felip notes, “The restriction of lyric speech enhances 
the significance of every single word, demanding from readers qualities like intellectual alertness 
and emotional depth which are the basic prerequisites of empathic perception.”98 The 
compressed form of lyric draws attention to nuances of language, requiring more engagement, 
which Stockwell notes can shade into identification with the speaker’s emotions. Features of 
lyric also tend toward the startling moments of defamiliarization that can raise new emotions, 
causing readers to reevaluate the work. Because of this link between language and emotion, and 
                                                
97 Although there is no emic genre called “lyric” in Old English poetry, many Old English poems have 
characteristics associated with lyric poetry elsewhere, providing sufficient justification for referring to them with the 
etic category of lyric. Old English narrative poems like Genesis A or Andreas use strategies of both narrative and 
lyric poetry, which is intriguing but beyond the scope of this chapter. 
98 Eleonore de Felip, “‘Hearing the Speechless’: Empathy with Animals in Contemporary German Lyric Poetry,” in 
Rethinking Empathy Through Literature, eds. Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim, Routledge Interdisciplinary 





because of the heightened reading context normally associated with texts of aesthetic 
complexity, lyric would seem to be a genre especially primed to invite emotional identification. 
Among the Old English lyric poems, scholars have frequently argued that the so-called 
“elegies” invite empathy. Harbus argues that the elegies promote empathy because the reader “is 
notionally equated” with the speaker and thus “both needed and excluded: not only allowed a 
glimpse of the interior world of the speaker, but positively invited to contemplate the crises of 
their mental worlds, to become emotionally involved and follow the speaker from distress to 
consolation though permanently kept separate from that private mental world.”99 According to 
Harbus, the reader moves from personal focalization to identification,100 potentially leading to 
shared emotion. Mary Ramsay sees the empathetic potential of the elegies slightly differently, 
arguing that Old English elegies such as The Wanderer or The Seafarer are performative texts, 
and that readers could go beyond observing the elegiac speakers to inhabiting their perspectives 
and feelings: “elegies like these offer hearers a textual space in which to mourn and words with 
which to voice their own grief, to give it expression and shape, and, most importantly, to give it 
boundaries.”101 The movement between grief and restraint or consolation offers various loci to 
which the audience might attach their feelings of sorrow while steering them towards appropriate 
and measured expression through conventional forms and images. Others have discussed 
particular examples of elegies as empathetic. Writing about Deor, Trilling argues that the poem’s 
series of examples invites emotional identification with the afflicted people in its exempla: “Each 
stanza adds to the emotional burden of sorrow and despair, drawing its readers into an experience 
                                                
99 Harbus, The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry, 140. 
100 Mielke Bal and Jean Genette, the pioneers of focalization as a narratological term, do not discuss it with regard to 
empathy, although Bal notes that readers are more likely to give power to a focalizing character in a narrative, as the 
reader has awareness of their motivations but not of other characters’. See Mielke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to 
the Study of Narrative, second edition (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1997), 142-61; Jean Genette, 
Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1980), 189-211.  
101 Mary K. Ramsay, “Dustsceawung: Texting the Dead in the Old English Elegies,” in Laments for the Lost in 





of longing for the same consolation that eludes the characters of the poem, including its 
speaker.”102 Kathleen Davis argues in passing that Wulf and Eadwacer invites empathy,103 while 
Harbus argues this more directly.104 
Building on the work of these scholars through cognitive linguistics, Morrison’s 
paradigms, and the resources of lyric poetry, we can use more concrete language to describe how 
elegies invite empathy as so many scholars believe that they do. First, then, I will briefly 
consider the category of elegy and how some of its major characteristics lend themselves both to 
cognitive complexity and to Morrison’s aesthetic paradigm. I will then focus on a close reading 
of The Wife’s Lament to provide a specific example of how these cognitive and aesthetic 
strategies combine to evoke empathy. 
The definition of elegy and the number of poems that can be classified as elegies have 
long been contentious issues. Indeed, scholars continue to debate the extent to which we can 
speak of any type of native generic classification in Old English poetry.105 Paul Battles has 
suggested that by analyzing the formulae in a poem’s opening, we can identify three different 
                                                
102 Renée R. Trilling, The Aesthetics of Nostalgia: Historical Representation in Old English Verse (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), 45. 
103 Kathleen Davis, “Old English Lyrics: A Poetics of Experience,” in The Cambridge History of Early Medieval 
English Literature, ed. Clare Lees (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 332-56, 347. 
104 Harbus, Cognitive Approaches to Old English Poetry, 170-73, revisited in “Embodied Emotion, Conceptual 
Metaphor, and the Aesthetics of Reading Old English Poetry,” 138-42. 
105 See Paul Battles’ summary of suspicion of generic classification in Old English scholarship in “Toward a Theory 
of Old English Poetic Genres: Epic, Elegy, Wisdom Poetry, and the ‘Traditional Opening,’ Studies in Philology 
111.1 (Winter 2014): 1-33, esp. 1-3. Although Stanley Greenfield wrote about elegies extensively, he argued that the 
term was a critical projection onto the past based on our sense of the poems, as opposed to “intrinsic genres” which 
would have been understood by Old English writers; Greenfield, The Interpretation of Old English Poems (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 14, 135. Christine Fell claims that the poems typically viewed as elegies are linked 
only by “a preoccupation with loss, suffering and mortality”; Fell, “Perceptions of Transience,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Old English Literature, edited by Malcolm Godden (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
180-97, at 180. María José Mora argues that the Old English elegy is a critical imposition of the Romantic period; 
Mora, “The Invention of the Old English Elegy,” English Studies 76 (1995), 129-39. Benjamin Timmer suggests 
that it is better to speak of an “elegiac mode” than a genre per se; Timmer, “The Elegiac Mood in Old English 
Poetry,” English Studies 24: 33-44, doi:10.1080/00138384208596730. T.A. Shippey reclassifies the elegies as 
“wisdom poetry,” linking them to other didactic and gnomic poems in Old English; Shippey, “The Wanderer and 
The Seafarer as Wisdom Poetry,” in Companion to Old English Poetry, edited by H. Aersten and R. Bremmer 
(Amsterdam, V.U. University Press, 1994), 145-58. More recently Davis has criticized attempts to create a coherent 





vernacular genres – epic, elegy, and wisdom poetry – which are frequently hybridized with other 
Latin or vernacular genres.106 Others argue for a traditional Old English elegy based on affinities 
with similar genres in other languages.107 But if the generic markers of lyric and elegy are 
disputed, the affective power of the poems classified as elegies is not, whether it is the 
conflicting emotions of Wulf and Eadwacer or the stoic sadness of the Wanderer. Harbus sees 
“reflective, emotional narration of complaint” as central to elegy itself.108 This emphasis on 
emotion, as well as the patterns of form and content that do recur across poems within this group 
(even if no marker applies to every poem classified as an elegy), justifies discussing the elegies 
as a genre, even if the term is analytical rather than intrinsic. While studies abound on the form 
and structure of elegies, it has been more difficult to assess their cultural and performance 
contexts, since all of the stand-alone elegies109 appear in manuscripts that may or may not reflect 
their original conditions of use.110 But even where we possess little information from which to 
                                                
106 Paul Battles, “Toward a Theory of Old English Poetic Genres.” Battles’ criteria lead him to propose reclassifying 
as elegies The Dream of the Rood and Judgment Day II, while suggesting that The Ruin might be excluded from this 
group as a poem lacking a speaker discussing their troubles in the first person; ibid., 32. 
107 In particular, Joseph Harris has suggested that a proto-Germanic elegiac form lies behind Old Norse and Old 
English elegies; Joseph Harris, “Elegy in Old English and Old Norse: A Problem in Literary History,” in The Old 
English Elegies: New Essays in Criticism and Research, ed. Martin Green (Rutherford, NJ, Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 1983), 46-56. Others have pointed out affinities to Latin and Celtic poetry to “define Old English 
elegy by what it is not, as well as by what it is”; Anne Klinck, The Old English Elegies (McGill-Queens University 
Press, 1992), 246; see p. 230-246 for Klinck’s discussion of sources and analogues. 
108 Harbus, The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry, 127. 
109 This is if one takes sections such as The Lay of the Last Survivor and The Father’s Lament in Beowulf as elegies 
(whether interposed from another context or composed as part of Beowulf), as I do. 
110 For a treatment of similar issues, see J.A. Burrows, “Poems without Contexts,” Essays in Criticism 29.1 (January 
1979): 6-32. Extant elegies do not contain instructions or rubrications to suggest their function, nor are they linked 
to a place in the liturgical cycle like homilies. Nevertheless, scholars have speculated on contexts. As noted earlier, 
Ramsay has suggested a role for them in grieving the dead. Traditional pan-historic definitions of elegy include 
lamentation as a core function/context, but given the contested status of elegy as a genre in Old English, it is 
difficult to say whether it functioned in the same context as elegy in other cultures. See for example the definition in 
The New Princeton Encylopedia of Poetry and Poetics, which states, “Traditionally, the functions of the elegy were 
three, to lament, to praise, and console”; “Elegy,” The New Princeotn Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, eds. Alex 
Preminger and Terry V.F. Brogan (Princeton, University of Princeton Press, 1993), 324. Joseph Harris has suggested 
that a Germanic proto-elegy may have developed out of funerary laments; if so, perhaps Old English elegy did at 
some point play a role in commemorating the dead. Using a new historicist approach, Patrick Conner suggests a 
more specific, limited context for the elegies: a textual means of mediating a relationship between the monastic 
community of tenth-century Exeter and the guild that requested liturgical services from them at set times during the 





infer concrete contexts, this has not prevented others from speculating on how elegies were 
meant to be read. 
Although the genre and use of elegy is in dispute, many have attempted to catalogue 
elegiac tropes and structures that appear across several, if not all, of the so-called elegies.111  
The overarching characteristic of elegy uniting these formulas is what Stanley Greenfield calls 
its “pattern of loss and consolation”112 or according to Klinck, its motif of loss: “The essential 
element of elegy as it is found in these Exeter Book poems is the sense of separation: a distance 
in time or space between someone and their desire.”113 Elegies, then, build their affective force 
on tension between unrestrained longing and potential consolation. This tension is often reflected 
in imagery of movement and stasis.  For example, Tom Shippey reads The Wanderer as a 
struggle between passionate expression of emotion and the need for “restraint.”114 The tension is 
also reflected in a movement between past and present, as Harbus argues: “The major catalyst in 
these psychological turnarounds, and the facilitator of exploration, is without exception the 
power of memory. . . . The past is brought to bear on the present and future through this 
rhetorically designed recollection, by which the present is reinterpreted more acceptably.”115 The 
achievement of aesthetic closure through contrast reflects Morrison’s aesthetic paradigm of 
opposites coming together to form a unified whole as readers discern the negative values within 
                                                                                                                                                       
Middle English Literature, ed. David Frame Johnson and Elaine M. Treharne (Oxford University Press, 2005), 30-
45. According to Conner, the elegies do so through empathy, “employing a rhetoric which both identifies the subject 
of each poem with the reader, and defers that identification, forcing the reader to admit that he or she could yet 
become such a subject, and thus ensuring further participation in the monastic/guild enterprise,” ibid., 34. Conner 
argues that the elegies might be a restricted genre because they appear in only one extant manuscript, although the 
paucity of surviving poetic codices we have would allow us to make a similar argument about many other poems, 
and elegiac elements do appear in Old English poems from other manuscripts such as Beowulf and Christ and Satan. 
Nevertheless, Conner offers an evocative suggestion of how the elegies might promote a fruitful empathy in a 
particular performance context. 
111 See a more detailed discussion, see my section on the characteristics of elegy in Chapter 4. 
112 Greenfield, “The Old English Elegies,” 94. 
113 Klinck, The Old English Elegies, 225. 
114 Shippey, Old English Verse, 58. 





texts. The movement between grief and restraint or consolation offers various loci to which the 
audience might attach their feelings of sorrow while steering them towards appropriate and 
measured expression through conventional forms and images. This is true whether one views the 
elegies as a performance to inhabit (as Ramsay does) or one to read empathetically (as Harbus 
does). This is true not just for the more explicitly didactic and Christian elegies such as The 
Wanderer, but for the more ambiguous elegies such as Wulf and Eadwacer, where the controlled 
form of the lament (for example, its terseness and refrain) sets bounds on the release of grief 
simply by requiring it to fit a formal pattern. Wulf and Eadwacer, in its series of separated pairs - 
two islands, two wolves, two other characters who may or may not be lovers, two contrasting 
emotions of wyn and lað - yokes contrasts in a way that provokes aesthetic empathy. Its structure 
also plays with setting and breaking forms, beginning with two short stanzas linked by the refrain 
“ungelic(e) is us,” then erupting in an eleven-line overflow that surges to the final line describing 
the dissolution of another pair, “uncer giedd geador” [l.19; the song of us two together].116 These 
contrasts of form and content lead readers to a sense of empathy with the enigmatic narrator who 
bridges these opposing sides with her song.  
  The Wife’s Lament offers a strong example of inviting fellow-feeling through contrast. 
The Wife’s Lament has provoked critical commentary for a variety of reasons, including its 
unusual landscape details, its cryptic and confusing story, and its female speaker.117 It appears 
only in the Exeter Book, and as with most of the other poems in the manuscript, we know little 
about its original date of composition or performance context.118 However, almost all scholars 
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Brewer, 2012), 170-173, for another reading of the emotional mechanics of this poem. Harbus argues that the 
complex cognitive work required to make sense of the allusive poem enforces a high degree of investment, so that 
the reader comes to “valorise the emotional quality of lived experience…in this fictional representation,” 173. 
117 For a summary of scholarship on the Wife’s Lament, see Klinck, The Old English Elegies, 49-54, 177-88. I will 
discuss other important debates about the poem below. 





associate it with Wulf and Eadwacer since both poems appear to be spoken by women 
experiencing anguished relationships and confinement or banishment.119 Both Alain Renoir120 
and Harbus121 have also assayed close readings of the poem’s affective potential. I wish to build 
on their readings, drawn from new criticism and cognitive linguistics, to articulate with more 
precision how structural and linguistic elements based on the aesthetic paradigm of empathy 
function in this poem. The Wife is a particularly empathetic target for readers who choose to 
share her emotions, reading themselves across the gap of difference. Further, she herself 
frequently imagines the minds of others, building a textured richness that invites readers to 
picture a number of mental states and ultimately to inhabit the emotions of the Wife as she 
grieves her position in exile. 
One of the key ways in which The Wife’s Lament invokes the aesthetic paradigm of 
empathy is through the affective topos of the exile, emphasized in the Wife’s anguished 
statement that “A ic wite wonn minra wræcsiþa” [l.5; always I suffer the torment of my journeys 
                                                                                                                                                       
erotic songs, reading The Wife’s Lament as a poem that is less about straightforward narrative than about engaging 
the reader through a psychologically searing portrait of separation from one’s lover (and thereby from wholeness); 
Davidson, “Erotic Women’s Songs in Anglo-Saxon England,” Neophilologus 59 (1975): 451-62. Kemp Malone 
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119 See for example Alexandra Hennesey Olsen, “Women’s Songs, Women’s Language: Wulf and Eadwacer and the 
Wife’s Lament,” in New Readings on Women in Old English Literature, ed. Helen Damico and Alexandra Hennesey 
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120 Alain Renoir, "A Reading of The Wife's Lament.” Renoir’s New Critical reading attributes the poem’s emotional 
effects to “the saturation of the text with emotion-packed words so organized as to produce a cumulative increase of 
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in exile]. Exile by definition implies a locational deictic shift and the sundering of a 
hierarchically-joined relationship like that described by Morrison in the biological paradigm, 
serving as a lightning rod for mental and emotional attention. To imagine the mind of an exile is 
thus to imagine a subjectivity that is cut off from the primary relationships of Anglo-Saxon life. 
Culturally, the trope of exile was emotionally evocative, as Robert Bjork notes that exile was 
“perhaps the most intense and painful experience one can have in Anglo-Saxon society.”122 The 
trope was written into the most paradigmatic tenets of Anglo-Saxon religion; as Margaret 
Bridges notes, Old English poems and homilies explain that all humanity is in exile, following 
the fate of their progenitors Adam and Eve.123 Humanity’s genetic and typological connection to 
Adam and Eve causes them to share in the condition of alienation experienced by their ancestors, 
and even elicit God’s pity, as Blickling III asserts that Christ chooses to be tempted by Satan in 
the desert in order to free Adam from his long “wræce.”124 These typological associations could 
enable a reader to imaginatively see themselves in literary exiles, even if they themselves were 
not currently experiencing this estrangement. Exile also carried a significant and real emotional 
cost in a social structure where belonging to the following of a lord was socially and 
economically important and in a literary milieu where the values of the comitatus were 
glorified.125 As Greenfield and Leonard Frey have noted, formulae related to exile appear in 
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many Old English texts, from the elegies to Guthlac B to Genesis A to Christ and Satan.126 But 
exile was also tied to outlawry, and could be delivered as a juridical punishment rather than 
occur as the result of danger or betrayal. Thus, the exile topos taps into multiple reservoirs of 
empathetic potential, and to empathize with an exile is to exercise aesthetic empathy for 
someone who is both unlike readers because of their outcast state and like readers because of the 
spiritually outcast state of all humanity. To the extent that the narrator of The Wife’s Lament 
shares the isolation and dimness of other exiled figures such as the Wanderer or Seafarer, she 
draws on a well of cultural sympathy associated with the exile trope.127 But the Wife’s exile is 
also particularly from husband as well as lord (often assumed by critics to be one and the same 
person). The relationship of marriage is one of the most paradigmatic examples of the biological 
paradigm cited by Morrison, and the use of the dual pronoun to refer to their union emphasizes 
this identification of two in one entity. The sundering of this paradigm thus renders her alienation 
more poignant. 
In addition to the affect of exile, the poem draws on the affect associated with 
descriptions of hell, which further reinforce the aesthetic paradigm by emphasizing a sense of 
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alterity into which readers must project themselves in the act of empathizing. As Alaric Hall has 
noted, the Wife’s confinement is described with imagery associated with hell, particularly as 
“wic wynna leas” (l.32) and a place of darkness, and the husband’s hypothetical confinement on 
a stormy “stanhliþe” (l.48) suggests the “cliff of death” topos associated with hell.128 Further, the 
designation of the wife’s abode as an “eorðscræf” (l.28) evokes descriptions of the grave in other 
Old English texts.129 These references import the emotional associations of hell – including the 
horror of being condemned there – into the reader’s interpretation of this poem, prompting 
defamiliarization and a recontextualization of the wife’s statements. The terror of such 
descriptions can include sympathy for those who are forced to undergo them, particularly when 
their emotional situation is painted so clearly for readers. The setting of the wife’s present sorrow 
is given poignant detail, with the “actreo” (l.28), the “dimme” hills overgrown with briars (l.30), 
and even the temporal setting of dawn for her lamentations, a scene-painting reminiscent in its 
detail of the vivid landscapes of eschatological homilies.130 Such a concrete environment with 
traditional affective associations, coupled with the wife’s foregrounded perspective, heightens 
the sense of empathy. 
On a cognitive linguistic level, the poem incorporates many deictic shifts to engage 
empathy. First, it sets the stage by foregrounding the deictic origo of the Wife as narrator. Where 
homilies rely on an external narrator who tells the reader how to feel about Christian doctrine 
and experience, often addressing narrator and audience together in the homiletic “we,” the Wife 
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begins “Ic þis giedd wrece bi me ful geomorre” [l.1; I make this giedd about myself very sadly]. 
The emphatic beginning of “Ic” emphasizes the Wife’s role in telling her own experience. Forms 
of the first-person pronoun occur seven times in the first five lines and continue to dominate the 
rest of the poem, a series of strong attractors that highlight the Wife’s place at the deictic center. 
Because of this, when the person changes (for example, to the dual pronoun in ll.22-26 or to the 
third person in ll.12-13), or when the center of focalization changes, the deictic shift is likely to 
be marked by the reader as significant. These seams are particularly important moments of what 
Stockwell would call texture. For example, we might consider the set of shifts in ll.12-15, which 
cover significant ground in a compressed space: 
Ongunnon þæt þæs monnes     magas hycgan 
þurh dyrne geþoht,     þæt hy todælden unc, 
þæt wit gewidost     in woruldrice 
lifdon laðlicost,     ond mec longade. 
[ll. 12-15; The kinsmen of the man began to consider that through secret thought, that 
they should part the two of us, so that we two lived widest in the kingdom of the world, 
most hatefully, and I longed.] 
After a considerable length of first-person narration, describing events and their reactions 
through the lens of their effect on the Wife, she turns to imagine the thought worlds of her 
husband’s enemies, picturing their hidden intentions. This world-shift propels both the reader 
and the narrator into imagining the thoughts of hostile characters, seeking to understand how a 
very different other thinks. But the person shifts back to the deictic center because the kinsmen 
wish to part “unc,” uniting the wife and her husband in the intimacy of the dual pronoun. “Unc” 





(“another person and I”) or first and second-person address (“you and I”). Readers must decide 
whether the narrator has shifted to speak to her husband or if it is still a report to the audience. 
Lines 14-15 present another instance of ambiguity, in that the reader could take “þæt . . . lifdon” 
as either subjunctive, the intent of the kinsmen not yet realized, or as indicative, the result of 
their deliberations come true as soon as it is reported. But if the mood of the verbs is not entirely 
clear, 15b is stark in its shift back to the present indicative and singular: “ond mec longade.” The 
passive position of the wife emphasizes her vulnerability to the force of this longing. Shifts in 
person and in hypothetical vs. real are combined with a projection of vast distance in the 
separation of wife and husband, “widost in woruldrice.” When the wife describes her distant 
husband again, it is to confess that his thoughts are now secret to her as well.  
Imagining other minds is central to the poem’s empathetic project, as it is to the aesthetic 
paradigm of empathy. Even as the poem foregrounds the wife’s thoughts in the song she 
composes about her own life, it engages text-world shifts into other perspectives. She imagines 
the thoughts of real people: the kinsmen and the husband who was formerly “gemæcne” or 
compatible but is now “mod miþende,” concealing his mind. She also imagines hypothetical 
perspectives that serve as points of comparison for her own situation: the “frynd” who “leger 
weardiað” (ll.33, 34) while she lives alone under her ash-tree and the “geong mon” (l.42) who 
hides sorrow behind a blithe countenance, perhaps a gnomic point of comparison with her 
husband (or, as some have argued, her husband himself). The wife is an empathetic narrator or at 
least one with a rich imagination, picturing other minds to interpret her situation as explicators or 
points of comparison.131 The reader who follows the narrator must engage in additional world-
switches to picture these other perspectives, creating a strong sense of texture as they cross 
boundaries while these hypothetical worlds render the wife’s sorrow sharper by contrast (as with 
                                                





the lovers) or by clarifying its conditions (as with the silently hostile husband). One might 
compare the wife’s invocation of other perspectives that lend context to her grief to Ramsay’s 
description of the elegies as emotional containers that can structure and situate the grief of 
mourners. 
This emphasis on others’ mental states is not unique to the elegies, of course; Old English 
poetry has a tendency to emphasize the mental states of characters, an observation noted by 
Antonina Harbus and Britt Mize.132 The latter scholar argues that the portrayal of subjectivity is a 
traditional element or even requirement of classical Old English poetry, so that poets would have 
inserted descriptions of characters’ mental states into poems because it “felt right” even if 
emotion might seem to contemporary readers like an unusual detail to include in a story (as when 
emotions are ascribed to the whale whose bone makes the Franks’ Casket.133 By analyzing Old 
English poems that are clearly related to prose texts, such as Genesis B and the Meters of 
Boethius, Mize shows that the poetic versions frequently expand descriptions of mental states. 
But although Mize sees depictions of emotion as central to Old English poetry, he reads these 
subjective portraits as repositories of traditional values rather than attempts at psychologically 
realistic vignettes. Genesis A reveals Sarai’s anxiety about Hagar not to provide the reader a rich 
mental world to imagine and empathize with (as Harbus might suggest), but rather to express 
traditional ideas about how authorities should behave.134 Mize is probably right that not every 
instance of emotion in narrative poetry would have been taken realistically or experienced 
empathetically, and he does suggest many other ways that representations of subjectivity do 
possess subtle and important effects, particularly as they dramatize “a system of ethical positions 
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and relationships.”135 But some of these representations could serve a dual purpose, both 
reflecting traditional knowledge and providing a locus for empathy, allowing readers to picture 
themselves in very different kinds of beings – enacting the aesthetic paradigm of empathy 
through engagement in a work of fiction. The elegies seem to be a particularly apt genre for this 
purpose. 
Deictic shifts and text-world switches abound in The Wife’s Lament; in addition to 
switches to other perspectives, there are switches to hypothetical worlds (such as treating their 
love “swa hit no wære,” l.24) and repeated movements to the past (as when she imagines their 
joyful boasts that only death could part them) and back to the present, juxtaposing these times to 
heighten the wife’s sad state. Temporal deixis is also particularly important as the wife describes 
the allusive, ambiguous series of events that led to her present confinement. Yet in spite of these 
deictic switches, as Martin Green notes, the poem achieves a sense of being frozen in time in the 
Wife’s present, unable or unwilling to look to a more hopeful future after death as a more overtly 
consolatory elegy such as The Seafarer does.136 The combination of dizzying deictic shifts and 
static temporality produces a sense of aesthetic (and arguably emotional) tension, an artifact-
emotion that could be reinterpreted as a fiction-emotion for the grieving Wife. 
 The poem also harnesses ambiguity to build defamiliarization that prompts increased 
mental engagement and empathy. Such doubling is most marked in the final eleven lines, which 
have been the subject of considerable debate. Scholars question whether these lines portray the 
husband, a hypothetical man, or some combination, and whether certain verbs are in subjunctive 
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or imperative mood (indicating either imagination or curse).137 This indeterminacy could be 
resolved through the interpretive choices of a live performance (and perhaps would be simplified 
if the song is based on a legend known to the original audience) but must finally be settled by 
readers, who must pay careful attention to details to interpret these ambiguities, requiring 
responsiveness to how the poem manipulates patterns.138 The work involved in interpretation 
also requires readers to supply the negative values necessary to empathize with the narrator, 
enacting the movement of malevolent sympathy described by Morrison that unites different and 
even opposing entities. It is thus the difficulty of The Wife’s Lament, including its many text 
worlds, its shifts in person and hypotheticality, and its ambiguity, that calls for the type of 
interpretive engagement that Stockwell noted in the audiences who cried when he read lament 
poetry. Such layers of lyric complexity, combined with the affective cue of exile, render 
emotional identification more likely.  
Other elegies share many of the strategies of the Wife’s Lament, combining cognitive 
complexity with markedly emotional themes. Indeed, many of the contrasts that structure elegy 
are created through deictic shifts that produce moments of texture and increased engagement. 
And indeed, most elegies are a mosaic of textural shifts, moving not only between first person 
and third person but between past, present, and future; home, exile, and heaven; hope and 
despair; hypothetical (indicated by subjunctive) and real (indicated by indicative). Such deictic 
and text-world shifts generate mental focus just as they do in the homilies. Interpretive ambiguity 
and doubling are other defamiliarizing strategies that occur in elegies such as Wulf and 
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Eadwacer, with its matched sets and famously opaque tale.139 The arguments that abound as to 
the number and type of speakers in poems such as The Wanderer,140 The Seafarer,141 and the two 
poems labeled Resignation142 suggest the difficulty in determining the seams of poems and the 
engagement required to make meaning of them. 
Many of the elegies engage in world-shifts created by switching from one person to 
another. Even in Resignation B, which is largely in the first-person, the narrator switches to refer 
to himself using the third person in lines 90-97. Other elegies invoke hypothetical individuals, 
engaging the reader’s ability to imagine other minds. Deor summons the mental anguish of a 
variety of historical individuals as points of comparison for the narrator’s own sadness. The 
Seafarer repeatedly imagines land-dwellers who live happier lives and cannot empathize with 
him and understand his sorrow because they do not have experiential knowledge of his 
afflictions (ll.12-17, 27-30, 55-57). In addition, the speaker conjures the emotional state of a 
hypothetical everyman who cannot be so set in worldly goods “þæt he a his sæfore sorge 
næbbe,” [l.42; that he should not have sorrow at his sea-faring]. The Wanderer switches between 
relaying first-person speech and imagining the emotions of a third-person exile that may or may 
not be the same as the first-person speakers. In this case as well, ambiguities require readers to 
evaluate interpretations based on the details of the text, heightening their appreciation for its 
patterns. In the famous, elegiac passage in Beowulf called the Father’s Lament, Beowulf 
imagines a hypothetical bereaved father in order to understand both the grief of his foster-father 
Hrethel and his own grief; I will discuss this passage further in chapter 5. 
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Another type of doubling occurs in the bipartite structure of many elegies in which the 
first section sets up the speaker’s situation and the second section presents a series of deictic 
shifts that direct the reader away from these circumstances toward heavenly realities, as in The 
Wanderer, The Seafarer, and arguably the Rhyming Poem. The shifts that occur in each of these 
poems are textural boundaries, requiring the reader to shift their reading strategies to interpret the 
conventions and commands of the second half of the poem. One might take as an example the 
transitional lines 66b-71 in The Seafarer: 
   Ic gelyfe no 
þæt him eorðwelan     ece stondað. 
Simle þreora sum     þinga gehwylce, 
ær his tid aga,     to tweon weorþeð; 
adl oþþe yldo     oþþe ecghete 
fægum fromweardum     feorh oðþringeð. 
[ll. 66b-71; I do not believe that earthly prosperity remains forever for him. Always a 
certain one of each of three things, before his time should come to pass, become doubtful; 
sickness or age or sword-hate force out life from the fated departing one.] 
In the first section of the poem, the Seafarer described their lonely existence and the longing that 
people experience to go seafaring. In line 58, the speaker explains their mental state, with a 
turning mind (using the verb hweorfeð) and a desire for the hatran (hotter) joys of the Lord 
rather than the things of earth. At this point, the poem turns toward the homiletic. The lines that 
serve as the fulcrum, “Ic gelyfe no þæt him eorðwelan ece stondað,” begin with a first-person 
declaration, emphasizing an individual reaction, but move into the sort of dogmatic declaration 





of the three means of death. Such a shift should prompt changes in interpretive strategies, 
inviting increased engagement as the first-person “ic” morphs into a third-person subject of 
homiletic discourse, acted on by the entropic forces of the world. The rest of the poem confirms 
this change, eschewing the first-person singular to focus on third-person declarations of the 
world’s condition and homiletic wisdom, until the first-person plural appears again in l.117, 
encouraging the reader in the manner of homilies to “hycgan hwær we ham agen, / ond þonne 
geþencan hu we þider cumen, / ond we þonne eac tilien” [ll.117-119; consider where we possess 
a home, and then consider how we might come thither, and let us also strive]. With this homiletic 
we, the elegy channels individual empathy into identification with the community of Christians 
who claim a home in heaven and labor to get there. By summoning this voice, the poem gestures 
toward the biological paradigm of empathy that relates part to organic whole, seeing the 
individual as one among the mass of humanity moving toward death. The poem’s movement to 
generalization paints every Christian individual as the Seafarer, in exile in the world and on their 
way to a good or evil afterlife. In this way, the Seafarer addresses its audience in a different way 
than the Wife’s Lament by building its argument on religious and communal grounds rather than 
on aesthetic and individual grounds. While it uses similar strategies of encouraging readers to 
imagine other minds, in the end the more religiously-oriented Seafarer links this back to a wider 
community, indicating that the other minds readers have identified with have always been related 
to them. It illustrates how poems that are frequently classified in the same genre by 
contemporary speakers could nevertheless draw on dramatically different models of empathy. 
The contrast between individual and community proves surprisingly relevant even for 
elegies voiced by solitary speakers. Although the elegies are technically monologues, the act of 





giedd wrece bi me ful geomorre, / minre sylfre sið” [ll.1-2; I fashion this song about myself, my 
own journey, very sad] suggests an audience to hear the giedd being fashioned, while the 
Seafarer suggests performance by saying, “Mæg ic be me sylfum soðgied wrecan” [l.1; I may 
fashion a true song about myself] and Deor announces at the end of his poem, “Þæt ic bi me 
sylfum secgan wille” [l.35; I wish to say this about myself]. Even Wulf and Eadwacer, which 
lacks such a formal introduction, shifts into addressing an absent Wulf in line 13 and accosts 
Eadwacer directly in line 16, summoning a personal (if imagined) audience for the speaker’s 
complaint. As Harbus and Ramsay note, this audience might be invited to follow the journey of 
the speakers toward consolation (or, in the Wife’s case, to remain with the speaker in their 
confinement143), while the homiletic movements in The Seafarer or the musings on transience in 
The Wanderer engage the response of a homiletic audience. The elegies are perhaps in this sense 
less voyeuristic than they seem if they suggest awareness of or construction of a group of 
listeners. Instead, they render even the moment of individual consolation as a communal project, 
one witnessed by the audience of a giedd created to express and process emotions. Elegies allow 
the individual to temporarily try on different affective positions in the safe distance of fictional 
narrative to work through emotions. Yet at the same time, the elegies’ implicit sense of audience 
also allows the speaker of the elegy to act like the homiletic we in building a shared identity, 
uniting the reader in an audience tasked to listen and follow directions. Thus they lead readers 
from identifying with the emotions of a solitary, grieving speaker to identifying with the wisdom 
voiced at the conclusion of the Wanderer, the Seafarer, the Rhyming Poem, or Deor – or, in the 
case of elegies with more ambiguous endings, such as The Wife’s Lament or Wulf and Eadwacer, 
they call readers to witness the fact of loss where resolution is not possible. Although narrative 
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empathy is often viewed as an individual transaction between reader and text, it possesses special 
force in its ability to channel the individual to the norms of a wider emotional community. 
Indeed, while homilies such as Blickling 10 employ empathy to teach individuals to 
conform to the norms of appropriate Christian community and build their appeal on the unity of 
individuals within that community, elegies are frequently focused on the challenge of identifying 
with other minds, of seeing oneself in another through the aesthetic paradigm of empathy. As I 
will address in Chapter 3, the discipline of empathizing with others could teach readers about 
appropriate emotions and how to understand the world. Such empathy was possible because the 
aesthetic paradigm enabled readers to recognize their identity as members of the Christian body 
while also imagining other possibilities, such as being an exile or a damned soul, through the 
mediation of texts that invited readers to inhabit these other perspectives. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has offered readings of possible textual mechanisms that invite empathy in 
Anglo-Saxon poetry and prose. In particular, I show how the biological paradigm could be 
employed to enjoin Christians to appropriate emotional states as members of the universal 
Christian body, while the aesthetic paradigm encourages readers to imagine other minds and 
project themselves into other individuals. My close readings in Chapters 4 and 5 will engage 
additional structural and linguistic strategies related to the biological and aesthetic paradigms, 
such as mise-en-abyme in Beowulf. Although no text can force a reader to empathize, Anglo-
Saxon texts that seem likely to encourage empathy tend to use these strategies, suggesting a 
conscious or unconscious link between such textual moves and affective engagement. 
Although attempting to discern authorial empathy strategies is a tentative enterprise, 





exploring the mechanics of empathy. In particular, the mechanics I have elucidated suggest 
additional criteria to use in determining and describing whether a passage invites empathy. In 
literary studies at large and Anglo-Saxon studies in particular, many scholars have claimed that 
texts invite narrative empathy with fictional characters; however, not all those who make this 
claim have offered substantive support for it beyond perhaps a sense that an affective response 
seems appropriate to contemporary readers. However, the work of Stockwell, Miall, Kuiken, and 
Morrison suggest frameworks that can be useful for describing how a text invites shared 
emotion. In addition, we must consider works in their wider contexts, to show how external 
context works in tandem with textual mechanics, including both linguistic and thematic 
elements, to encourage empathy.  
  The next chapter moves from considering how texts invite empathy to focus on why they 
might do so. And if the mechanisms of empathy in Anglo-Saxon texts are helpfully elucidated by 
contemporary cognitive theories, the functions of empathy are often startlingly different from 
what contemporary readers would expect. Rather than promoting altruistic action, empathy 
frequently encourages individual reform, unlocks nuanced interpretation of texts and the wider 







CHAPTER 3: THE FUNCTIONS OF NARRATIVE EMPATHY 
 
This chapter discusses the functions of narrative empathy in Anglo-Saxon England. To 
exhaustively narrate the functions of empathy would be impossible, since they are as many and 
varied as the readers who choose to empathize. However, I will focus on two functions that are 
clearly evident in Old English texts and relevant to contemporary debates on empathy: “imitative 
empathy,” which inculcates desirable emotions via imitation; and “interpretive empathy,” which 
allows readers to access deeper meanings in texts via shared emotion. I focus on these functions 
both because there is significant evidence that Anglo-Saxon texts elicited empathy for these 
purposes, and because they highlight the Anglo-Saxons’ focus on inviting empathy for 
egocentric rather than altruistic reasons, seeking primarily individual improvement. 
This focus on the self diverges markedly from much (though not all) contemporary 
research on empathy. Contemporary theorists have ascribed various effects to narrative empathy, 
from driving the market value of fiction to producing altruistic citizens.1 This latter function has 
attracted perhaps the most critical and popular attention.2 Philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues 
that literature encourages the cultivation of moral values necessary for social life,3 while 
psychologist Martin Hoffman argues that empathy can begin a process to altruistic behavior – 
one that can be blocked at various points but can also produce social compassion.4 In a series of 
                                                
1 See Keen’s discussion in Empathy and the Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), especially ch. 2 and 4. 
Additional functions have been ascribed to empathy in general, particularly as a means of understanding other 
minds. For a succinct, recent introduction to debates about empathy’s effects, see Derek Matravers, Empathy. 
2 See Keen’s summary of views on this in Empathy and the Novel, 16-26, and her recent revisitation of this in 
“Novel Readers and the Empathetic Angel of Our Nature,” in Rethinking Empathy Through Literature, ed. Meghan 
Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim, Routledge Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Literature (New York: Routledge, 
2014), 21-33. 
3 Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity; Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge. 
4 Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development. This particular study focuses on a more general concept of empathy 





more specific, literary-oriented studies, Mary-Catherine Harrison has written extensively on 
narrative empathy’s value to promote altruism in the nineteenth-century writings of Elizabeth 
Gaskell and Charles Dickens. Harrison demonstrates how these texts reconfigure the empathetic 
bias toward people similar to the reader by redefining what similarity means.5 Studies of 
narrative empathy also range beyond altruism to consider how it affects interpersonal and 
interobject relations in other ways; one recent volume has challenged a narrow emphasis on 
empathy as a means of understanding another individual’s mind, probing the possibility of 
empathy with objects and animals and considering the empathetic potential and limits of sharing 
emotions with groups.6 All of these functions relate to interpersonal (or interobject) relations; 
although they may not result in compassionate action, they could still be seen as fundamentally 
altruistic rather than egocentric. 
More recently, scholars have critiqued the empathy-altruism hypothesis in literature, 
pointing out that empathy can paradoxically lead to pleasure at the pain of others,7 that the 
effects of empathy are often weak and rarely lead to genuinely prosocial action,8 and that 
reactions of personal distress cause an empathizer to ultimately distance themselves emotionally 
                                                                                                                                                       
and the implications of his work have been applied to narrative empathy, leading Keen to discuss Hoffman in 
Empathy and the Novel, 16-22. 
5 Mary-Catherine Harrison, “The Paradox of Fiction and the Ethics of Empathy: Reconceiving Dicken’s Realism,” 
Narrative 16.3 (Oct. 2008): 256-78; “How Narrative Relationships Overcome Empathic Bias: Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
Empathy Across Social Difference,” Poetics Today 32.2 (2011): 255-88. 
6 See Rethinking Empathy Through Literature, edited by Meghan Marie Hammond and Sue J. Kim (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), esp. Ralph James Savarese, “I Object: Autism, Empathy, and the Trope of Personification,” 74-
92; Eleonore De Felip, “‘Hearing the Speechless’: Empathy with Animals in Contemporary German Lyric Poetry,” 
93-106; Sigrun Meinig, “Empathizing with the Experience of Cultural Change: Reflections on Contemporary 
Fiction on Work,” 107-118. 
7 See for example Lou Agosta, Empathy and the Context of Philosophy (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
14, noting that empathy is a helpful skill for a torturer; Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View, ed. R. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 135, describing how sympathetic feeling led 
spectators to enjoy an execution. 
8 See for example, Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1958), 88-109; Theresa A. Kulbaga, “Pleasurable Pedagogies: Reading Lolita in Tehran and the Rhetoric of 
Empathy,” College English 70.5 (2008): 506-21; Lauren Berlant, “Poor Eliza,” American Literature 17.3 (1998): 
635-68. For a summary of the debate between empathy-altruism proponents and critics, see Ann Jurecic, “Empathy 





from a suffering person.9 Even C. Daniel Batson, one of the most vocal proponents of the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis, concedes that there is no inherent link between altruism and 
morality: wanting to do something for another may violate other moral principles.10 But popular 
attention to altruism, whether to promote or critique it, sometimes eclipses other, more 
egocentric functions of empathy. For example, other psychologists have suggested that narrative 
empathy increases emotional intelligence. Psychologist Keith Oatley, one of the primary 
proponents of the simulation theory of empathy, argues that narrative empathy enables us to 
understand and reflect on our own emotions, particularly when the reader is kept at the optimal 
emotional distance: too close and they overidentify with the emotions in the text as their own, 
too far and they inhabit a more detached, spectatorial stance.11 Similarly, Lisa Zunshine has 
argued that fiction enables us to understand other minds by giving us practice in evaluating what 
fictional characters are thinking.12 To both, fiction is like a lab in which one can experience and 
evaluate emotions, whether in themselves or in other people. Those focused on altruism can miss 
these other functions of empathy. 
Anglo-Saxon texts rarely invite empathy for the purpose of altruism, but reconstructing 
the horizon of expectations13 for Anglo-Saxon readers suggests that they had other reasons to 
empathize with fictional characters. For example, as chapter 1 noted, Gregory the Great’s 
hermeneutic afforded empathy an interpretive function that allowed the empathizer to understand 
                                                
9 See for example Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development, 197-205. 
10 Batson, “Empathy-Induced Altruism and Morality: No Necessary Connection,” in Empathy and Morality, ed. by 
Helen Maibom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 41-58. 
11 Oatley has argued this at length over the years; for three examples, see Oatley, “Communications to Self and 
Others”; “Meetings of Minds”; “Why Fiction May Be Twice as True as Fact.” 
12 Lisa Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus: The Ohio State University 
Press, 2006). Zunshine’s interest in empathy moves beyond a narrow focus on shared emotion and emphasizes 
shared perspective. 
13 “Horizon of expectations” is a term used by Hans Robert Jauss (see for example Jauss, Toward an Aesthetics of 
Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) to refer to the set of cultural 
norms a reader brings to decoding a text, based largely on inferences from similar texts they have read. It serves my 






the deeper meaning of a text. In other cases, an emotion experienced through empathy could 
become appropriated, even learned, by the empathizer. In a variation of this, some Anglo-Saxon 
texts teach readers to long for heaven by enacting a uniquely text-focused variant of Gregory’s 
concept of condescensio passionis, in which a pastoral figure conforms itself to the emotions of a 
sorrowing subject in order to guide them into consolation and more appropriate feelings. Some 
religious texts fill in for this pastoral role by empathizing with a reader in sorrow but then 
modulating into joy, turning an empathy that for Gregory is altruistic into an egotistic one that 
begins and ends with the reading self. Anglo-Saxon empathy could also extend beyond the self in 
ways that move beyond the altruism paradigm. As my discussion of homilies in chapter 2 
demonstrated, empathy can build identity with an emotional community, encouraging readers to 
share its emotional, spiritual, and cultural norms. Such identification causes a person to identify 
with the wisdom of the group and to pursue group goals.14 As a corollary, texts could selectively 
channel empathy to move readers to emotional distress so that they distance themselves from an 
out-group, as in Napier 29, in which empathy with the damned leads readers to reject the 
practices and fate of the wicked. While I focus primarily on interpretive and imitative empathy in 
this chapter, I will engage with other, more nuanced functions of empathy in chapters 4 and 5. 
The concepts of imitative and interpretive empathy both overlap with and diverge from 
contemporary ideas of empathy. The simulation theory of empathy championed by Zunshine and 
Oatley suggests that empathy allows us to experience imaginary feelings. However, Anglo-
Saxon imitative empathy moves beyond simulation’s emphasis on imagining by suggesting that a 
reader can not only understand emotions through empathy, but appropriate them. In this way, the 
text functions as a pastoral vehicle in a fusion of performance and guidance, first conforming to 
                                                
14 Suzanne Keen refers to this type of appeal as “bounded strategic empathy”; see Keen, “Strategic Empathizing: 
Techniques of Bounded, Ambassadorial, and Broadcast Narrative Empathy,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für 





the reader’s state and then lifting the reader into consolation. Theorists have also suggested that 
empathy could have an interpretive function. Oatley and Zunshine’s work argues that empathy 
allows us to interpret others’ minds by offering insight into their emotions. Some historians have 
asserted more controversially that empathy might allow readers to interpret historical events.15 
Anglo-Saxon interpretive empathy in the Riddles, however, is less about understanding the 
emotions of specific people or historical situations than it is about using emotions in fiction to 
understand truths about the world and social relations. Anglo-Saxon interpretive empathy 
accords with Britt Mize’s argument that classical Old English poetics represents mentality not 
for the purpose of psychologically-rich portraits, but “to evoke a system of ethical positions and 
relationships.”16 Imitative empathy as it is expressed in genres such as the Old English Riddles 
indicates that poetic representations of internal states could both evoke emotion and reflect the 
order of the world. 
Imitative and interpretive empathy overlap and shade into one another as well as into 
other functions of empathy, but I will first discuss each separately in order to discuss 
backgrounds and examples that are specific to each function. In each case, I will first discuss 
Anglo-Saxon backgrounds specific to these functions of empathy to make a case that Anglo-
Saxon readers would have read texts with this empathic purpose in mind. Second, I will provide 
a few examples of texts whose form and adaptations (in the case of texts translated from Latin) 
suggest that the composer or adaptor wished to elicit empathy for such a function. For imitative 
empathy, I focus on three hagiographies that encourage readers to imitate either the emotions of 
saints or of minor characters who offer more stable emotional models. For interpretive empathy I 
                                                
15 See Derek Matravers’ discussion of R.G. Collingwood in Matravers, Empathy, 62-74, and Amos Goldberg, 
“Empathy, Ethics, and Politics in Holocaust Historiography,” in Empathy and its Limits, eds. Aleida Assmann and 
Ines Detmers (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 52-76.  





explore examples from three sets of Old English texts used in education: the translation of 
Gregory’s Dialogues; the riddles of the Exeter Book; and the Old English introductions to the 
first fifty psalms found in the Paris Psalter. While these examples can provide only an initial 
foray into the functions of empathy in Anglo-Saxon England, they indicate that empathy had a 
role in the reading mentalities of at least some Anglo-Saxons. 
Imitative Empathy 
Empathy researchers have long recognized the connection between empathy and mimicry 
or imitation, pointing out that neurological features cause us to mirror the movements and 
emotions we observe.17 In 2004, a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study revealed 
neural overlap between experiencing pain and witnessing someone experiencing pain.18 Some 
scholars have theorized that this neural overlap might extend to the reading experience, so that to 
read about an emotion would stimulate a similar neural response.19 The link between mirror 
neurons and empathy has been over-stated by many scholars,20 and should not be uncritically 
applied. A biological basis need not be necessary to link empathy and imitation, however, 
particularly in the case of deliberate attempts to imitate. If one wished to imitate the emotions of 
                                                
17 See Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), xxix-xxx for a brief summary of early research on mirror neurons, the neurological 
features which are triggered by mimicry. For more on mirror neurons and their connection to empathy, see in the 
same volume Marco Iacoboni, “Within Each Other: Neural Mechanisms for Empathy in the Primate Brain,” 45-57, 
and Alvin I. Goldman, “Two Routes to Empathy: Insights from Cognitive Neuroscience,” 31-44; for more on 
empathy and imitation, see Jean Decety and Andrew N. Meltzoff, “Empathy, Imitation, and the Social Brain,” 58-
81. 
18 Singer et al. “Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not the Sensory Components of Pain,” Science 303 
(2004): 1157–1161.  
19 A 2006 study also found that mirror neurons for motor actions fired when people read accounts of these motor 
actions rather than seeing them; see L. Aziz-Zadeh, S.M. Wilson, G. Rizzolatti, and M. Iacoboni, “Congruent 
Embodied Representations for Visually Presented Actions and Linguistic Phrases Describing Actions,” Current 
Biology 16.18 (Sep. 19, 2006): 1818-23. 
20 See C. Lamm and Jasminka Majdandžić, “The Role of Shared Neural Activations, Mirror Neurons, and Morality 
in Empathy,” Neuroscience Research 90 (2015): 15-24, at 15-16. Lamm and Majdandžić caution against 
misinterpreting and overextending neuroscience studies to make sweeping claims about empathy. The neural 
activation need not be the mechanism of empathy but merely a sign of it, and determining relationships is rendered 
difficult by methodological limitations. At the same time, attempts to yoke mirror neuron activity to altruistic 
behavior should be tempered by the recognition that empathy is often also limited by social factors to members of an 





another individual, empathy would be one way to process what those feelings might be like 
before appropriating them to one’s own situation. 
In this section, I argue that many Anglo-Saxon texts invite a deliberate exercise of 
empathy with the exemplary emotions of characters in order to acquire them for themselves. The 
emotions inculcated by imitative empathy need not be directed toward others; rather, they offer 
personal benefit, allowing the empathizer to practice emotions necessary to the Christian life. 
Anglo-Saxon texts often attempt to inculcate emotions that are directed toward God or the self 
rather than other humans, including compunction, consolation, and penitential sorrow. The main 
thrust of imitative empathy is towards individual formation in the texts that I will analyze here. 
As already noted, many contemporary critics of empathy decry the fact that empathy need not 
(and often does not) result in others-oriented action. However, imitative empathy still holds out 
the promise of molding individuals, and to the extent that these more egoistic emotions produce 
moral reform, they might lead to behavior that also affects the larger body of which the Anglo-
Saxon Christian subject represented a part. 
Imitative empathy is similar to the affective piety movement reflected in later medieval 
texts that invite a reader to picture themselves as a participant in events such as the Crucifixion.21 
Both imitative empathy and affective piety involve performing emotions using a fictional scene 
as an imaginative aid. Rachel Fulton22 argues that affective piety is fundamentally empathetic: “it 
is a story of the effort to identify empathetically with the God who so emptied himself as to 
become incarnate from a human woman and to die a humiliating death.”23 Fulton’s argument 
                                                
21 For some key studies of affective piety, see Sarah McNamer, Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval 
Compassion ; Caroline Walker Bynum, Jesus as Mother, 16–17, 77–81, 85–90, 129–35; Rachel Fulton, From 
Judgment to Passion; Stephen J. Shoemaker, “Mary at the Cross.”  
22 While I cite Fulton’s scholarship here because of its importance to research on affective piety, I strongly condemn 
her recent public behavior. 





links with the connections discussed in chapter 1 between Christ’s human embodiment, the 
church’s mystical embodiment, and the injunction to empathy with other people. But affective 
piety can adopt a range of emotional stances, ranging from positioning oneself as a generic 
participant in the scene (such as a spectator at the Crucifixion) to empathizing with a specific 
character. In Oatley’s terms, this would refer to the position of identification rather than 
spectating.24 Thus, a text judged as affective could encourage sympathy rather than empathy – 
for example, encouraging the reader to feel sorrow for Christ’s suffering without imagining 
themselves on the cross. In contrast, the imitative empathy I wish to focus on in this chapter, 
although akin to the empathetic feelings enacted by respondents to the Crucifixion in affective 
piety, is rather different. It leads readers through a process of emotional reform that they can 
replicate in their own lives. It represents in some ways a more practical, pastoral concern that is 
not simply co-extensive with affective piety. Many Anglo-Saxon narrative texts, from homilies 
to lyric poems, invite readers to take on the emotions of exemplary characters, allowing them to 
experience feelings ranging from compunction to penitential sorrow to holy joy. I will not focus 
here on the types of emotions traditionally associated with affective piety, such as the anguish 
associated with the Crucifixion, although this is an important area of study and one that recent 
Anglo-Saxon scholarship has begun to address.25 Instead, I will explore a less noticed purpose 
for empathy: how imitative empathy in hagiography and elegy could guide readers into emotions 
                                                
24 See for example Oatley, “A Meeting of Minds,” 445-46. 
25 For discussions of Anglo-Saxon affective piety, see Alan Frantzen, “Spirituality and Devotion in Anglo-Saxon 
Penitentials,” Essays in Medieval Studies 22 (2005): 117-28, and Scott DeGregorio, “Affective Spirituality: Theory 
and Practice in Bede and Alfred the Great,” Essays in Medieval Studies 22 (2005): 129-39; Frances McCormack, 
“Those Bloody Trees: The Affectivity of Christ III,” in Anglo-Saxon Emotions, ed. Alice Jorgensen, Frances 
McCormack, and Jonathan Wilcox (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015), 143-61. A recent paper by Jennifer Lorden at the 2017 
International Congress on Medieval Studies provided an excellent summary of how histories of affective piety 






related to consolation, such as penitential sorrow and longing for heaven, enacting the Gregorian 
concept of condescensio passionis in textual form. 
Just as narrative empathy was a proficiency that had to be learned, imitation was a core 
skill of the monastic life and necessary to grow in perfection.26 Cassian’s Institutes encouraged 
monks to select one or two older monks as models,27 but monks were also to imitate the 
examples of biblical characters and saints, the examples par excellence of virtues.28 Further, 
imitation was extended beyond living people to texts, since the moral level of scriptural 
interpretation assumes that the text furnishes examples to be followed, even if these examples are 
buried beneath the literal level. Hagiography by definition is written to “teach the faithful to 
imitate actions which the community had decided were paradigmatic.”29 To the extent that any 
saint’s life is an imitatio Christi,30 readers should be encouraged to imitate them in emotions as 
well as actions. Athanasius asserts that his Life of Antony, one of the foundational examples of 
medieval hagiography, is written “ut ad eius aemulationem atque exemplum uos instituere 
possitis” [that you might be able to establish emulation and example of him],31 foregrounding 
imitation as an appropriate response to saintly narratives. The imitative value of biblical narrative 
                                                
26 See, for example, Derek A. Olsen, Reading Matthew with Monks: Liturgical Interpretation in Anglo-Saxon 
England (Collegeville, Liturgical Press, 2015), 28-38 for a discussion of the “mimetic character of monastic life,” 
28. 
27Cassian, De Institutis. Sources Chrétiennes, vol. 109, edited by Jean-Claude Guy (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965), 
IV.40, p.180-82.  
28 Christopher J. Kelly argues that Cassian viewed Scripture through the lens of mimesis, with the narratives of 
Scripture presenting a series of lessons that require imitation in response; see Cassian’s Conferences: Scriptural 
Interpretation and the Monastic Ideal, Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies 
(Surrey, Ashgate, 2012), esp. 3-16. 
29 Thomas J. Heffernan, Sacred Biography: Saints and their Biographers in the Middle Ages (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 5. 
30 See Thomas D. Hill, “Imago Dei: Genre, Symbolism, and Anglo-Saxon Hagiography,” in Holy Men and Holy 
Women: Old English Prose Saints’ Lives and their Contexts, ed. Paul E. Szarmach (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 
35-50; and also Michael Lapidge, “The Saintly Life in Anglo-Saxon England,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Old English Literature, ed. Malcolm Godden and Michael Lapidge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
243-63. 
31 I quote Evagrius’ Latin translation, which would have been better known in Anglo-Saxon England: Die 
Evagriusübersetzung der Vita Antonii, ed. Pascal Bertrand, PhD. Diss, Utrecht University, 2006, Preface l.14, p.160. 






and hagiography is thus foundational in the Christian-Latin tradition. Old English texts, 
including those intended for an audience beyond clerics, restate the value of imitating the 
positive qualities of saints and exemplary characters: Ælfric introduces his Sermo de Memoria 
Sanctorum by asserting that “We magon niman gode bysne” [we may take good example] from 
Old Testament figures32 and elsewhere calls stories about saints useful first “to gebysnunge, þæt 
we þe beteran beon” [as an example, that we might be better].33 Such examples could be of 
emotion as well as actions. For example, in Blickling Homily 2 on the healing of a blind man, 
the homilist directly calls on the reader to “Cleopian we nu in eglum mode & inneweardre 
heortan, swa se blinda dyde” [Let us call now in sorrowful mind and with inward heart, as the 
blind man did].34 The blind beggar is explicitly a model who allows the audience to practice 
salvific emotions by choosing to empathize with him. 
But although readers might be commanded to imitate specific emotions, they might still 
find it difficult to feel these emotions. It is one thing to tell a reader to feel compunction; it is 
another for a reader to experience compunction, particularly if it is foreign to the emotional 
culture of one’s upbringing. For this reason, texts that invite imitative empathy are a useful 
formational tool, because they allow readers to simulate a positive emotion by experiencing it 
through another character. As Oatley notes, literature is a tool for processing and understanding 
emotion.35 Imitative empathy, however, moves a step further from understanding emotion by 
inviting readers to experience a new emotion that they can apply to their context. 
There is ample foundation for imitative empathy in the religious emphasis on imitation 
and the doctrine that texts could serve as models. It remains to show that Anglo-Saxon texts 
                                                
32 Ælfric’s Lives of Saints, ed. Walter Skeat (London, Early English Text Society, 1881), II.336. 
33 This occurs in the Passion of Chrysanthus and Daria; Ælfric’s Lives of Saints, ed. Skeat, II.396. 
34 The Blickling Homilies of the Tenth Century, ed. Richard Morris (London, Early English Text Society, 1880), 19. 





invited readers to feel and thus imitate the emotions of characters. I will discuss three examples 
from hagiography, a genre that foregrounds the importance of following appropriate models. The 
first two examples, Ælfric’s Life of Swithun and the anonymous Life of Euphrosyne, suggest that 
imitative empathy was valued by Anglo-Saxon hagiographers because they foreground 
characters as empathetic models. What makes them especially strong evidence is that where the 
saints that they memorialize present particularly alienating targets of empathy, they offer 
alternate models, foregrounding minor characters who offer responses that are more 
understandable and applicable for Anglo-Saxon audiences. In these characters’ human frailty and 
struggle to adopt appropriate emotions, these characters provide a sympathetic acknowledgment 
of the distance between saintly and human emotional reactions. As both respond obediently, they 
show readers how to choose right feelings from a subject position that is similar to their own. As 
a contrast to these two saints’ lives, the Life of Eustace invites empathy with the central saint, 
whose aristocratic obedience shows readers how to move from sadness to resignation at one’s lot 
while steering them away from the inappropriate excess of tristitia or despair, an inappropriate 
sadness that would jeopardize salvation.36 Its empathy functions as an antibody that teaches 
readers both inappropriate and appropriate emotions. 
Although the purpose of hagiography is ostensibly to provide examples for imitation, Old 
English saints’ lives rarely invite simple emotional identification with saints. Hagiography is not 
required to invite empathy with the central saint, of course; a text can encourage imitation of 
actions rather than emotions, and hagiography had many purposes besides offering models for 
imitation, including establishing an individual’s claim to sanctity, promoting their cult, or simply 
revealing the wonders of God. Further, Alice Jorgensen points out that many saints display 
                                                
36 For a discussion of tristitia see Robin Norris, “Reversal of Fortune, Response, and Reward in the Old English 
Passion of Saint Eustace,” in Anonymous Interpolations in Aelfric’s Lives of Saints, edited by Robin Norris, Old 





emotions that are “admirable but somewhat alienating,” because “holiness means transcending or 
even reversing the ordinary person’s feelings about pain, rejection and mutilation.”37 For many 
saints the mark of sanctity is steadfastness under trial, an emotional resolve that can be difficult 
to understand. Thomas Hill points out that such resolve is central to hagiographies, which “are 
concerned with ideal types. In hagiography consistently the saint does not hesitate.”38 Michael 
Lapidge emphasizes that hagiography is focused on replicating an ideal type rather than 
presenting unique, incisive portraits.39 This idealized steadfastness, as well as other generic 
qualities of hagiography that make them akin to romance, could militate against empathetic 
readings of saints’ lives.40 Ælfric’s hagiography supports this assumption, sometimes avoiding 
more extreme emotional displays.41 Although he adds evaluative words to his sources to guide 
the reader’s emotional judgment of heroes and villains, encouraging them to disassociate from 
“arleasan” villains but cheer for “halgan” heroes,42 he seems less interested in encouraging 
readers to share in the emotions of these characters. 
A second challenge for those who wished to imitate biblical characters and saints was 
how to discern what was worthy of imitation, particularly when reading about Old Testament 
polygamists or exceptionally ascetic saints. Ælfric’s preface to his translation of Genesis reflects 
concern about identifying appropriate models; for example, Ælfric writes disapprovingly of a 
former teacher who taught that Jacob had possessed four wives while not realizing that this was 
                                                
37 Alice Jorgensen, “Historicizing Emotion: The Shame-Rage Spiral in Ælfric’s Life of St Agatha,” English Studies 
93.5 (August 2012): 529-38, 536. 
38 Hill, “Imago Dei.” 
39 Lapidge, “The Saintly Life in Anglo-Saxon England,” 262. 
40 See Hill, “Imago Dei,” esp. 38-43. 
41 See for example Hugh Magennis, “Contrasting Features in the Non- Ælfrician Lives in the Old English ‘Lives of 
Saints,’” Anglia 104 (1986): 316-348, 344. 
42 See Ruth Waterhouse, “Affective Language, Especially Alliterating Qualifiers, in Ælfric’s Life of St Alban,” 





inappropriate under the New Law.43 Such priests not only chose inappropriate models but 
ignored appropriate ones, for example citing the apostle Peter’s wife as a reason for clerical 
marriage while ignoring the fact that he had repudiated her. According to Ælfric, selecting the 
wrong models could prove that one was not truly a Christian: “Gyf hwa wyle nu swa lybban 
æfter Cristes tocyme, swa swa men leofodon ær Moises æ oþþe under Moises æ, ne byð se man 
na cristen ne he furþon wyrðe ne byð þæt him ænig cristen man mid ete” [if someone now 
desires to live after the coming of Christ just as men lived before Moses’ law or under Moses’ 
law, such a one is not Christian nor moreover is he worthy that any Christian man eat with 
him].44 This concern about appropriate models was not new to Ælfric, but had a patristic 
inheritance extending back to Augustine’s warning of the dangers of mistaking signs for literal 
truths in De Doctrina Christiana, where he describes the literally-minded reader as bound in 
“miserabilis animi seruitus” [a miserable slavery of the soul].45 Those who could not understand 
figurative meaning might find models in the wrong places, with disastrous consequences. This 
consequently put pressure on those such as Ælfric who would translate or paraphrase Old 
Testament narratives to steer readers away from inappropriate models. 
 Despite these challenges, hagiographers had a variety of strategies at their disposal to 
guide the audience to select good models. They could adapt their sources to deemphasize 
behavior that should not be imitated, as when Ælfric expunges references to “risqué passages” in 
his biblical translations.46 They could also guide reader application through extradiagetic asides, 
                                                
43 þa cwæþ he be þam heahfædere Iacobe þæt he hæfde feower wif: twa geswustra and heora twa þinena. Ful soð he 
sæde, ac he nyste, ne ic þa git, hu micel todal ys betweohx þære ealdan æ and þære niwan [Then he spoke 
concerning the patriarch Jacob, that he had four wives, two sisters and their two servants. Very truly he spoke, but 
he did not know, nor did I then yet, how great a division there is between the old law and the new.] The Old English 
Heptateuch, ed. Richard Marsden, EETS 330 (Oxford: EETS, 2008), 3. 
44The Old English Heptateuch, ed. Marsden, 3-4. 
45 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ed. Daur and Martin, III.5, l.16, p.83. 






as when Ælfric appends an exemplum about a chaste thegn to his Life of Æþelþryð or warns the 
reader of the dangers of false dreams in the Life of Swithun.47 The texts I will discuss here 
employ a third strategy: they offer an alternative empathetic model that more closely resembles 
the audience. I will focus on two examples of hagiographies that present such side-characters for 
identification. In the Life of Saint Swithun, although Ælfric celebrates the miracles of a saint with 
no recorded life, and hence no examples of emotions to imitate, Ælfric elaborates on his source 
material to develop recipients of miracles into characters with whom readers can empathize and 
learn lessons such as love for enemies. In the Life of Euphrosyne, critics have noted that the 
saint’s father Paphnuntius dominates the narrative through his driving desires and his long-
winded, emotional speeches, to the extent that he draws attention away from Euphrosyne herself. 
However, Paphnuntius’ dominance in the narrative makes him a fitting emotional exemplum in 
his journey from fixation on the world and inappropriate sorrow to consolation and desire for 
heaven. Both examples suggest that imitative empathy was considered useful enough that 
authors would highlight other characters as empathetic models even if they drew attention away 
from the central saint. 
Ælfric faced a special problem when composing the Life of Saint Swithun: little 
documentation existed for Swithun’s life, a problem Ælfric explicitly addresses in his 
introduction to the vita.48 Following extant Latin sources, in particular Lantfred’s Vita Sancti 
Swithuni, Ælfric focuses on Swithun’s posthumous career, and the saint is primarily a vehicle for 
miracles – healing the infirm, reconciling the estranged, and judging the irreverent. In Swithun’s 
place, however, a host of minor characters dominate the narrative, many of them characterized in 
emotional terms. As Elaine Treharne notes, these side-characters serve Ælfric’s aim “to improve 
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his audience’s personal and public commitment to their faith.”49 Collectively, they provide 
examples of how (or now not) to interact with saints, modeling appropriate response to 
revelation.  
But there is a character in the Life of Swithun who seems especially well-primed to be an 
empathetic model that could overcome similarity bias in some audiences:50 a thane whose 
struggles could anticipate those of aristocratic lay male readers who struggled with conflict 
between the values of monastic Christianity and those of retributive justice. The thane has been 
bedridden for some time when he has a dream in which two mysterious figures command him to 
follow them to a place where he will receive health. The story is focalized through the thane, 
drawing attention to his simultaneous confusion and gladness to hear that he will be healed. The 
figures then lead him to a paradisiacal land where Swithun is about to celebrate mass. Swithun 
pauses to tell the thane that to be healed he must do no harm to others, but rather help people, 
particularly by giving alms. The focus then shifts to the thoughts of the thane as he weighs this 
command against an ethic of exchange: “Se adliga þa ðohte þæt he yfel nolde don buton þam 
anum þe him ær yfel dyde, and þam wolde don wel þe him wel dyde ær” [the sick man then 
thought that he did not wish to do evil except to the one who previously did evil to him, and 
wished to do good to the one who previously did good to him.]51 To the thane, it makes more 
sense to help good people and hurt those who have hurt him.52 But Swithun, knowing the thane’s 
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thoughts, tells him that he must instead imitate the example of Christ and Paul by doing good to 
his enemies. When the man awakes and tells his wife about the dream, she identifies the man as 
Swithun and tells the thane to go to Winchester, where he is healed and reports the miracle to 
Æthelwold.  
The length and detail of this episode (64 lines in Skeat’s edition, or about one-seventh of 
the narrative, if one does not count the digression on dreams afterward) is striking, particularly 
since, as Treharne has observed, Ælfric omits many of the episodes contained in the Latin 
sources in this homily, creating a “sharply-focused” tale.53 Further, this episode is not present in 
the Epitome, the Latin abbreviation of Lantfred’s life that Lapidge believes Ælfric used as a basis 
for his vernacular translation.54 Mechthild Gretsch speculates that Ælfric may have decided to 
include the episode of the sick thane at an advanced point in the translation process, perhaps 
because of its aesthetic appeal and its connection to his mentor Æthelwold.55 But its pedagogical 
potential provides another reason to include it. As an anonymous protagonist, he is more like an 
Everyman figure with whom one could more easily identify.56 On the other hand, his position as 
a thane might have made him an easier target of empathy for an aristocratic audience such as 
Ealdorman Æthelweard, who co-commissioned the Lives of Saints. Furthermore, the thane’s 
desire to live by an ethic of exchange might reflect the attitude of readers, particularly those who 
administered justice to wrongdoers in a system of corporeal punishment and wergild that was 
built on an ethic of exacting payment from those who do harm.57 Given this, a reader such as 
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Æthelweard might be more inclined to identify with the nobleman’s struggle, align with him in 
receiving Swithun’s rebuke, and be encouraged to follow the nobleman’s ultimate obedience. 
Moving from reluctance to obedience models the emotional submission required to do good to 
one’s enemies. 
Ælfric does streamline aspects of the episode from Lantfred’s level of detail in ways that 
affect the thane’s presentation and the sense of dilemma. Lantfred narrates Swithun’s 
admonitions to the man in the context of a dialogue: Swithun asks the man what offering he will 
bring to the altar, and the man asks Swithun in turn what he desires.58 In Ælfric’s version, 
Swithun immediately (sona) tells the man how he should behave henceforth, implying that the 
thane is not making a voluntary contribution but rather responding to a direct order from the 
saint.59 Further, Lantfred and Ælfric use different tenses when describing the man’s internal 
response to Swithun’s instructions. Lantfred describes the man’s past actions: he had not done 
wrong to anyone prior to that moment except to those who had done him wrong. Ælfric’s thane 
describes his present desires: he does not wish to do wrong to anyone (presumably in the future) 
unless to those who have done him wrong. Thus, Ælfric’s account emphasizes the thoughts and 
feelings of the thane in the present, staging a more immediate emotional dilemma for readers to 
                                                                                                                                                       
see Capital and Corporal Punishment in Anglo-Saxon England, ed. Jay Paul Gates and Nicole Marafioti 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2014). Swithun’s response could add further support to William E. Bolton’s 
argument that Ælfric presents an ambiguous attitude toward clerical involvement in secular justice in some of his 
saints’ lives including Swithun; see Bolton, “‘We Ne Moton Deman Ymbe þæt’: Clerical Judgment in Ælfric of 
Eynsham’s Lives of Saints Swithun, Edmund, and Æthelwold,” Viator 46.1 (2015): 21-42. 
58 Qui dixit ad egrum: ‘Accede huc, homuncio, propius; et loquere nobiscum de tuis utilitatibus.’ Languidus uero, 
dum ad sacrum appropriaret ierarchum, inquit ad eum: ‘Quid uis, domine mi?’ Presul ait, ‘Vide, frater, nemini 
malum deinceps facias, nulli maledicas, proximum non detrahas, predonibus, homicidis, furibus et sacrilegis haud 
consentias, uerum omnibus succurras indigentibus in quantum uales opibus—et sic per Dei uirtutem priscam 
recipies sanitatem.’ [He said to the sick man: ‘Come closer, little man, and speak to us about your contribution.” The 
sick man, while he was approaching the holy priest, said to him: “What do you wish, my lord?” The bishop said: 
“Make sure, brother, that henceforth you do no evil to anyone, that you curse no one, that you do not slander your 
neighbor, that you do not conspire with robbers, murderers, thieves and those who plunder the church, but that you 
assist all needy persons with your riches as well as you can—and in this way through God’s power you shall regain 
your former health.”] Lapidge, The Cult of St. Swithun, 326-27. 





inhabit as they identify with the thane whose thoughts are scrutinized and mildly rebuked by 
Swithun. Ælfric also adds that Swithun’s rebuke is made bliðelice (which Lapidge translates as 
‘gently’ although it could also mean ‘pleasantly’ or ‘joyfully’60), suggesting an attempt to soften 
the blow for readers who see the rebuke as directed at them. These alterations sharpen the 
protagonist as a model for readers. 
The thane in the Life of Saint Swithun illustrates Ælfric’s willingness to introduce 
characters similar to his patrons (a practice that also occurs in his other hagiography, such as the 
Life of Æthelthryth61). Anonymous hagiographers also made use of side-characters as emotional 
models. The Life of Euphrosyne is one of the most striking examples.62 The titular saint, as a 
cross-dressing virgin-turned-monk, was unlikely to reflect the life experience of many Anglo-
Saxon readers. Further, Euphrosyne’s decision to desert her father and take refuge in a monastery 
could run counter to norms stressing loyalty to kin. But Euphrosyne is not the only significant 
character in the text; indeed, the text begins not with her but with her father Paphnuntius, who 
provides the central empathetic target for readers who learn with him to redirect their desires 
toward heavenly goals. Paphnuntius’ longing for an heir comes to drive a considerable portion of 
the plot.63 First, his sorrow over his wife’s barrenness provokes compassion from an abbot64 and 
leads to the miraculous birth of Euphrosyne. His desires lead to her betrothal to a wealthy suitor, 
while his desire for the church’s blessing on her union provides the impetus for Euphrosyne to 
run away by giving her the opportunity to discover the attractiveness of monastic observance. 
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His desires might seem positive and paternal, perhaps especially to Anglo-Saxon readers who 
wanted to see their daughters – and their goods – provided for.65 However, Euphrosyne glosses 
his wishes as negative desires, motivated by “idlum welum” or idle wealth,66 and she flees him to 
pursue the heavenly kingdom. 
Once she has departed, Paphnuntius’ emotional conflict intensifies. When his searching 
for her proves fruitless, he breaks forth in a lengthy, stirring lament, which Andrew Scheil calls 
“the most ornamental, moving dialogue in the vita.”67 As Scheil points out, its language is highly 
stylized and affective, portraying his daughter through several emotionally loaded images: 
vineyard, light vessel, lamb. But as Stephen Stallcup observes, these images are also pervasively 
material, and further lament the despoiling of useful possessions that are “rendered valueless” 
through loss or destruction.68 Further, Paphnuntius characterizes Euphrosyne as his wealth. His 
attachment to his daughter reveals him as still tied to the world, and puts him at risk of the deadly 
sin of tristitia or despair.69 Paphnuntius’ turn to poetry follows a literary tendency to use poetry 
to express intense grief, reflected in the Old English elegies and the Consolation of Philosophy. 
His lament’s formal qualities, as well as this link between poetry and affective response, could 
encourage in the reader an empathetic frame of mind.70 Although it does not follow the tropes of 
Old English elegy, it nevertheless reflects the belief in poetry as a means of processing and 
understanding emotion. Readers receive specific details about his desires, and may very well 
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understand his motivations to safeguard children and wealth, which could motivate them to 
empathize with his sorrow rather than feel sympathy from a distance. But one possible change to 
the lament from the most proximate Latin source we possess71 suggests revisions made to 
eliminate potentially jarring elements of his lament. The Latin version declares Euphrosyne to be 
a paragon: “Illa generositatis constitutio, illa malorum consolatrix, illa laborantium requies, 
gementium portus erat” [she was the definition of nobility, the consoler of evil men, the rest of 
the laborers, the refuge of the sorrowing].72 The Old English calls her only “geomrigendra frofor 
and geswencendra rest” [comfort of the sorrowing and rest of the laboring].73 The adaptor of the 
Life of Euphrosyne may have worked from a version of her vita that omitted the other two Latin 
descriptors, and Magennis notes that the translator frequently omits “unnecessary phrases and 
details”74; however, one could argue that there is a further reason to omit “generositatis 
constitutio”: To call her the definition of generosity would impute to her power to distribute her 
father’s wealth, whereas the vita focuses on Paphnuntius’ attitudes toward wealth. In its focus on 
Paphnuntius’ attitude toward riches, the text downplays Euphrosyne’s material beneficence. 
Paphnuntius finally seeks solace from the abbot who first showed him compassion. When 
the monks’ prayers fail to locate Euphrosyne, the abbot reassures him that his daughter must be 
safe, or else God would have answered their prayers. Momentarily comforted, Paphnuntius 
returns to good works and generosity, but these activities alone cannot assuage the sorrow that he 
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confesses to the abbot “ma and ma wyxst on me” [grows more and more in me].75 The abbot 
ultimately sends him to the monk Smaragdus – in fact his daughter in monastic habit, rendered 
unrecognizable by her ascetic practices – to receive consolation, and Paphnuntius’ emotional 
education begins.76 Euphrosyne’s counsel is a model of pastoral consolation. She presents her 
father with an appropriate goal to pursue (“heofona rices eadignysse”),77 explains the 
mechanisms to reach it, and addresses inappropriate emotion – “fæder and modor and oþre 
woruldlice þing lufian to-foran gode” [to love father and mother and other worldly things before 
God]78 – that could hinder one’s attainment of heaven. Further, she acknowledges that affliction 
(gedrefednys, which can refer to emotional turmoil as well as physical affliction79) produces 
perseverance. Then the admonition shifts from indirect to direct speech: 
“Ge-lyf me ne forsihð þe na god and gif þin dohtor on ænigum lyre feallen wære þonne 
gecyðde þe þæt god þæt heo ne losode ac getryw on god þæt heo sumne gode ræd hire 
geceas Læt nu þine micclan cwylminge Agapitus min lareow me rehte be þe hu swyðe þu 
gedrefed eart æfter þire dehter and hu þu þæs abbodes fultumes bæde and his broþra nu 
wylle ic sylfe eac þeah ic wac sy and synful god biddan þæt he þe forgife forebyrd and 
geþyld and þe getiðige þæs ðe selost sy and hire behefast Gelomlice ic wilnode þe 
geseonne þæt þu sume frofre þurh me eaðmodre findan mihtest” and heo ða cwæð to him 
“Gang nu min hlaford.”80 
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[“Believe me, God does not despise you, and if your daughter were fallen into any 
damage, then God would have revealed that to you, that she should not be lost. But trust 
in God that she chose some good counsel for herself. Now, forsake your great affliction. 
Agapitus, my teacher, told me about you, how severely you are afflicted about your 
daughter and how you asked for help from the abbot and his brothers. Now I myself 
desire also, although I am weak and sinful, to ask God that he should give you 
forbearance and patience and grant to you what is best for you and most behooves her. 
Often I desired to see you that you might find some comfort through me, humbly.” And 
then she said to him, “Go now, my lord.”] 
These orders bear some further analysis. First, Smaragdus’ admonition that Paphnuntius trust 
God to keep his daughter safe highlights the reality that she is secure, while not reassuring him 
about worldly wealth. By decoupling these two issues, intertwined in Paphnuntius’ earlier 
speech, Smaragdus points to which value is more important, acknowledging that the safety of a 
daughter is a reasonable concern, but one that need not be held in light of God’s ability to protect 
her. Second, Smaragdus’ order as a spiritual superior to forsake his cwylminge or affliction is a 
command to change his emotional response to his daughter’s absence. Smaragdus ascribes 
knowledge of Paphnuntius’ sorrow as coming from Agapitus as an intermediary, drawing 
attention to her monastic identity that enables her to empathize with him as a pastoral figure 
rather than as his daughter. Her promise to pray that God would give him what is fitting for both 
him and his daughter both emphasizes her authority as intercessor (even as she humbly draws 
attention to her weakness) and refocuses Paphnuntius on God as the one who determines what 
should be valued as best. Euphrosyne’s speech constructs her as a monk who is both humble, 





also comes to have a pastoral relation to the reader who empathizes with Paphnuntius.  
Thirty-eight years later, Euphrosyne is on her deathbed from sickness. When Paphnuntius 
learns, he goes into Euphrosyne and pronounces a despairing lament, with effusive words to 
describe his sorrow and his decades-long desire to see his daughter. His consolation was still 
attached to a person in Smaragdus, and without this person, he relapses into tristitia. But seeing 
Paphnuntius’ refusal to be consoled (“he nanre frofre onfon nolde”),81 Smaragdus rebukes him in 
direct speech again, challenging his lack of faith in God’s strength, telling him to put off his 
affliction, reminding him of the story of Jacob the patriarch seeing his long-lost son Joseph, and 
urging him to remain for three days. The biblical citation invites Paphnuntius to receive 
consolation by locating himself in the biblical story as Jacob, although the nature of 
Paphnuntius’ connection to Jacob does not become clear for him until three days later, when 
Euphrosyne reveals her identity to him before dying. After her death, contrary to her wishes to 
keep her identity a secret, Paphnuntius’ lamentations reveal the secret to the monks. 
Paphnuntius’ tale continues after Euphrosyne’s death: he obeys her command to commit his 
property to the monastery, joins the monks, and passes away living in the same cell that she 
occupied. The hagiographer comments that “se dæg heora forðfore is mærsod on þam mynstre” 
(the day of their departure is honored in that monastery),82 uniting the father with the daughter in 
the monastery’s remembrance. Paphnuntius has finally learned to let go of earthly desires, and in 
so doing, earns a place with his daughter. 
The relative attention given to Paphnuntius is surprising, particularly given the 
translator’s approach to their material. The adaptor condensed the vita significantly from the 
Latin source, omitting side-characters and some extravagant emotional details, but largely 
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preserves Paphnuntius’ laments, suggesting that they were viewed as an important part of the 
story.83 Hugh Magennis sees Paphnuntius’ prominence as a weakness of the text that can 
“unbalance the presentation,” particularly since some of Euphrosyne’s emotions are abbreviated 
in the Old English.84 Indeed, the first reference to Euphrosyne’s emotions does not occur until 
line 45 of Skeat’s edition, when she expresses wonder at the life that monks lead. Not only do 
Paphnuntius’ emotions potentially destabilize the text structurally, but also emotionally, for if the 
excessive sorrow of tristitia is problematic, Paphnuntius displays dangerous levels of it. His 
laments are long and elaborate, and he frequently relapses into grief after being offered 
consolation by the abbot and Smaragdus. He even suggests that he is at risk of damnation for his 
sadness when he tells the dying Smaragdus, “eallunga þus heofende ic to helle niðerstige” 
[assuredly, thus weeping I will descend to hell].85 Robin Norris argues that Paphnuntius’ effusive 
grief nonetheless serves a critical purpose: by observing the convention that a confessor be 
mourned by their follower after death, it establishes the genre of Euphrosyne’s Life as a vita 
rather than a passio.86 Further, its melodramatic aspects provide the kind of extremes that make 
some hagiography more akin to romance, as Thomas D. Hill notes.87 Yet there could be other 
reasons to emphasize Paphnuntius’ sadness, even at Euphrosyne’s expense: as a fully-fledged 
individual whose “character follows a clear arc of development,”88 Paphnuntius is a well-
developed target for empathy. The reader is given little doubt as to how Paphnuntius feels, as he 
pronounces verbose speeches full of emotion words. In addition, other characters respond with 
empathy to his speeches: the whole town weeps when he laments his daughter’s disappearance, 
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and the abbot is “efensargiende” with Paphnuntius so much that he introduces him to Smaragdus. 
If these intradiegetic voices empathize with Paphnuntius, the reader might as well, particularly if 
they were aristocratic lay males who understood Paphnuntius’ concerns for wealth and for his 
child. To them, his desires might seem less foreign than those of Euphrosyne, who is ready to 
leave family and wealth to pursue a life of asceticism. In Paphnuntius’ case, fathers might feel 
“situational empathy,” evoked by similarity.89 But if readers are led to sympathize with 
Paphnuntius by recognizing how they share his concerns, they might also be challenged when 
Euphrosyne glosses his desires as being motivated by “idlum welum” and counsels him to 
reorient his values toward eternal things. An audience that resonated with the sorrows of 
bereaved Paphnuntius and identified with his expanded laments might ultimately feel consolation 
with him by considering the abbot’s admonition to trust God’s sovereignty and Euphrosyne’s 
counsel to not cling too tightly to temporal wealth or relationships. Euphrosyne’s speech to 
Paphnuntius on the values of heaven is not fully relegated to indirect speech as other portions of 
the Latin source are,90 and the reader can thus feel her words directed to themselves as well as 
Paphnuntius. This is not to argue that Euphrosyne is not the main character of her own vita or 
even that she could not be a model for readers. The text does present Euphrosyne’s desires as 
well, giving her multiple speeches that express her longing for monastic life. However, for 
audience members who might struggle with a symbolic reading of Euphrosyne or whose lifestyle 
was less suited to monasticism, Paphnuntius provides a more immediately accessible example. 
Paphnuntius and Euphrosyne’s dialogue maps onto the vita a consolation narrative 
reminiscent of the Consolation of Philosophy. Indeed, Paphnuntius’ first stylized lament, with its 
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parallelism, metaphor, and literariness, is reminiscent of Boethius’ initial poetic lament.91 Just as 
Lady Philosophy comforts Boethius in the Consolation of Philosophy by reorienting his 
worldview, Euphrosyne offers Paphnuntius and the reader reassurance (albeit a more Christian 
and less philosophical one). This draws attention to an important aspect of imitative empathy: 
although it focuses on producing spiritually salutary emotions, from compunction to 
steadfastness, it runs the risk of calling up other emotions that were dangerous and to be avoided. 
Tristitia, for example, was one of the deadly sins reproved by Ælfric in the Sermo de Memoria 
Sanctorum.92 The stories of Paphnuntius and Eustace warned readers against excessive sorrow 
by initially allowing readers to share sorrow before rejecting it, offering a safe space in narrative 
to process the emotion before rejecting it. This kind of empathy serves a dual purpose, both 
helping the reader understand what actually constitutes tristitia and where the line was drawn 
between sadness and inappropriate sorrow, and also demonstrating how to move away from this 
feeling by refocusing on eternal priorities. Like a vaccine, providing a small dose of a disease to 
protect against future outbreaks, such imitative empathy trained the soul’s emotional antibodies 
to fight sorrow by first evoking it. It also recognized the necessity of continuing to fight against 
negative emotion, as Paphnuntius’ frequent relapses suggest the ever-present danger of falling 
away. As a counter to Magennis’ claim that Paphnuntius unbalances the text, then, perhaps one 
could argue that he balances the portrayal of Euphrosyne by offering another exemplar - a man 
who is good, but whose emotional attachments need to be redirected from the world to heaven. 
Both Paphnuntius and the thane underscore the difficulties of emotional reform: they are 
valuable models because they illustrate the possibility of struggling toward sanctity even if one’s 
emotions still cling to the earth. Both characters, in their reluctance to accept the instructions of 
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their saintly guides, show a sympathetic understanding of the bewildering distance between 
saintly and human emotions. However, both characters’ eventual acceptance of appropriate 
attitudes can guide readers who sympathize with them and move into understanding and 
consolation. In this way, they function like the pastoral figure described by Gregory the Great 
who demonstrates condescensio passionis, lowering their emotions to those of a sinful sufferer as 
a precursor to teaching them how they ought to be, reorienting their values to appropriate ends. 
I do not mean to argue that saints could never be empathetic models in hagiography. 
Gregory the Great argued that even the weaknesses of saints could be instructive, discussing at 
length in Book II of Moralia in Job how biblical characters are intended as both positive and 
negative exempla: 
Narrat autem gesta eorum et ad imitationem corda prouocat infirmorum. Dumque illorum 
uictricia facta commemorat contra uitiorum proelia, debilia nostra confirmat; fitque 
uerbis illius ut eo mens minus inter certamina trepidet, quo ante se positos tot uirorum 
fortium triumphos uidet. Nonnumquam uero non solum nobis eorum uirtutes asserit, sed 
etiam casus innotescit, ut et in uictoria fortium quod imitando arripere et rursus uideamus 
in lapsibus quod timere.93  
[[Scripture] relates the deeds of the Saints, and stirs the hearts of the weak to follow their 
example, and while it commemorates their victorious deeds, it strengthens our feebleness 
against the assaults of our vices; and its words have this effect, that the mind is so much 
the less dismayed amidst conflicts as it sees the triumphs of so many brave men set 
before it.  Sometimes however it not only informs us of their exellencies, but also makes 
known their mischances, that both in the victory of brave men we may see what we ought 
to seize on by imitation, and again in their falls what we ought to stand in fear of.] 
                                                





As Gregory explains, the narratives of Scripture not only provide information but also change 
one’s interior, stirring, strengthening, and forestalling dismay. In this way, even seeing one’s 
emotions mirrored in negative characters could be beneficial, if this emotion was controlled and 
redirected to shame and repentance. Jorgensen makes a similar point in her reading of the Life of 
Agatha, arguing that Anglo-Saxons steeped in an honor culture might first identify with the 
emotions of the villainous Quintianus, to ultimately be reproved by the fact that these emotions 
are condemned in the moral world of the text.94 Such a reaction fits Gregory’s statement that 
hagiography shows individuals what they ought to stand in fear of, but with an experiential 
element that raises the stakes: individuals not only see but feel what they should fear. Empathy 
like this is risky, however, in that it might lead to sympathetic approval rather than fear. Readers 
who sympathize with Quintianus in the Life of Agatha or the damned in Napier 29 could 
potentially experience inappropriate identification as well. As I will discuss in chapter 4, some 
texts reflect an awareness of the dangerous potential for affective language to encourage such 
flawed empathy. 
Old English hagiography does sometimes present flawed saints as emotional examples, 
particularly in poetry. For example, Amity Reading has argued that the poetic Andreas presents 
its saint as an imperfect character in a lifelong process of conversion – and thus, an example for 
readers,95 while Shannon Godlove has suggested a similarly sympathetic revision of the apostles 
in Christ II.96  Examples of empathetic saints also exist in prose, particularly in anonymous lives. 
The Life of St. Eustace, based on a Latin life, invites empathy for a wealthy military commander 
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– like Paphnuntius or the thane, the sort of person that aristocratic male Anglo-Saxons might 
identify with – and depicts his resolve after he loses possessions, home, and family. Norris has 
pointed out the translator downplays more effusive emotions in the source to avoid the 
appearance that Eustace has tristitia. The Old English version’s new, toned-down Eustace is a 
better emotional model for Anglo-Saxon readers. Yet Eustace is not devoid of sadness; in fact, 
when he loses his children in the final straw, he engages in a lengthy lament akin to 
Paphnuntius’s in which he complains that he has lost more than Job, and Norris suggests that he 
is on the verge of demonstrating tristitia.97 However, at the end of this lament, Eustace is able to 
recognize that he has gone too far, confessing, “Drihten leof ne onscunige ðu ðines ðeowes 
mænigfealdan word ic sorgie soðlice ðæt ic ma spræce ðonne hit gedafnað sete drihten 
heordrædene minum muðe ðæt min heorte ne abuge to yflum wordum ði-læs ðe ic beo aworpen 
fram ðine ansyne” [Dear Lord, do not abhor the manifold words of your servant; truly I sorrow 
that I speak more than is befitting. Lord, set a guard on my mouth that my heart might not bend 
to evil words lest I should be cast from your sight.] Eustace recognizes that excessive speech 
displeases God and draws on Psalm 140:3-4, using a scriptural prayer to give appropriate bounds 
to his words as he prays for restraint.98 As Norris points out, the emotional quality of Eustace’s 
words is not condemned, only the number of his words.99 Thus, the reader who shares his feeling 
is not condemned for their initial sadness but steered away from excessive expression of it. The 
next time that Eustace prays, his prayer is shorter and more restrained, showing a movement 
toward consolation. And indeed, Eustace begins to recover his former position and relationships 
from this point forward. Eustace’s emotional arc and ultimate ability to control his feelings make 
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him a model not only for how to respond appropriately to worldly loss, but also how to move 
from sadness into steadfastness or consolation. Indeed, his initially excessive emotion may be the 
bait that first hooks the reader into emotional engagement and empathy before helping them 
discover resolve along with Eustace, following a pattern of consolation that also occurs in the 
Consolation of Philosophy and the elegies.  
Although I do not have space to discuss them here, Old English lyric and narrative poetry 
could also promote imitative empathy with exemplary figures. For example, Janet Ericksen has 
noted how Adam and Eve serve as models of penitential sorrow in Genesis B.100 M. Bradford 
Bedingfield argues that the disciples at the beginning of Christ II are meant to be “a sympathetic 
model” for readers of how to respond to the Ascension.101 As noted in chapter 2, some of the 
elegies invite an empathy that simulates the process of consolation for readers in a more intimate 
form, approaching the same process suggested in the characters of Paphnuntius and Eustace, but 
using the indeterminacy of poetry and the lacunae in the portrait sketched by the poem to provide 
a space for readers to project themselves into the “negative values” described by Morrison.102 
However, as my examples from hagiography illustrate, writers often chose to invite empathy 
with positive models to lead readers to experience beneficial emotions. Whether readers 
empathized with a character presented in a third-person narrative or directly assumed the words 
and persona of a first-person character, they were frequently confronted with emotions to learn 
about and appropriate. Sometimes these emotions are unambiguously exemplary, while at other 
times they modulate from a less desirable emotion that the reader may find easier to empathize 
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with before moving to a more salutary emotion. In all cases, however, imitative empathy changes 
the individual as he or she tries out appropriate behaviors that might not feel natural. This change 
would lead to appropriate actions such as penance, but the emotion was also an end in itself, 
reflecting reoriented, appropriate goals. Although contemporary empathy theory has criticized 
the ways that empathy becomes a means to appropriate others’ emotions, few scholars have 
considered the circumstances in which a text might invite empathy for the purposes of 
appropriation.103 Although intent does not absolve a text of the problematic implications of 
appropriating emotion, it does indicate the positive and even empowering valences given to 
imitative empathy in some contexts. 
Interpretive Empathy 
Imitative and pastoral empathy focus on understanding one’s own emotions and learning 
to feel rightly through another character; however, the by-products of narrative empathy are not 
limited to emotion. As noted in the first chapter, Gregory the Great saw empathy as more than a 
tool to channel reader-response; it also played an important role in hermeneutics, enabling 
readers to discern meanings hidden in the emotions of potentially alienating characters. Thus, 
narrative empathy rightly enacted could make confusing emotions yield their true significance. 
Such an interpretive strategy need not apply only to Scripture. If the Life of Euphrosyne offers 
readers a more accessible emotional model in Paphnuntius, it also offers readers equipped with 
the Gregorian skill of narrative empathy the opportunity to derive new meanings from the text by 
empathizing with Euphrosyne’s more perplexing emotions. A reader who seeks to identify with 
Euphrosyne’s desire for chastity over family loyalty would understand her sometimes alienating 
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statements about the rewards of the heavenly life over the earthly, just as she attempts to make 
Paphnuntius understand. 
 Evidence suggests that some Anglo-Saxons also saw a connection between empathy and 
accurate interpretation. When the preface to the Old English Consolation of Philosophy 
comments that Alfred undertook this translation while experiencing “mislicum and 
manigfealdum weoruldbisgum þe hine oft ægðer ge on mode ge on lichoman bisgodan” [various 
and many worldly afflictions which afflicted him often both in mind and in body],104 it may 
imply a claim similar to Gregory’s assertion that illness allowed him to better understand Job: 
through Alfred’s shared experience of affliction, the king in turn is better able to understand the 
meaning of Boethius’ pain and consolation, even if someone may feel because of intellectual 
training that they “rihtlicor ongite þonne he meahte” [perceive more correctly than he [Alfred] 
might].105 The Old English prose psalms and their introductions, often associated with Alfred 
and his circle, model empathy as an interpretive tool, offering commentary on the feelings of the 
Psalm composers as the first step in unraveling the interpretation of a psalm and how it applies to 
the Christian individual’s emotional life. Alfred in particular seems to have been attuned to the 
potential of empathy as a means to understand and experience correct emotional responses to 
life’s vicissitudes. 
 Although no Anglo-Saxon texts directly reference Gregory’s theory of interpretive 
empathy, educational texts ranging from the Old English Dialogues to the Riddles present 
opportunities to make fellow-feeling a primary strategy of understanding meaning within the text 
and within the world. Such interpretation might also be applied to characters in other texts, such 
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as the biblical poetry in the Junius Manuscript. One could argue that it is difficult to prove that 
any particular text would be read empathetically as an interpretive strategy, particularly in 
instances where empathy is a hermeneutic tool that might be brought to bear on a text rather than 
one invited by a text. Yet given the evidence for this strategy in Gregory’s writing, Alfred’s 
statements in a similar vein, and the types of texts that seem to offer additional depths with an 
empathetic reading, we can reasonably infer that empathetic hermeneutics was a viable and 
valuable function of empathy in Anglo-Saxon England. Even Beowulf presents its central 
character using empathy as an interpretive strategy in the moving passage known as the Father’s 
Lament, as I will discuss in chapter 5. The remainder of this section will focus on three different 
examples that suggest Anglo-Saxons viewed narrative empathy as an interpretive tool. Gregory’s 
Dialogues in its Old English translation suggests how narrative empathy can prevent 
inappropriate affective responses by providing an intradiegetic model in the character of Peter; 
the Old English Riddles invite emotional identification to understand relations in the world; and 
the Old English Prose Psalms introductions make empathy central to understanding the meaning 
of the psalms. Taken together, these illustrate narrative empathy as a deliberate process of 
internalizing another’s emotions in order to understand ethical dilemmas, hierarchical 
relationships, and moral truth. 
 Gregory’s Dialogues presents a collection of miraculous stories about Italian saints;106 
during Alfred’s educational reforms, it was translated into Old English, perhaps indicating its 
perceived usefulness as a teaching tool.107 One of its uses was likely as a set of examples. As 
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hagiography, the Dialogues is concerned with the value of saints as models, as Peter makes 
explicit when he asks Gregory to tell him stories of saints from their region: 
Full maneȝa men wæron, þa þe onælað 7 ȝetihtað þa bysna ȝodra wera swyðor þonne þa 
lare to þære lufan þæs heofonlican eðles. 7 swa ȝeweorðeþ full oft, þæt þam mode þæs 
ȝehyrendan becymeþ twifeald fultum on þam bysenum ura fædera: forþon hit byþ 
onbærned of wiðmetennesse ȝodra foreȝanȝendra wera to þære lufan þæs toweardan lifes, 
7 þeh hit wene, þæt hit sylf hwæthwu3u sy, symble hit byð ȝeeadmodod þæs þe swyðor, 
þonne hit onȝyteþ æniȝe beteran wisan be oðrum mannum.108 
[There were full many men, who kindle and inspire with examples of good men more 
strongly than with teaching to the love of the heavenly kingdom. And so it very often 
occurs that the mind of the listener receives twofold blessing in the examples of our 
fathers: because it is kindled from the invention of good foregoing men to the love of the 
life to come, and if it should think that it itself might be something, always it is humbled 
the more severely, when it perceives any better wise concerning other men.] 
Peter’s response illustrates the value of saints as emotional models who can inspire others to love 
of heaven, sometimes by offering examples that are not immediately imitable but rather 
humbling. What is clear is that readers are to have emotional responses to the saints. To help the 
reader understand which emotional responses are appropriate in which circumstances, the 
Dialogues offers Peter as a model audience. As Peter asks leading questions and makes 
emotional exclamations, he propels the dialogue forward. For example, upon hearing of how the 
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monk Maurus is able to walk on water because he obeys the command of his superior Benedict, 
Peter exclaims, “soþlice swa me þæs godan weres wundor habbað geblissod, þæt swa ic swyþor 
drince, swa me swyþor þyrsteð” [truly, I have rejoiced in the miracles of the good man such that 
the more strongly I drink, the more strongly I thirst.]109 This leads Gregory to recount another 
story. Peter’s desire in this quotation shows that readers are to be moved to rejoicing and to 
desire, not to emulate a miracle as audacious as walking on water.110 Here the Old English adds 
the emotional response of rejoicing to the Latin, further guiding the reader into an appropriate 
response.111 
Peter continues to model appropriate emotional responses, allowing the reader to see the 
difference between when a saint should be imitated and when they should simply be admired. In 
one case he illustrates the response of humility when a saint’s actions are inimitable exclaiming, 
“nu me ȝelamp, þæt ic þæt ȝehyrde, þæt ic æfterhyrȝan ne mæȝ, 7 ma me lysteþ wepan þone 
sæcȝan” [now it has befallen me, that what I heard, I may not imitate, and it befits me more to 
weep than to speak].112 Peter recognizes that not all saintly actions and emotions are possible to 
imitate, and his response steers the reader away from inappropriately assuming that they too can 
or should attempt some of the miracles carried out by saints like Paulinus. In the Dialogues, then, 
Peter is both an example of imitative empathy113 and a key to interpretation; the reader who 
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empathizes with him as a fellow audience member learns to put on the appropriate emotions in 
response to exemplary lives, but not to over-identify with saints whose powers are different. 
 While Peter as model reader attempts to demystify how to respond to the wondrous, 
many of the nearly 100 Old English Riddles found in the Exeter Book invite direct empathy as a 
means of gaining insight from the mysterious. Listed without answers (at least in the only extant 
manuscript in which most of these riddles appear), the Riddles focus more explicitly on the 
puzzle of interpretation than many riddles in Latin collections, which often provide the answer as 
the title and make the process of interpretation secondary to the knowledge encoded in the 
riddle.114 Recent scholarship has been as concerned with the riddles’ mechanics of concealment 
and interpretation, how riddles script their game and how readers play it, as earlier scholarship 
was with the solution revealed by the riddle. Anita Riedinger has explored how the riddles’ use 
of traditional formulas allowed them to misdirect readers.115 Dieter Bitterli has discussed the 
riddles’ relationship to the Latin tradition, including their erudite use of runic and numerological 
puzzles and evocation of scribal tools, fused in a creative Anglo-Saxon expression.116 Patrick 
Murphy focuses on the “extended, implicit metaphors” that guide the selection of clues used to 
both present and occlude the answer, while Antonina Harbus has considered conceptual 
metaphors in riddles via cognitive linguistics.117 In James Paz’s recent study of objects in the 
Riddles, he notes that they are a “multisensory” experience incorporating sight, sound, and 
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possibly even touch,118 and argues that “riddling can be seen as the closest form of reading.”119 
In all of these studies, the mechanics of interpretation are as important to understanding the 
riddles as recognizing the object or concept to which they refer. Working from the 
phenomenological tradition, Patricia Dailey reads the riddles with a view to their 
“responsiveness,” or ability to evoke particular reactions from readers above and beyond the 
process of seeking a solution.120 
Central to this process of interpretation is the ability to make appropriate identifications 
among disparate concepts, whether this involves recognizing an underlying metaphor, set of 
formulaic assumptions, or learned system structuring the riddle. Murphy notes in passing the 
definition of the riddle propounded by fourth-century grammarian Donatus, whose grammatical 
commentaries were influential in Anglo-Saxon England, as something that discloses the 
“occultum similitudinem rerum,” which Murphy translates as “the hidden similarity of 
things.”121 In this definition, identifying commonality is at the heart of riddling, and the ability to 
find the answer is the same ability that allows one to understand and interpret connections in the 
world. Lois Bragg directly asserts this connection for the Old English riddles, arguing that their 
solutions can only be reached through an act of “identification with the speaker.”122 For Bragg, 
identification is a hallmark of lyric in general because lyric requires that readers “re-view . . . 
emotion through the eyes of another, the speaker of the poem.”123 The riddles tie this experience 
to understanding an answer. Morrison’s biological paradigm of empathy is built on a similar 
sense of “the hidden similarity of things,” creating analogy between biological processes of 
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reproduction and models of identification with others. Further, although Gregory’s primary 
interest in interpretive empathy is for explicating Scripture, for readers with training in 
ruminatio, such reading strategies could be applied to other spiritual texts. Even from the 
standpoint of the cognitive linguistic theory of texture discussed in chapter 2, the linguistic 
complexity of the riddles would lead to the type of mental engagement that complements and 
invites emotional engagement. From a variety of complementary cultural angles, then, it would 
make sense that interpreting riddles would invite the reader to connect not only disparate 
concepts but reader and narrator.124 
Such identification between reader and riddle need not be emotional. However, emotions 
figure prominently in the descriptions of several of the riddling speakers, making identification 
emotional by necessity. For example, in Riddle 39, the solution is described as a quasi-exile who 
“sceal wideferh wreccan laste / hamleas hweorfan” [ll.8-9; must far and wide, homeless, turn in 
the track of exile; 8-9] and “sy earmost ealra wihta” [l.16; is the saddest of all creatures],125 while 
in Riddle 5, the speaker is described in elegiac terms as an “anhaga” (1) who is “ecgum werig,” 
weary from the battle (3). In Riddle 38, the answer is said to be “geoguðmyrþe grædig” [l.2; 
greedy in youthful mirth], while in Riddle 33, the answer laughs cruelly [l.3; “hleahtor was 
gryrelic,” the laughter was terrible]. The Leiden Riddle describes its solution by what it does not 
feel, emphasizing its lack of fear: “ni anoegun ic me aerigfaerae     egsan brogum, / ðeh ði n[…]n 
siæ     niudlicae ob cocrum” [l.12-13; nor do I fear terror from the peril of a flight of arrows].126 
The speaker of Riddle 15 must “of eðle eaforan mine / forhtmod fergan” [ll.12-13; must travel, 
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fearful-minded, from my nephew]. On the other hand, the solution to Riddle 3 is characterized by 
the emotion it evokes from others, in particular fear. Emotion thus plays a significant role in 
many of the riddles, and understanding this emotion is part of unraveling the riddle’s solution. 
 Take, for example, Riddle 5’s “anhaga,” described in terms that suggest evocatively 
pitiful emotion. It is “beadoweorca sæd, / ecgum werig” [ll.2-3; full from works of battle, weary 
from blades], and does not expect “frofre” [l.4; comfort]; even as the remnants of files injure it, it 
cannot hope to find “læcecynn” [l.10; a healer] to cure its wounds, but must rather “ecga dolg 
eacen weorðað / þurh deaðslege dagum ond nihtum” [ll.13-14; become full with the wounds of 
swords through deadly blows day and night]. The image of a battle-tired warrior with no hope of 
healing could provoke a range of affective responses. Readers might show pity rather than 
empathy, feeling sorry for the mysterious creature’s plight, or readers might emotionally distance 
themselves from the description of battle-terror. But to grasp the solution, readers must 
understand the cause of this terror, which requires focusing on it in the process of interpretation, 
considering how it plays out in human relationships, and finally applying it to the speaker of the 
riddle. John Niles has pointed out the importance of understanding the emotions of the riddles in 
terms of Anglo-Saxon social systems, arguing that “The riddles stress lordship, obedience, fear. 
They dwell on the service of man to master.”127 Applying the affect of such power relations to 
the weary warrior of Riddle 5 lends insight into the solution, but also into the emotional life of 
Anglo-Saxon warriors, a life more complex than the glorified heroic ethos of many poems. This 
critique of heroic emotion might also be reflected in the riddle’s solution, which could be a more 
mundane “chopping block” as much as it could be a heroic shield.128 As Patrick Murphy notes, 
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this riddle is prototypical of “a particular brand of transfer whereby inanimate objects are 
animated by the very feelings they typically arouse in those who own or use them in daily 
life.”129 The shield stands in for the warrior who wields it, and its weariness hints at the less 
glamorous aspects of heroic life, presenting a counterpoint to the ethos of undaunted warriors 
battling to the death celebrated in poems like The Battle of Maldon. But if the reader associates 
the riddle with both shield and chopping block, there is a double movement from the high-flown 
images of warfare in Anglo-Saxon poetry and the mundane weariness of a chopping block and of 
a soldier worn down in battle. Empathy with the speaker of Riddle 5 is thus a means of 
experiencing the emotions surrounding familiar objects, and of re-experiencing the emotions 
associated with a particular set of social and aesthetic relations. It allows interpretation of both a 
riddle and the deeper truth of the warrior’s experience. 
 Some of the animal riddles also emphasize the need to ascribe emotion to the riddle’s 
solution in order to both identify the solution and to understand the world. One example is 
Riddle 72, which depicts an ox that narrates its transition from being a joyful youngster feeding 
with its brothers and sisters to a servitor silently suffering woe: 
Ic þæh on lust, 
                                                                                                                                                       
William Sayers suggests that it may be a different common item in “Exeter Book Riddle No. 5: Whetstone?” 
Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 97 (1996): 387-92. Another unpublished riddle in Paris BnF lat. 5596 also supports 
the “chopping block” or “table” answer”: 
19. In heremo sum creata.  Petierunt me populi multi, posuerunt me in domo regali, ornauerunt me uestimenta 
pulcra.  Veniebant reges tam et pontifices, adorauerunt me.  Saturati sunt, derelinquerunt me, posuerunt me in 
domus angulo; denudauerunt caput meum.  Veniebant canes, lingebant ulcera mea.  Quid interest?  R.  Hoc est 
mensa quod cunctis potentibus bene prestabilis est. 
[19. I was made in the wild.  Many people sought me, they placed me in a royal house, they adorned me with 
beautiful coverings.  Kings as well as bishops would come, they honored me.  They ate their fill, abandoned me, 
placed me in a nook of the house; they had uncovered my head.  Dogs would come, they would lick my wounds.  
What does it concern?  This is a table that is quite precious to all important persons. ] 
As Charles D. Wright notes, “The type of table described is presumbably the trestle table, whose top (made from 
trees growing in heremo) could be removed for storage in a corner or nook (angulus).  The vestments are of course 
the tablecloths placed on and later removed from the table’s ‘head.’ The riddle master wittily quotes Luke 16.21, 
which refers to the dogs licking the sores of Lazarus; here they lick the “sores” (made by knives) of the table for 
remnants of food.” I am indebted to Wright for sharing the riddle and translation from his edition in progress. 





oþþæt ic wæs yldra     ond þæt an forlet 
sweartum hyrde,     siþade widdor, 
mearcpaþas Walas træd,     moras pæðde, 
bunden under beame,     beag hæfde on healse, 
wean on laste     weorc þrowade, 
earfoða dæl.     Oft mec isern scod 
sare on sidan;     ic swigade, 
næfre meldade     monna ængum 
gif me ordstæpe     egle wæron. 
[ll.9b-18; I prospered in pleasure, until I was older and then alone forsook the dark 
shepherd, traveled more widely, trod the Welsh boundary-lands, tracked the moors, 
bound under wood, had a ring on the neck, suffered woe in the track of work, a portion of 
afflictions. Often the iron injured me with a wound on the side; I remained silent, never 
spoke to any man if the sharp point was painful to me.] 
Interpretation requires imputing to the solution the ability to feel, but also requires imaginatively 
dwelling on these emotions, which are repeatedly described as the ox changes from joyful to 
afflicted. As Bitterli observes, “the ox’s story of how it grew up to become a plough animal is 
turned into a moving narrative of affection, exile, and hardship.”130 The imagery of journeying 
widely and traversing borderlands suggests not only servitude but exile (in addition to neatly 
paralleling the routes of oxen being driven to market, as Lindy Brady has noted131). Anglo-Saxon 
readers need not feel sympathy for literary depictions of servants, but the sympathetic treatment 
of servants (particularly wrongly-accused ones) in the Life of Swithun suggests that they could be 
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viewed with compassion. The ox’s silent acceptance of affliction could be paralleled with the 
silence of Christ while on trial,132 so that entering into the ox’s emotion leads to a deeper 
understanding not only of the answer but of another significant religious emotion, fulfilling 
Gregory’s dictum that empathy with difficult emotions can enable recognition of more profound 
spiritual truth. In another example of a speaker inviting spiritually salutary empathy for animals, 
the narrator of Riddle 15 (most likely a badger) presents emotions of maternal concern, 
protecting its children “forhtmod” or fearfully-minded (l.13). The process of decoding the riddle 
invites the reader to understand this emotion and the flight it propels, perhaps encouraging 
reflection on appropriate situations in which pastoral concern for others might prompt healthy 
fear and protective action. 
 But what of riddles that invite emotional engagement while also presenting alienating 
images that would seem to discourage empathy? The lonely exile of Riddle 39 is one such 
example. Although its description of wandering suggests particularly elegiac emotions that the 
reader might imaginatively share, as “earmost ealra wihta” [l.16; the saddest of all creatures] 
who “sceal wideferh wreccan laste / hamleas hweorfan” [ll.8-9; must far and wide, homeless, 
turn in the track of exile]; the riddle continues, “no þy heanre biþ” [l.9; nor is he the more 
abject], negating the expected emotional state. In fact, the creature is perhaps most conspicuous 
for the human qualities it lacks, enumerated in a long list including blood, bone, mouth, eyes, 
and features even more essentially associated with life such as “gewit” (13), “sawle,” and 
“feorh” (16). Can readers empathize with an entity that does not seem human nor alive, even if it 
“leofaþ efne seþeah” [l.27; nevertheless likewise lives]? Scholars have proposed a variety of 
interpretations for the riddle, with more recent critical consensus revolving around “dream” as a 
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solution,133 a concept that would be difficult to anthropomorphize as a subject with emotions that 
could be empathetically shared. To see a dream as “earmost,” or as an untroubled exile, is to take 
empathy to its limits, asking to what extent one can identify with a fictional emotion and to what 
extent doing so is interpretively useful. Dailey, in her discussion of “responsiveness,” argues that 
some of the riddles may be exercising the reader’s capacity for wonder at the mysterious.134 
Riddle 39 presents the wonder of an object that evokes and displays emotion even if it lacks the 
human qualities typically associated with objects of empathy. Perhaps in this way it also 
encourages responsiveness to the indefinable and mysterious, which after all has a hidden 
similarity to the world of daily experience. The habits of mind unlocked by empathetic response 
to the riddles clarifies Mize’s argument that Old English depictions of mentalities aren’t about 
emotion but rather ways of understanding the world. These functions are complementary in 
many poems that center on emotion and understanding the subjective experience of the mundane 
and the wondrous. 
 The final set of texts I will discuss foreground empathy as a way to understand deeper 
meanings in Scripture. In Paris Bibliothèque Nationale Fonds Latin 8824, conventionally called 
the Paris Psalter,135 a set of Old English introductions to the first 50 psalms associated with the 
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circle of King Alfred explicitly instructs readers to read the psalms through the emotions of 
David, Christ, and other biblical figures in order to understand their meaning. At the same time, 
they encourage readers to feel similar emotions to these biblical figures, fusing interpretive and 
imitative empathy. 
Many aspects of the Paris Psalter highlight its use as a devotional text. Although many 
copies of psalters glossed in Old English exist, the Paris Psalter is unique in offering the Old 
English translation as a separate text, displayed with the same level of respect as the Latin Psalter 
that accompanies it. This privileging of Old English suggests that the manuscript was intended 
for a community that saw English as a language suitable for intense literary expression and 
devotional response.136 The Old English translations themselves seem tailored to encourage an 
Anglo-Saxon community to empathize with the original psalm speakers. The paratext of the 
prose Psalms encourages a special relationship to the psalms as the utterances of real people, 
often specifying the circumstantial and emotional contexts of the specific moments in David’s 
life when each psalm was written.  The translation choices made in these vernacular renditions 
also reinforce literal rather than figural interpretations, encouraging identification with the 
historical speakers of the prayers, while evoking contexts such as exile, shame, and valor, which 
an Anglo-Saxon aristocratic audience would find emotionally resonant. In addition, the shifting 
focalization of these psalm translations, moving from first-person affective utterances to 
constitutive statements of Christian truth and even glossing of a semi-exegetical nature, attempts 
to align the audience’s emotions with Christian goals and submission to Christian hierarchy. 
Taken as a whole, the prose Psalms encourage a type of empathic identification that involves not 
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in the history of empathy it is not essential that Alfred or a member of his circle have composed these psalms. 
136 For discussion of how individuals engage differently with a text in their first language, see Alice Jorgensen, 





only adopting the words of the prayers but keeping in mind the perspectives and feelings of the 
original Old (and New) Testament figures who prayed them, using these feelings to change one’s 
own emotional state while participating in an emotional community of like-minded people 
praying the Psalms. In this section, however, I will focus on how the introductions offer primers 
for interpretive empathy by directing readers to inhabit the emotions of the psalm speakers as the 
first step of understanding. 
The introductions are intimately tied to the translations, and O’Neill argues that the 
translator of the prose Psalms also wrote the introductions, based on the “distinctive 
interpretations” that both share.137 Unsurprisingly, they work in tandem with the psalms to 
mediate the potentially foreign emotional world of David’s psalms for an Anglo-Saxon audience 
that might benefit from cultural and linguistic contextualization. The Old English introductions 
engage with the fourfold system of exegesis championed by Augustine of literal, allegorical, 
moral, and anagogical interpretations. However, they are more immediately indebted to an Irish 
commentary tradition that presents a very different fourfold schema with two historical 
interpretations (one related to David and one to Hezekiah or the Israelites), one moral, and one 
allegorical. This Irish-derived tradition of Psalter commentary emphasized the literal and 
historical contexts of the Psalms, drawing on the commentary of fifth-century bishop Theodore 
of Mopsuestia via Old Irish intermediaries.138 Some of Theodore’s more unusual views led to his 
condemnation as a heretic in 553, but his works often circulated anonymously or under other 
names and could therefore easily and innocently become known to psalm commentators. His 
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orientation is persistently historicist, to the extent that he diverged from classic messianic 
interpretations of some psalms. Surviving commentaries in Latin and Old Irish show Theodorean 
influence, including a set of argumenta and commentaries attributed (probably spuriously) to 
Bede called In Psalmorum Libri Exegesis.139 In addition to drawing on the argumenta from 
Pseudo-Bede, Alfred likely had access to an Irish manuscript that contained at least parts of 
Julian of Eclanum’s Latin translation of Theodore’s commentary.140 
The immediate source of the psalter introductions is unknown, but G.T. Dempsey 
suggests that the “author of the 'Anglo-Saxon Introductions' [may] have had for his use a catena 
of Theodorean interpretations taken down by the student Aldhelm from the lectures of Theodore 
of Canterbury.”141 Filtered through this historical exegesis, the introductions prime the reader to 
consider the Psalms from a consistently literal point of view conducive to empathy. Jorgensen 
discusses how the introductions work with the psalms as a tool to provide language for the 
“expressions of the experiences and feelings of the person praying,” as well as having an 
“authenticating or validating effect” for personal emotions.142 In addition to expressing emotion, 
the psalms can create and guide emotion as an emotional “script – a sequence of perception, 
feeling and response – that both encourages the Christian to classify emotion in a particular way 
and directs the progression from situation to behavior.”143 Jorgensen’s work highlights the ways 
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that the psalms are performative texts that acquire authority as a set of emotional expressions 
used by key figures in biblical history. Jorgensen emphasizes the way in which the psalms (and 
particularly the introductions) encourage readers to perform their own emotions. Here I wish to 
emphasize the necessary precondition the introduction presents of understanding the feelings of 
those who first spoke the psalms. Because the first speakers have the primacy in the 
introductions, their thoughts and emotions become the critical context for reading. The 
authentication of one’s own emotions occurs only when one first understands the original 
speakers’ emotions. 
The rubric for Psalm 2 provides an intriguing case study for analysis. The second psalm 
was popularly attributed as a messianic psalm, which would seem to associate it primarily with 
allegory and prophecy. Even Theodore of Mopsuestia considered it to be messianic.144 
Cassiodorus explains that although the heading calls it one of David’s psalms, nevertheless 
“Quapropter Dauid hic intellegendus est Dominus Christus, de cuius passione loquitur propheta 
et ipse Dominus sua uerba dicturus est” [David is to be understood here as the Lord Christ, and 
the prophet speaks of His passion. The Lord Himself will speak His own words].145 Augustine 
adds that the words of verse 5 “Ex persona ipsius Domini nostri Iesu Christi ista manifesta sunt” 
[in the person of our very Lord Jesus Christ are themselves manifest].146 The Old English 
introduction, however, emphasizes a different speaker: 
Ðæs æfteran sealmes capitul is gecweden “psalmus Dauid,” ðæt is on Englisc, “Dauides 
sealm,” for ðæm [he is] hys sealm gecweden for ði he seofode on ðæm sealme and 
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mænde to Drihtne be his feondum, ægðer ge inlendum ge utlendum, and be eallum his 
earfoðum; and swa deð ælc ðæra ðe ðysne sealm sincgð be his sylfes feondum; and swa 
dyde Crist be Iudeum. 
[The following Psalm’s title is called ‘psalmus Dauid,’ that is in English, “David’s 
psalm,” because it is called his psalm, because he lamented in the psalm and complained 
to the Lord concerning his enemies, either domestic or foreign, and concerning all his 
afflictions; and so does each of those who sings this song concerning his own enemies; 
and so did Christ concerning the Jews.] 
Here the glossator firmly states that it is called a Psalm of David, not to connote Christ, but 
because David wrote the Psalm. The introduction offers three levels of interpretation: David with 
his enemies, the individual with their enemies, and Christ with his enemies. The order is 
intriguing; Christ is presented last, and briefly, while David is given the most space. Thus, the 
one who sings the Psalm is explicitly imitating David rather than Christ. After explaining why it 
is called a psalm of David, the introduction offers a fairly specific description of the context for 
its utterance and David’s intent in uttering it. Specifically, it is a lament and complaint, one 
occasioned by enemies (both at home and abroad) and afflictions. This sets the emotional tone 
for the reader and their expectations for interpretation. However, the psalm is not specifically 
described as a prophecy, moving away from Cassiodorus’ and Augustine’s emphasis on 
prophecy. Instead, it focuses on a specific moment in the past, offering enough information about 
David’s emotional state and motives that a reader could imagine them, meeting a precondition 
for empathy. It is striking that a psalm that traditionally emphasizes the Christological and 






But the introduction does more than just offer a context for empathic engagement; it also 
emphasizes that the reader is to participate in the deictic ego of the Psalm by highlighting that 
“swa deð ælc ðæra,” or that those who read the Psalter are participating in the same mindset.147 
Although this clause in the introduction evokes a moral reading, it does so in language that 
emphasizes the reader’s response, rather than a set of allegorical representations with moral 
import. Yet at the same time, because David and the speaker are described in separate 
interpretative clauses, a self-other distinction is evoked. Even if this introduction is a fairly close 
translation of the Latin source, it highlights the connection between the persona of the psalmist 
and the person who performs the psalm in the present. 
 This contrasts with the headings for Psalm 2 in two of the extant versions of Theodore’s 
commentary. One commentary notes that the psalm is in the voice of “Dauid prophetans,” but 
primarily concerns what Christ suffered at the hands of enemies. In describing the moral 
meaning, it states that the psalm “Indicat” [reveals] the way of the righteous, “insinuat” 
[introduces] the power of domination, and “exhortatur” [exhorts] mankind “ad appetitam 
beatitudinem” [to blessed longing] as the passage “fugiendam infidelitatem monet” [advises 
fleeing unfaithfulness].148 The Argumentum from Pseudo-Bede, probably a closer source, reads 
“Generalem David querimoniam facit ad Deum, quod regno sibi desuper dato, et gentes et populi 
Israel inviderint, communem ad omnium correctionem dirigens. Aliter Christus de passione et 
potestate sua dicit. Lege apud Lucam” [David made general complaint to God, that with reign 
having been given to him from above, both the gentiles and the people of Israel were jealous, 
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directing for the common correction of all. Alternatively Christ spoke concerning his passion and 
power. Read in Luke.] 149 It mirrors the Old English’s assertion that David lamented to God 
about the opposition he faced (and it is possible that the “ge inlendum ge utlendum” of the Old 
English introduction develops from the commentary’s description of the foreign and domestic 
enemies that David faces in the Gentiles and his own people), while also nodding to the moral 
sense and at last to the messianic sense. What is most strikingly different in the Old English is 
the expression of the moral equivalent using “swa deð ælc ðæra ðe ðysne sealm sincgð be his 
sylfes feondum.” Whereas the Latin introductions present the psalm as an advisor that offers 
counsel or correction to the audience, the Old English formulation presents the psalm more as the 
performance of a previous individual that present readers can apply to their situation. 
 In a manner similar to Psalm 2, most of the introductions frame each Psalm as a personal 
prayer to God – thus, to empathize with the speaker is to learn how to pray. Further, the 
introductions typically emphasize the literal and focus on the original speakers of the Psalm (as 
well as the rulers for whom they prayed). Not only do they do this, they also aid interpretation by 
contextualizing the Psalms for Anglo-Saxons through the framing events they encourage readers 
to imagine. Even if the situations depicted derive from a Latin source such as Pseudo-Bede’s 
argumenta, they could still be relevant and emotionally evocative to Anglo-Saxons. There are 
descriptions of David in danger and on the run as well as enjoying prosperity and success. Psalm 
11 describes his lamentation over the current state of society, “þæt on his dagum sceolde 
rihtwisnes and wisdom beon swa swiðe alegen” [that in his days righteousness and wisdom 
should be so severely forsaken], while Psalm 13 contains his concern over lack of “treowa,” 
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reminiscent of Alfred’s statements in the Preface to Pastoral Care.150 The introduction to Psalm 
7 describes him as shamed and in exile, two conditions that would resonate with recurring 
conditions and emotions of Anglo-Saxon literature. Loyalty and learning are prominent themes. 
In addition, David is frequently afflicted by diseases “ge inlendum ge utlendum,” reminiscent of 
the bodily infirmities Alfred was said to suffer.151 These situations are also resonant with Anglo-
Saxon concerns, making it easier to imagine oneself inhabiting the ego of the Psalm. The generic 
context of the introductions is also altered to be relevant to Anglo-Saxon speakers. For example, 
the introduction to Psalm 4 phrases it in context as a song composed at a time when David 
“gealp” or boasted of his victory. By placing it in context as a “gealp,” the introduction 
naturalizes this speech act in the context of Anglo-Saxon poetry. Further, this act of boasting is 
something that each “welwillende” individual can participate in as well. The introduction to 
Psalm 6 states that David sang it about the terror of Doomsday, perhaps anachronistic for an Old 
Testament King, but quite resonant for Anglo-Saxons familiar with the affective eschatological 
tradition of the Vercelli homilies or the Judgment Day poems. The psalms are presented using 
cultural and religious ideas that readers can understand, making empathy easier to practice. 
 These prose introductions are not unique to the Paris Psalter. In fact, they appear in 
another codex worth noting for its very different aims: the Vitellius Psalter, a mid-eleventh-
century glossed Gallican Psalter associated with Winchester.152 Where the Paris Psalter seems 
adapted to the concerns of a layperson, the Vitellius Psalter suggests a more learned interest, as it 
is bundled with computistic materials in addition to charms and canticles. Unlike the Paris 
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Psalter, which offers a functional equivalence between the English and Latin, the Vitellius 
Psalter presents the Old English as an interlinear gloss and the introductions as a marginal gloss, 
suggesting a different relationship between the authoritative Latin and the explanatory Old 
English.153 M. J. Toswell notes that it is difficult to determine the precise uses of Anglo-Saxon 
Psalter manuscripts, and that they often seem to have been used for different purposes at 
different times.154 Yet the presence of these introductions suggests an interest in understanding 
and internalizing these Psalms as historical texts, and in understanding them via the vernacular. 
Their presence in the Vitellius Psalter suggests that the introductions to the prose Psalms were 
being copied and found useful in later Anglo-Saxon England. Further, it suggests that a literal 
understanding of the Psalms – one that might encourage an empathic response – could appear 
even in contexts not exclusively targeted toward affective piety. 
As the Dialogues, the Old English riddles, and the Old English prose psalm introductions 
attest, narrative empathy facilitated understanding. Sharing the emotions of a character was 
viewed as possible and worthwhile to understand oneself, others, other texts, and truths about the 
world and scripture. That these examples occur across a spread of genres suggests that many 
Anglo-Saxons may have approached texts using empathy as an interpretive lens, and that writers 
and translators chose to foreground emotions that could yield insights into self or society. This 
interpretive empathy is consonant with Oatley’s work on literary simulation as a means of 
processing personal emotions, but branches in a different direction, grounded in the reading 
mentalities of Christian Anglo-Saxons. 
The two functions of empathy discussed in this chapter attribute salvific force to shared 
emotion, imbuing it with the ability to shape individuals into appropriately feeling Christian 
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however, for an argument that we should view the glossed psalters as truly bilingual. 





subjects and empower them to see the world more accurately. They also attribute power to 
narrative, which can take on the same function as Gregory the Great’s ideal pastor, 
condescending to a reader’s emotion in order to reform them. The functions of narrative empathy 
described here also add to studies that emphasize the diverse roles of literacy in Anglo-Saxon 
England.155 At the same time, these functions broaden our understanding of mentalities that 
readers used to draw meaning from texts by suggesting that emotion was just as important in the 
interpretive process as intellection. In the final two chapters, I will turn to case studies that 
illustrate these functions of narrative empathy in specific clusters of texts. Chapter 4 analyzes 
how Christ and Satan grapples with an important corollary to imitative empathy: if empathy 
could lead one to acquire emotions for oneself, this would be true if one empathizes with villains 
as well as heroes. Christ and Satan leads the reader to empathize with Satan and thus identify 
their own propensity to sinful emotion such as Satan’s pride, but at the same time the poem 
encourages readers to be critical of affective language that invites empathy. Chapter 5 explores a 
variation of interpretive empathy in Beowulf, as the poem helps readers negotiate the 
complexities of a pagan past that presented perhaps as many interpretive challenges as the 
patriarch Job did. Beowulf invites empathic unsettlement as a way to help readers come to terms 
with the painful loss of their past ancestors, giving readers greater insight to the flaws in heroic 
systems wed with sympathy for the characters who follow these flaws. Together, the specific 
examples in chapters 4 and 5 illustrate how Anglo-Saxon writers trained readers to be more 
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CHAPTER 4: COUNTER-EMPATHY IN CHRIST AND SATAN 
 
 The first three chapters have attempted to trace outlines of narrative empathy in Anglo-
Saxon texts, inventorying core concepts underlying narrative empathy; strategies by which such 
empathy could be elicited; and purposes for eliciting that empathy.1 In the scope of this 
approach, many of the readings have been necessarily abridged, focused on isolating specific 
structures or functions rather than exploring a text in its full context. The last two chapters stage 
extended readings of how narrative empathy works in two Old English poems and consider how 
individual texts present views on empathy that do not fit a monolithic narrative about the benefits 
of empathy in Anglo-Saxon culture. In this chapter, I read a poem that presents a critical view of 
empathy, one that recognizes the potential dangers of identification with evildoers and offers a 
caution to readers of elegy, one of the most affective Old English genres. Christ and Satan 
presents full awareness of the empathic potential of poetry, but warns readers to consider how 
and with whom they empathize. To make this argument, I draw on another branch of cognitive 
theory: mood studies, developed by cognitive film theorist Greg Smith, which explores how 
films manipulate genre conventions to create an affective state that encourages readers to feel 
particular emotions.2 
Christ and Satan covers a staggering amount of salvation history in 729 lines, from the 
fall of the angels to the Harrowing of Hell, the Last Judgment, and the Temptation of Christ. 
These events, however, do not receive equal treatment; the poem structurally falls into two parts, 
the first (ll. 36-50, 81-124, 129-58, 163-88, 228-278) repeatedly presenting the fall of the angels 
and five laments of Satan, and the second (ll. 382-729) focusing on Christ’s actions in the 
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Harrowing, the Last Judgment, and the Temptation, with fitt 8 (ll. 368-82) forming a hinge.3 The 
impotence of Satan in the first part of the poem provides a foil for Christ’s active power to save 
and judge in the second part. Scholars have long agreed that the poem follows the trend of much 
Old English religious poetry by writing the tropes of Germanic heroism into Christian history.4 
This is perhaps most strikingly illustrated in the poem’s first section, as Satan obsessively 
recapitulates the fall of the angels and describes his mingled bewilderment and despair at the 
punishment that he and his followers have earned through elegiac questions such as “Hwær com 
engla ðrym, / þe we on heofnum habban sceoldan?” [ll.36-37; Where has the glory of angels 
come, which we ought to have in heaven?] and lamentations that he must “wadan wræclastas” 
[l.120; traverse paths of exile].5 Critics beginning with C.E. Abbetmeyer have read Satan’s 
speeches as examples of a “plaints of Satan” tradition reflected in Latin poetry.6 Leonard Frey 
was among the first to note that Satan’s speeches, although not true elegies, also use the formulae 
of exile that Stanley Greenfield had begun to codify.7 After pointing out the structural 
similarities to elegy in Satan’s laments, Frey commented, “To a culture aware of the status of an 
exiled man, cut off from life’s advantages and necessities, the story of Satan’s fall must have 
been richly suggestive. The development of the story in Anglo-Saxon exile terms was a natural 
                                                
3 For a recent summary of how scholars have approached the division of Christ and Satan, see Emily Thornbury’s 
discussion in Becoming a Poet in Anglo-Saxon England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 162-63. 
4 See for example Charles R. Sleeth, Studies in Christ and Satan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 71-
111; David F. Johnson, Studies in the Literary Career of the Fallen Angels: The Devil and his Body in Old English 
Literature, PhD Diss., Cornell U., 1993, 82. 
5All quotations of Christ and Satan are from The Junius Manuscript, ed. George Philip Krapp, The Anglo-Saxon 
Poetic Records 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), and are cited parenthetically by line number. All 
translations are mine unless otherwise noted. 
6 For a description of the plaints of Satan tradition, see C. E. Abbetmeyer, Old English Poetical Motives Derived 
from the Doctrine of Sin, PhD Diss., University of Minnesota, 1900, 16-20; Merrel Dare Clubb, Christ and Satan: 
An Old English Poem (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), xxiv-xxxiii; Sleeth, Studies in Christ and Satan, 
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particularly in Genesis B; see Hill, “Satan’s Injured Innocence in Genesis B, 360-2, 390-2,” English Studies 65 (July 
1984): 289-90. 
7 Leonard Frey, “Exile and Elegy in Anglo-Saxon Christian Epic Poetry”; Stanley Greenfield, “The Formulaic 





basis for Christian instruction.”8 However, he says little about what the story would suggest to 
Anglo-Saxon readers, and since Frey, few scholars have studied the significance of Satan’s 
speeches as emotional orations in the elegiac mode. In a more theologically-oriented critique, 
David F. Johnson notes the elegiac topos of exile in the poem and describes one of Satan’s 
rhetorical plaints as “extremely affective.”9 More recently, M.G. McGeachy has discussed 
Satan’s speeches alongside explicitly elegiac Old English poems, which she compares to 
African-American blues songs.10 McGeachy highlights the performative nature of these 
speeches, describes some of the specific formulae of exile that they invoke, and comments that 
“the poet may have counted on its attractive emotive power to arouse response in the poem’s 
audience.”11 Yet McGeachy also does not elaborate on the “response” that these elegiac topoi are 
meant to elicit.  
Collectively, these scholars broach a difficult question relating to Satan’s speeches: how 
are readers expected to respond emotionally to lamentations of loss delivered in an affectively-
charged mode by the most evil character in biblical history? Elegies frequently portray 
sympathetic subjects such as the Wanderer and Seaferer, yet Christ and Satan makes a point of 
emphasizing Satan’s culpability and his continued desire to harm humanity, so that he has more 
in common with the many unsympathetic exiles in Old English poetry, including Cain, Grendel, 
and Nebuchadnezzar. Robert Hasenfratz and Margaret Bridges have nonetheless argued that 
Christ and Satan encourages empathy even towards Satan. Hasenfratz reads Christ and Satan 
alongside vernacular homilies that portray the damned as penitent but unable to make amends 
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because the time for repentance has passed; pointing out that the poem uses the vocabulary of 
penance and exile to describe Satan’s sorrowful plight, he argues that readers would empathize 
with Satan and thus be motivated to do penance for their own sins.12 Bridges suggests that 
evoking the tropes of exile encourages sympathy for Satan because the Anglo-Saxon poetic 
tradition portrayed all humans as exiles.13 I agree with Hasenfratz and Bridges that Satan inhabits 
a sympathetic subject position evoked by motifs of exile and penance,14 but this does not clarify 
how the poem or its readers might negotiate the inevitable tension between empathy for the 
subject position invited by elegiac tropes and antipathy towards the subject who inhabits it. 
Further, neither Hasenfratz nor Bridges fully considers Satan’s laments in light of the elegy 
tradition or the corpus of unsympathetic exiles. Using cognitive film theory and philosophical 
models of medieval empathy and counter-empathy, this chapter reads Christ and Satan against 
Old English elegies and depictions of unsympathetic exiles to argue that the poem elicits a 
complex emotional response that cannot be reduced either to sympathy or antipathy, but rather 
engages simultaneously multiple kinds of empathy involving different forms of identification 
with the subject. If the inherent poignancy of elegiac tropes could pull the reader toward 
malevolent sympathy,15 the poem subverts these tropes by denying that the consolation 
frequently offered in elegies is in Satan’s case possible or merited by the subject, pushing readers 
toward counter-empathy - a reaction of pleasure when witnessing the suffering of another. Far 
from being mutually exclusive, these emotional responses uneasily coexist in the text. By 
coopting and subverting elegiac tropes and the traditional affective responses associated with 
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13 Margaret Bridges, “The Heroic and Elegiac Contexts of Two Old English Laments of the Fallen Angel.” 
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them to represent a traditionally unsympathetic exile, the poet stages a Christian critique of 
Germanic elegy, exposing how dubious subjects could appropriate its aesthetic language and 
emotionally-charged forms for specious ends, tempting an audience to identify with them, to feel 
misguided sympathy for the devil. 
Generic Contracts and Contrasts: Reading Counter-Empathy and Malevolent Sympathy 
Genre is a key category that conditions readers’ affective stances toward texts as part of 
their horizon of expectations. As Fredric Jameson points out, genres are “social contracts . . . 
whose function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact.”16 He describes genres 
as culturally-constructed agreements that in turn lay out a set of rules and expectations that a 
reader brings to the text. While the image of contract carries notions of precision, cognitive film 
theorist Greg Smith follows a long series of genre theorists in noting that readers’ perceptions of 
genre are comparative and fuzzy rather than categorical and precise.17 According to Smith, when 
audiences encounter particular generic markers in a text, they do not usually apply this to a rigid 
set of genre rules but to other texts that have similar collocations of characteristics, using this to 
orient their expectations about the text. Smith focuses on how the associations evoked by genre 
create what he calls a “mood,” a non-specific emotional state that predisposes the reader toward 
experiencing particular emotions in response to a text.18 Once a text establishes a mood and 
effectively primes the reader, it can more easily elicit the emotions associated with that mood. 
For example, a horror film may establish a mood of suspense that predisposes the audience 
                                                
16 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: Routledge, 2002), 
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17 That genre is flexible is not a new observation; see for example Alastair Fowler, Kinds of Literature: An 
Introduction to the Theory of Genres and Modes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). Smith’s work goes 
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toward feeling fear later in the film. A viewer encounters the generic markers of a horror film 
such as typical music, plot devices, and camera angles, associates this with other instances of 
films bearing these characteristics, and experiences a sense of foreboding. In the same way, 
structural and stylistic characteristics can by association encourage particular responses to a text. 
Smith uses the term “mood-cue system” to refer to the mechanics of eliciting and changing 
emotions. By observing how films use clusters of generic characteristics to set a mood and 
introduce new markers at key moments to change the mood, Smith argues that we can track how 
films (and by extension, I would argue, narrative texts) successfully and unsuccessfully invite 
different emotional associations over time. Given this understanding of genre, a reader of Christ 
and Satan would not have to read the plaints of Satan in relation to a formal category of ‘elegy’ 
in order to read them against similar imagery and structure in other poems, considering the 
emotional movements of these poems and reading those expectations back onto Christ and 
Satan.19 
Two such emotional movements – counter-empathy and malevolent sympathy – are 
especially pertinent to Christ and Satan. Counter-empathy is defined most simply as “feeling 
good when someone else feels bad.”20 It is perhaps more well-known by its German designation, 
Schadenfreude, pleasure at the pain of others.21 To call it counter-empathy is to point out its 
obvious inverse relationship to empathy, which requires convergent emotion between two 
people. Social science and psychology research suggests three kinds of misfortune that can elicit 
Schadenfreude in observers: a misfortune by a subject who is envied, a misfortune that presents 
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21 For the early history of Schadenfreude see Wilco W. van Dijk and Jaap W. Ouwerkerk, “Introduction to 
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benefit to the observers, and a misfortune that appears to be just.22 Counter-empathy would be a 
culturally intelligible mode of response to Satan, as two of these categories of misfortune would 
apply to him: as the architect of the falls of both the demons and mankind, his punishment would 
be considered just by most Christians, while according to the doctrine of replacement theory, 
Satan’s fall into hell left empty thrones in heaven which God reassigned to Christians.23 
Furthermore, counter-empathy was explicitly commended as one of the rewards of the blessed at 
the sight of the damned. Ælfric explains this in his exegesis of the story of the rich man and 
Lazarus in Catholic Homilies 2.23: “Ne astyrað þæra rihtwisra gesihð him nænne ógan: ne heora 
wuldor ne wanað: for þan ðe þær ne bið nan besargung þæra manfulra yrmðe; ac heora tintrega 
becymð þam gecorenum to maran blisse. swa swa on metinge bið forsewen seo blace anlicnys: 
þæt seo hwite sy beorhtre gesewen;” [Nor does the sight [of the damned] stir any horror in the 
righteous, nor does their glory wane; because there is no sorrowing at the affliction of the sinful, 
but their tortures become greater joy to the chosen, just as in a painting the dark likeness is 
despised, that the white might be brighter.]24 Ælfric retransmits this doctrine as it is presented in 
his source, Gregory’s Homiliae in Evangelia 40.25 The poem Christ III similarly states that the 
righteous will feel counter-empathy at the vivid sight of the damned, triggered not only by the 
recognition that the wicked are being punished but by the recognition that the righteous have 
received better than they could hope, having been saved from hell “þurh miltse meotudes” 
(1253). Happiness stems from relief at perceiving the contrast of fates that are “ungelice” (1261), 
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an idea that recurs throughout Christ III26 and evokes Ælfric’s description of aesthetic 
satisfaction in the contrast of black and white. Timothy Arner and Paul Stegner see this reaction 
extending beyond relief to pleasure, yoking the aesthetic and counter-empathetic in Christ III to 
describe the vision-triggered delight of the saved in this passage as “voyeuristic,” a means for the 
poem to offer readers a foretaste of heaven by staging the spectacle of the damned before the 
Last Judgment.27 Both of these texts present a structural category of contrast that represents and 
evokes the pleasure of Schadenfreude when evil is punished. Reading Christ and Satan along 
these lines, readers’ firsthand knowledge of Satan’s sorrows would evoke pleasure in the 
knowledge of their own potential for salvation, a potential that is foreclosed for Satan. The 
formal element of contrast encodes this pleasure in the structure of the text. But if contrast could 
evoke the pleasure of counter-empathy, for medieval readers fear of their own potential for 
damnation inevitably coexists with this pleasure, paradoxically evoking malevolent sympathy,28 
a fellow-feeling that unites opposing entities as one emotionally identifies with an antagonist. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, malevolent sympathy was encoded not only thematically but structurally 
through features such as metaphor or antiphrasis. To borrow Smith’s terms, these structures can 
cue a mood predisposed to sympathy. 
Morrison takes Augustine’s argument further to claim that the aesthetic contrast of 
malevolent sympathy could allow a reader to empathize with the damned if they recalled their 
own potential for damnation, supplying the “negative values” omitted in the depiction. Indeed, a 
number of Old English eschatological homilies remind the audience of their risk of being 
condemned, exhorting them to keep in mind the terror that the damned will feel on Doomsday as 
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a stimulus to compunction and repentance.29 A reader motivated by such fear might well pity the 
damned. But not all Anglo-Saxon readers would have to look for “negative values” to feel 
sympathy for Satan in Christ and Satan. Monastic audiences versed in patristic thought might 
take satisfaction in the punishment of evil, but lay audiences might not, particularly if they too 
cultivated the worldliness of the damned. Since Ælfric felt the need in his vernacular homily to 
include Gregory’s explanation of why the sight of the damned would not stir up terror in the 
righteous, he must have sensed that his audience might instinctively incline to empathy rather 
than counter-empathy. Further, the formulae of elegy in Satan’s speeches in Christ and Satan 
would inevitably cue the audience to empathize with a character speaking in that mode. The 
audience would not have to remember their own potential for damnation to be moved to sadness 
by Satan’s evocations of loneliness and exile, framed in a language that they used to describe 
their own sorrows. The repeated descriptions of Satan’s pain and anguish, an expected part of the 
generic contract of elegy,30 inherently make him a target for identification. As Patrick Hogan 
suggests, the more information we possess about characters, the more likely we are to identify 
with them or at least not to see them as simple villains.31 The laments enact textual strategies to 
manage reader response so that identification does not exceed appropriate limits. Yet Satan 
hovers on the edge of a potentially subversive sympathy in the very features of language and 
genre that work toward closure, illustrating how the same forms can evoke the disparate 
emotional responses of empathy and counter-empathy. 
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Empathy, Genre, and Elegy: Cognitive and Structural Backgrounds 
Key to Satan’s pathos in Christ and Satan is his manipulation of elegiac structures that 
build sympathy through contrast, which sets the poem apart from other examples of the “plaints 
of Satan” tradition by raising the signals of an alternate type of generic contract. To speak of Old 
English elegy as a unified genre is of course problematic.32 No Old English word denoting 
“elegy” has survived, although we find the term “giedd,” which has a wider range of meaning, 
sometimes used to describe elegies.33 However, most scholars agree that a core group of poems 
in the Exeter Book, as well as sections of other Old English poems, share certain thematic, 
structural, and formulaic qualities that fit under Greenfield’s rubric. Although Satan’s laments 
are not true elegies, they appropriate and play with elegiac conventions; thus, recognizing the 
movements and images that elegies use to encourage emotional investment throws into relief 
how this poem destabilizes the empathetic potential of elegies, revealing how the genre could 
mislead unwary readers. Paul Battles has argued that one of the key ways to distinguish Old 
English genres is through tone, and that poems blend genre characteristics, as when The Fates of 
the Apostles opens with both epic and elegiac conventions.34 As Battles points out, other poems 
evoke characteristics of elegy without being elegies per se;35 Satan’s plaints fall under this 
rubric. 
Although the genre of elegy is in dispute, many have attempted to catalogue elegiac 
tropes and structures that appear across several, if not all, of the so-called elegies. Harris, in 
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hypothesizing a common Germanic ancestor for both Old English and Old Norse elegy, imagines 
several characteristics of this proto-elegy that still apply to most elegies in Old English: 
a dramatic monologue spoken by a figure from a known heroic story who told in the first 
person about the joys and especially the griefs of this life….The intellectual content 
consisted in a contrast of Once and Now, a sense of the lacrimae rerum, loss, and 
sometimes, it seems, of consolation. There may have been room for some conventional 
wisdom or at least generalization, especially near the beginning and end.36 
 
Anne Klinck has argued for particular structural characteristics that typically cluster in the 
elegies including “monologue, conventional introduction of the speaker, gnomic conclusion, 
repetition of key phrases, repetition of entire lines, and, occasionally, rhyme.”37 Other scholars 
have catalogued specific images and motifs in extant Old English elegies. Edward Irving’s 
classic article on such imagery lists images of ruined structures (especially walls), exile, and 
restraints (often in tension with images of excess).38 M.G. McGeachy notes several further 
conventions, including separation from one’s lord, the center of identity and hierarchy; 
projection of emotion into the external world; and settings of exilic movement and/or bondage 
within a prison.39 Harris mentions “elegiac exaggeration” in which examples are piled together 
either for hyperbolic comparison to or expression of one’s sorrow (as an example, one might take 
Deor’s list of dramatic historical and mythological losses building to his displacement, which 
seems small by comparison).40 Greenfield’s study of the traditional formulas for exile, one of the 
defining topoi of elegy, lists four themes: social status, deprivation, an interest in the speaker’s 
interior state, and movement into or out of exile.41 Yet the overarching characteristic of elegy 
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uniting these formulas is what Greenfield calls its “pattern of loss and consolation”42 or to 
Klinck, only the motif of loss: “The essential element of elegy as it is found in these Exeter Book 
poems is the sense of separation: a distance in time or space between someone and their 
desire.”43 Full consolation may occur within the poem, but more frequently, as Shippey puts it, 
“part of the consolation offered is poetry itself, the expression and formalization of raw 
experience.”44 Through the process enacted by elegy, speakers can acquire a measure of 
consolation from reframing their experiences within an eternal lens, but sometimes more 
important than the consolation offered is the opportunity to poetically process this grief within a 
formal structure. In the same way, as readers identify with the processes of these speakers 
expressed in poetic form, they may be able to reframe their own sorrows. The overarching mood 
of elegy, then, is grief, but one that may be assuaged by consolation, particularly a consolation 
arrived at through the work of remembering and reshaping the past.45 By emphasizing loss and 
consolation as the defining characteristics of elegy, scholars locate the genre’s emotional effects 
at the core of its identity. This makes Christ and Satan’s evocation of elegy all the more 
subversive because Satan’s laments call the elegiac project of consolation into question at its 
foundation.  
If poetic form can give bounds to grief, it can also enable empathy. But it also 
underscores how elegiac features can move beyond inspiring the empathy for a like-minded 
person described by Harbus and Ramsay, since the structured contrast of elegy uses the play of 
opposites to create a space for potential identification with another who can be very different 
from readers. As noted earlier, Augustine and Gregory both described models of emotional 
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response based on contrast. For Gregory, the darkness of one fate makes another shine the more 
brightly, increasing joy. For Augustine, figures of language enable understanding by yoking 
contradictory images. By this means, reading with or even as the adversary in Christ and Satan 
might tempt one to identify with the adversary. But readers who might be inclined to empathize 
with some elegiac protagonists (as Harbus and Ramsay suggest they would) instead experience 
the tension of seeing elegiac formulae applied to an adversary, pushing against the conventions 
of elegy, and through this experience gain a new understanding of themselves as potentially 
susceptible to the same oferhygd that caused Satan’s fall, or to the same error that caused the fall 
of Adam and Eve. The narrator of Christ and Satan states later in the poem that Satan should be 
taken “to bysne,” as an example (195). Bede observes that historiography records the fates of 
evil people as negative exempla that discourage readers from evil deeds;46 for readers who have 
empathized with Satan’s pain and regret, the devil becomes an example of the all-too-real 
consequences of pride. But as Satan’s laments continue and as readers experience how Satan’s 
utter ruin has cut off from him the consolation offered to elegiac speakers, they are encouraged 
to distance themselves from him, moving from empathy into the realm of counter-empathy and 
focusing on the heavenly rewards they have the potential to reap in the wake of Satan’s fall. 
Further, as they are confronted with the fact that elegiac tropes can expose them to emotional 
identification with an insincere and self-serving figure, readers might discover the potential 
dangers of the generic contract of elegy. The mood-cue approach helps to explain with more 
precision how this misappropriation works. 
The Aesthetics of Counter-Empathy in Christ and Satan 
Satan’s five laments gradually stage the poem’s subversion of elegy in a structure of 
variation on a theme that heightens both the affective power of elegy and the frustration of 
                                                





permanently deferred comfort. The opening of Christ and Satan preemptively influences the 
audience’s emotional response to Satan’s words by describing God’s creation of the world by his 
own paramount “miht and strengðo” [l.2; power and strength]. The description of God evokes 
the reverential tone Battles associates with wisdom poetry,47 describing how God created heaven, 
earth, and sea, then exclaiming “Hwa is þæt ðe cunne / orðonc clene nymðe ece god?” [ll. 17-18; 
who is the one that knows pure understanding unless eternal God?]. Wisdom poetry positions 
readers as learners and suppliants, and this introduction reminds the reader of God’s supreme 
power beyond human knowledge. Only then, with God’s position as arbiter of rightness 
established, does the poem present an alternate set of elegiac textual cues as it describes the loss 
that provokes Satan’s sorrow: 
Ðuhte him on mode   þæt hit mihte swa, 
þæt hie weron seolfe   swegles brytan, 
wuldres waldend.   Him ðær wirse gelamp, 
ða heo in helle   ham staðeledon, 
an æfter oðrum,   in þæt atole scref, 
þær heo brynewelme    bidan sceolden 
saran sorge,   nales swegles leoht 
habban in heofnum   heahgetimbrad, 
ac gedufan sceolun   in ðone deopan wælm 
niðær under nessas   in ðone neowlan grund, 
gredige and gifre.   God ana wat 
hu he þæt scyldige werud   forscrifen hefde! 
                                                





[ll. 22-33; It seemed to them in mind that it might be so, that they themselves were the 
Bestower of Heaven, the Ruler of Glory. Worse befell them there, when they established 
a home in hell, one after another, in that dark pit, where they must endure burning flame 
with painful sorrow, not at all have the light of heaven in the high-timbered heavens, but 
must dive in the deep flames down under precipices in the deep ground, greedy and 
voracious. God alone knows how he has condemned that guilty troop!] 
This introduction sets a new mood by evoking many of the tropes of elegy; perhaps the most 
obvious one is exile, one of the most affective states in Anglo-Saxon literature. As Bridges notes, 
Old English poems and homilies explain that all humanity is in exile, following the fate of their 
progenitors Adam and Eve.48 Just as readers could project themselves into the damned, they 
might read themselves into Satan, the first exile, and experience sympathy for him. Exile often 
suggests the generic contract of elegy and association with a somber, grieving, or sympathetic 
mood. But the affective force of this trope is immediately emptied and the mood is denied when 
the poem provides the cause of the demons’ exile. Elegies typically offer only cryptic 
explanations, if any, for how the speaker has come to be separated from society (aside from the 
implication that an antagonist has caused the exile if it is involuntary), and rarely are these 
explanations based on the speaker’s actions.49 However, Christ and Satan offers a clear reason: 
Satan and his followers have been ejected from heaven because of pride [l.50; oferhygdum] and 
because they come to believe collectively that they are like God. But if the angels’ pride is the 
                                                
48 See for example Vercelli 14, in The Vercelli Homilies and Related Texts, ed. Scragg, 240: “for Adames 
gewyrhtum we wæron of ðam eadilican setle norxnawanges gefean utascofene 7 on þas wræc sende þysse worulde 
þe we nu on lyfiað” (for Adam’s sins we were shoved out of the joy of the blessed seat in paradise and sent in this 
exile to this world which we now live in).  
49 For example, The Wanderer and The Seafarer provide no explanation for their narrators’ exiles. As I discuss in 
Chapter 2, the narrator of The Wife’s Lament offers an extremely cryptic account of the circumstances leading to her 
current exile when “Het mec hlaford min herheard niman” (l. 15, my lord commanded me to take a hard dwelling); 
The Exeter Book, ed. Krapp and Dobbie, p.210. The narrator of Wulf and Eadwacer states that “Wulf is on iege, ic 
on oþerre” (l.4, Wulf is on an island, I on another), but her description does little to explain precisely how she 





characteristic of a collective, their fall is individual and personal, as they make their new home 
“an æfter oðrum.” Greenfield notes that the solitariness of elegy is often expressed through 
epithets that begin with an-, notably anhaga.50 Evoking the lonely an of elegy here calls on the 
affective response triggered by other instances of the genre, while simultaneously breaking the 
convention of elegy by revealing a community of others that also falls. The elegiac pull towards 
isolation in this term allows loneliness to persist even though the demons exist in hell together. 
In a further twist, although the demons are barred from their original homeland, they 
wander within a new ham. This home occupies the structural slot of the bleak elegiac 
landscape,51 but that slot has been ominously filled with the type-scene “The Cliff of Death,” 
dark and underground “in ðone neowlan grund” [l.31; into the deep abyss] and “þæt atole scref” 
[l.27; that terrible pit].52 The demons lack heaven’s light, conveyed through a “nales” clause, a 
structure that also occurs in The Wanderer: “Warað hine wræclast, nales wunden gold, / ferðloca 
freorig,  nalæs foldan blæd” [ll.32-33; exile paths remain for him, not at all wound gold; a frozen 
soul enclosure, not at all the fruit of the earth]. They are also overcome with ravenous appetite, 
as they are “gredige and gifre” [greedy and rapacious]. This formula is used in the Old English 
poetic corpus to describe the worms that greedily devour a corpse in Soul and Body II (l.70) and 
the rapaciousness of fire in the Phoenix (ll.506-507), but also (with the terms reversed) to 
describe the longing of the narrator’s mind in the Seafarer (l.63), associating such hunger with 
elegiac desire. The introduction concludes with a statement reminiscent of the gnomic wisdom in 
many of the elegies, but one that emphasizes the inexpressibility of the demons’ damnation: only 
God knows the extent of their loss. This cannot serve as consolation for Satan’s troop; indeed, it 
                                                
50 Greenfield, “The Formulaic Expression of Exile,” 202. 
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where “sindon dena dimme” (30; the dunes are dark). 
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only emphasizes that they do not understand their punishment. 
 Before Satan’s first speech, then, readers have been primed with contradictory images of 
exile that should evoke a mood of sympathy but instead block it. The narrative frame speaks of 
painful loss, but images of solitariness, separation from joy, isolation, and longing are subverted 
by imputed motives of greed, juxtaposed with evil community, and denied heavenly consolation. 
Thus, the generic pressure for empathy with the “saran sorge” of the angels is destabilized by 
these antithetical tropes. Further, if this description draws on the formulae of exile, it also echoes 
formulae elsewhere to describe the fall of the angels. For example, in Guthlac A when the saint 
taunts his demonic captors with a recapitulation of their fall, he uses similar phrases: they fell 
“for þam oferhygdum” (l.661), they are told that “Eow þær wyrs gelomp” (l.665), they will never 
return to heaven (ll.658-60), their deprivation is described with a “nales” formula (l.672), and 
hell is described as a “ham” shaped for them (l.677). This passage in Christ and Satan braids the 
topoi of elegy into what may be a traditional depiction of the angels’ fall, leading to a moment of 
emotional vertigo. The traditional language and insistence on the demons’ evil actions pushes 
against empathetic identification by evoking another set of generic conventions: those associated 
with the fall of the angels. Yet for those familiar with the elegy tradition of loss, the language 
retains affective associations: they can be subverted, but once evoked they cannot be erased. This 
tension dramatizes the potential danger of the affective tropes of poetry, which can be applied to 
evildoers as well as heroes.  
 If the possibility exists for empathy with evildoers, such empathy is rarely invited in the 
Old English poetic corpus. Instead, evil and unsympathetic outcasts abound: Cain is exiled for 
his envy-fueled murder;53 Nebuchadnezzar lives like an animal for his extravagant pride;54 
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Grendel wanders the fens, exiled as the kin of Cain;55 and in Genesis B, Satan vows defiance 
against God in the vein of a heroic war leader, avoiding other overtly elegiac tropes.56 But none 
of these exiles indicates any regret for their deeds (except Nebuchadnezzar, although only after 
God has restored his sanity). And while these passages employ tropes of exile, none elaborates 
other characteristics of elegy. In particular, only Cain and Satan are given speeches. Cain’s is a 
fairly brief declaration of his banishment,57 while Satan’s speech in Genesis B is a long defiant 
declaration of his intent to gain revenge on mankind, casting him in a heroic rather than elegiac 
mold. He accuses God of wrongdoing (ll. 360-62) and seeks a way to corrupt humanity as a 
means of attaining compensation (l. 399; “andan gebetan”). Satan’s vigorous intent to harm 
humanity and question God work against empathy for him. Based on these examples, 
unsympathetic exiles seem more likely to elicit Schadenfreude than empathy. The Satan of 
Christ and Satan differs because he appropriates other generic cues of elegy, a language 
calculated to make others identify with him emotionally. By grafting the empathetic forms of 
elegy onto the familiar images of banished evildoers, Christ and Satan exploits the tensions 
between them, revealing to readers just how potent elegiac forms could be. 
Satan’s laments highlight this potency by presenting elegiac tropes that should encourage 
empathy but that are subtly discouraging due to their incongruous context. The first lament 
begins with a mournful cry belonging to vernacular and Latin lament tradition before turning this 
tradition on its head: 
Hwær com engla ðrym,  
                                                
55 See for example Beowulf 154-62, 721, 1275, 1352. Although Grendel is frequently viewed as quasi-sympathetic, 
Ben Reinhard argues from penitentials that the creature’s unrepentant attitude would be more likely to inspire 
rejection than sympathy; see Reinhard, “Grendel and the Penitentials,” English Studies 94 (2013): 371-85.  
56 For Satan’s speech after being cast into hell, see Genesis B 356-441. It is interesting that just as Satan bends the 
tropes of heroic poetry to deceive his followers in Genesis B, he bends elegiac tropes to deceive readers in Christ 
and Satan. 





þe we on heofnum     habban sceoldan?  
þis is ðeostræ ham,     ðearle gebunden  
fæstum fyrclommum;     flor is on welme  
attre onæled.      Nis nu ende feor  
þæt we sceolun ætsomne     susel þrowian,  
wean and wergu,     nalles wuldres blæd  
habban in heofnum,     hehselda wyn.  
Hwæt, we for dryhtene iu     dreamas hefdon,  
song on swegle     selrum tidum,  
þær nu ymb ðone æcan     æðele stondað,  
heleð ymb hehseld,     herigað drihten  
wordum and wercum,     and ic in wite sceal  
bidan in bendum,     and me bættran ham  
for oferhygdum     æfre ne wene. 
[ll. 36-50; Where has the glory of angels come, which we ought to have in heaven? This 
is a dark home, sorely bound fast with fiery bonds; the floor is seething, burning with 
poison. Nor is an end now far that we must suffer torment together, woe and affliction, 
not at all have the fruit of glory in heaven, the joy of the high-hall. Lo, we formerly had 
joys before the Lord, song in heaven in better times, where now the noble stand about the 
eternal one, the heroes about the high-seat, worship the Lord with words and works, and I 






One of the most emotionally-charged tropes of Latin and vernacular elegy is the ubi sunt 
question.58 The Wanderer uses a “Hwær com” variation on this question as the narrator stares at 
a ruined wall and reflects on the people who once lived within it: “Hwær com mearg? Hwær com 
mago? Hwær com maþþumgyfa? Hwær com symbla gesetu? Hwær sindon seledreamas?” [ll. 92-
93; Where has gone the horse? Where has gone the man? Where has gone the treasure giver? 
Where have gone the seats of feasting? Where are the hall joys?]. Satan’s initial exclamation, 
“Hwær com engla ðrym,” may echo the Wanderer’s lament, “Eala þeodnes þrym” [l. 95; Alas, 
glory of the lord]. But here, instead of lamenting a way of life that has vanished, Satan laments a 
glory that still exists but is denied only to him and his retainers. This is the first of many times 
that Satan describes his lost object of desire. Crucial to the poem’s emotionally complex 
portrayal of Satan, this object is not primarily the possession of power and authority in heaven 
(although Satan does wistfully recall possessing “gewald ealles wuldres,” control of all glory, in 
line 106). Most of his recollections of heaven focus on the joys that existed around the throne as 
the angels praised God. Although Satan repeatedly states that the motives for his fall were pride 
and a desire to possess heaven, he never claims that this desire was right, and his primary regret 
is that he no longer experiences those joys. The descriptions of heaven create a strong pull 
toward sympathy: Satan desires and misses something that readers should also want. Because he 
possesses a laudable goal, readers should be cued toward sympathy. In contrast, however, the 
description of the dark, fiery pit of hell raises a different set of emotion cues that readers would 
associate with other texts depicting hell, raising an alternate set of responses such as empathetic 
distress and the desire to distance oneself emotionally. The juxtaposition of Satan’s hellish 
environs with the beatific vision that he has lost encourages pity for a villain who is in a bizarre 
                                                





way an example of what to desire, revealing the dangerous potential for poetry to impute good 
motivations to evil characters. 
Although Satan laments his loss in a sympathetic manner with an ubi sunt question suited 
to the elegiac mode, he does so in a context that undermines the generic association with 
loneliness. By referring to the glory “we” ought to have in heaven, he reveals the presence of an 
anti-comitatus. From his initial recollection of glory his lament moves into a series of contrasts, 
describing their presently dark home and the future that seals their torment, then imagining the 
past when the angels encircled the throne of God and praised their Lord in the heavenly hall. 
This moment is reminiscent of the Wanderer’s dreams of being with his absent lord: “Þinceð him 
on mode þæt he his mondryhten / clyppe ond cysse, ond on cneo lecge / honda ond heafod, swa 
he hwilum ær / in geardagum giefstolas breac.” [ll. 41-44; it seems to him in his mind that he 
embraces and kisses his lord, and lays his hands and head on his knee, as he at times previously 
in days of old enjoyed gift seats]. Satan and his followers, cut off from “hehselda wyn” [the joy 
of the high seat], imagine those who remain faithful encircling the throne in praise. But here, the 
devils’ fate is sealed because of their choice. They do not lament a lord who has died and whom 
“hrusan heolstre biwrah” [Wanderer l. 23; the earth has covered in darkness], as the Wanderer 
does; rather, they imagine other retainers enjoying the presence of a Lord who still lives and 
dispenses joys around the throne. Their “oferhygd” – and Satan’s “oferhygd” in particular, as he 
seems to acknowledge by introducing the first-person singular “ic” in line 48 – has earned them 
eternal exile.  
 As if to emphasize their culpability, his retainers respond to his lament in another anti-
elegiac move, introducing a community chorus to Satan’s solo lines. Antonina Harbus argues 





like-minded person, who, on all occasions in the elegies, is lacking.”59 But Satan does have 
followers who can and do listen and respond to him, even if they are not like-minded. Indeed, 
whereas Satan’s first lament typically uses the first-person plural to speak for his people and 
changes to “ic” only at the end, his followers’ rejoinder repeats forms of the second-person 
pronoun or possessive adjective twelve times in as many lines, highlighting Satan’s singular 
responsibility for what has happened to them. His lies convinced them not to praise God and 
disrupted the scenes of heavenly worship they now miss; his delusions of grandeur, believing 
that he possessed heaven and earth and was “halig god, / scypend seolfa” [ll. 56-57; holy God, 
the Creator himself] or “sunu wære / meotod moncynnes” [ll. 63-64; were Son of the Lord of 
mankind] have caused them to be bound in a fiery prison. His self-deception, highlighted by the 
subjunctive mood (wære), does not even settle on a singular divine identity for himself, 
encompassing both Father and Son. This emphasis on Satan’s guilt contains the potentially 
affective elements of his earlier longing for heaven, steering the audience away from sympathy. 
The anti-comitatus also denies the possibility of sympathizing with Satan as a lonely refugee, 
serving as an intradiegetic model for counter-empathy. Unlike the elegiac narrators who are 
especially sympathetic because they are cut off from community, Satan has brought his own 
perverse comitatus with him,60 showing the affective forms of the poem to be empty – a jarring 
reminder that being true to form need not entail being true. 
 The following four laments build on this reminder, evoking an elegiac mood while 
frustrating it through contextual misappropriation. They also show Satan at work attempting to 
make meaning of his situation, just as Harbus argues that speakers in elegies frequently 
reinterpret the past to understand the present. The second lament begins with Satan recollecting 
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his former position and his proximity to God, “dryhtene deore” [l.82; dear to the Lord]. This time 
he enlarges on the moment in which he decided that he wished to rebel against Christ and take 
control for himself. At this moment temporal boundaries collapse: “ic wolde towerpan wuldres 
leoman, / bearn helendes, agan me burga gewald / eall to æhte, and ðeos earme heap / þe ic 
hebbe to helle ham geledde” [ll. 85-88; I desired to cast down the light of glory, the son of the 
Savior, to possess for myself control of the strongholds, everything as a possession and this 
wretched troop which I have led home to hell]. The syntax and patterning of Satan’s grand 
schemes leads one to expect another infinitive describing how Satan brings “ðeos earme heap” to 
victory. But line 88b instead brings Satan’s imagination crashing down into the world of what 
actually happened: rather than leading them to great heights, Satan led them “home” to hell. As 
the Wanderer wakes up from dreams of his lord to find himself on the sea, Satan’s lofty goals 
shift suddenly into dismal reality. This is the first of many times that Satan refers to hell as a ham 
and remembers his arrival in it. Redefining hell as ham is one way in which Satan can attempt to 
make meaning out of his past by creating a new center of heroic life where his demonic retainers 
serve him as their lord.61 Indeed, Satan’s emphasis on his act of leading the devils to their home 
suggests an inversion of the Harrowing to be portrayed later in the poem, an anti-Exodus where 
followers are brought into captivity rather than out of it.62 Yet for Satan’s redefinitions, this new 
ham can never be an eðel, a true homeland, nor even an eard, as Satan comments that they need 
not expect God to ever “eard alefan, / æðel to æhte, swa he ær dyde” [ll. 115-116; grant a land, a 
homeland as a possession, as he did before]. Rather, hell is a place where they want to hide but 
cannot, where their company is not the seabirds of the Seafarer but snakes and dragons. Because 
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hell is an unsuitable home, Satan declares that he will act like an exile and “hweorfan ðy widor, / 
wadan wræclastas, wuldre benemed, / duguðum bedeled” [ll. 119-21; turn the more widely, 
traverse paths of exile, deprived of glory, separated from the heavenly hosts], using traditional 
formulae for exile identified by Greenfield. These might carry sympathetic emotional overtones, 
but they highlight Satan’s failed attempts to give purpose to his present. Unlike the typical 
elegiac speakers who discover consolation by reframing their situation through the formal 
process of elegy,63 Satan’s emotional journey will never have a true destination, and the poem 
thus highlights the artifice of consolation induced by poetry alone. 
 The third lament continues to deflate this artifice as it describes the demons’ new ham, 
parallel to many elegiac passages describing the desolate landscape of the exile. Hell is “þes 
windiga sele” [l. 135; this windy hall] and a place of cold (although this cold is mixed with heat, 
a traditional attribute of hell),64 yet hell is not only desolate but grotesque in a way that moves 
beyond elegy, as a place of extreme temperatures, loud lamentation of hellish warriors, and 
naked men struggling with serpents (ll. 134-35). Satan’s attempts to describe himself as an 
effective leader who has brought his people home are also shown to be empty, as he is so 
powerless that he can only injure the souls that God does not want to possess. Satan turns again 
to imagine the throne scene of heaven, this time visualizing himself and his followers singing 
around the Son. But it is only to return to a present in which he is wounded by sin, guilty in 
deeds, and chained in his prison with burning restraints. The elegiac terms have the potential to 
draw sympathy, but the horrors of hell distance readers, keeping them in the emotional tension 
that affords critical distance to evaluate how elegy manipulates. 
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The contract unravels perhaps most forcefully in the fourth lament’s dramatic debunking 
of elegiac tropes, commencing with a series of nine “eala” statements imagining the loss of 
heaven and invoking the ubi sunt tradition. In keeping with the dilation of the earlier laments, 
heaven is most prominent here, dominating the first seventeen lines of this speech. When Satan 
again reviews his fall, he is no longer the leader but the led, “alæded fram leohte in þone laðan 
ham” [l. 177; led from light to the hateful home]. His best attempts at redefinition are 
unconvincing even to him. His confusion extends to a seeming failure of memory: “Ne mæg ic 
þæt gehicgan hu ic in ðæm becwom” [l. 178; Nor may I fathom how I came to this]. Yet 
immediately afterward he announces the reason: “Wat ic nu þa / þæt bið alles leas ecan dreamas / 
se ðe heofencyninge heran ne þenceð, / meotode cweman” [ll. 180-83; I know now that he is 
bereft of all eternal joys who does not think to obey the heavenly King, to please the Lord]. This 
gnomic insight can offer no comfort to Satan now that the time for obedience is past. In Satan’s 
final solo speech, his hopes have completely degenerated: his previous strategies do not give him 
consolation, he cannot understand his situation, and eternal truths offer no restorative action for 
him to undertake. At the conclusion of this lament, the narrator imagines Satan reenacting the 
fall to hell once again, followed by his “gifre and grædige” (l. 191) followers, creating an 
envelope that brackets the earlier use of “gredige and gifre” and signals a structural turning point. 
Although pathetic, Satan begins to move away from being empathetic, unable to use the 
strategies of elegiac narrators to acquire comfort. 
At this moment, with elegiac frustration built up to a breaking point, the narrator delivers 
a lengthy homiletic aside that begins to draw out the moral of these laments, explaining how to 
read a villain who has been simultaneously despicable and sympathetic. Satan is to be taken “to 





enrage the Son of God but to engage in appropriate activity, choosing a homeland (l. 204; eard) 
with Christ in heaven. The poem again describes the joys of heaven in detail, but readers are 
already familiar with heaven, having seen it repeatedly through Satan’s eyes as a place longed 
for but now lost. However, now that readers have been drawn away from mythic time and from 
Satan’s viewpoint, they can receive the hope of consolation that fills the gap of frustration in 
Satan’s laments. The narrator exhorts listeners to “cerran þider” (l. 216; turn thither) using a 
different verb for turning than hweorfan, the verb that describes the restless turning of the 
demons in hell and on earth. Satan’s pictures of heaven are now revealed as previews of readers’ 
own consolation, and the poem moves toward counter-empathy. By seeing heaven reflected first 
in the eyes of the demons as a desirable place, an empathizing audience would be moved to long 
for it themselves. Now they are reminded that they can possess it, if they will live and think 
rightly. Where Christ III restates the patristic doctrine that the torment of the condemned can 
reinforce the joy of the saved, Christ and Satan can give readers a taste of this joy by showing 
them Satan’s despair and then causing them to realize the joy of their own hope by contrast. The 
images of heaven are repeated and reinforced as the poem moves forward into the Harrowing, 
where Christ interrupts the hopeless reveries of the devils to ferry his own people ham. In the 
terms of the mood-cue approach, this moment reads as a key shift in the emotional energies of 
the poem, dropping the generic cues of elegy to present those of homily, which marshals hope of 
reward and fear of punishment to encourage different affective alignments. Such a shift to 
homily is not uncommon for Old English poetry, notably appearing in the codas to The 
Wanderer and The Seafarer; its commonplace nature wraps Satan’s subversive laments into one 
of the most conventional of Old English generic cues, signaling for the reader the need for 





 The final lament, a dramatic reenactment of the fall of the angels, punctuates this 
message of consolation. The demons begin with their longest description yet of heaven and the 
praises around the throne. Then, like a soloist in a liturgical chant, Satan takes up the lament, 
indicated in the text only by the switch from first-person plural to first-person singular: “Ongan 
ic þa steppan forð / ana wið englum, and to him eallum spræc” [ll. 247-48; I then began to step 
forth alone towards the angels, and spoke to them all]. Alone before the angels, Satan 
foreshadows his later loneliness as an exile with his followers. Satan rehearses his incitement to 
rebellion in direct speech, in an inversion of the homiletic injunctions delivered only lines ago. 
But as the instigatory speech ends, he immediately recounts his expulsion “of þam deoran ham” 
[l. 255; from the dear home], acknowledging the true locus of home to be heaven. Again he 
reviews the pains of hell, but notes this time that he is powerless to touch the soul who desires to 
ascend – that is, the soul who follows the homiletic narrator’s exhortations. Satan ends his final 
lament by wondering whether God will ever give them another homeland – an uncertain ending 
to a speech that in terms of elegy should end with, if not hope, at least resignation. The poem 
moves on to another homiletic passage describing ways that readers can ascend to heaven and 
avoid Satan’s fate. But it cannot completely leave aside the fall of the angels, reviewing the 
expulsion two more times in fitts VII and VIII before recounting the Harrowing. These final 
recapitulations seal Satan’s fate from an authoritative external perspective; readers are 
increasingly distanced from Satan’s viewpoint as the poem focuses on Christ and the possibility 
for humans to ascend with him to heaven, signaling a decisive change in mood. 
The poem leads readers from sympathy to counter-empathy and critique not only through 
the series of smaller cues and miscues it provides, but also through its wider structural 





uncomfortably in the elegiac dialectic between desire and consolation, structure and excess. By 
pointing to the contrasts that normally produce empathy but subverting them, the poem draws 
attention to how elegiac strategies influence the emotions of an audience. The imperative of 
biblical history already requires the laments to resist the elegiac modulation toward comfort. A 
reader with a basic knowledge of the fall of the angels narrative knows that Satan will never 
experience consolation; he is condemned to hell forever, and he acknowledges this repeatedly. In 
his first lament he declares, “ic in wite sceal / bidan in bendum, and me bættran ham / for 
oferhygdum æfre ne wene” [ll. 48b-50; I must in torment remain in bonds, and never hope for a 
better home for myself because of pride]. In contrast, the final lines of The Wanderer pronounce 
“Wel bið þam þe him are seceð, / frofre to fæder on heofonum, þær us eal seo fæstnung stondeð” 
[ll. 114-15; It goes well for him who seeks favor for himself, comfort from the father in heaven, 
where all our stability remains for us], and the conclusion of The Seafarer calls on readers to 
“hycgan hwær we ham agen, / ond þonne geþencan hu we þider cumen” [ll. 117-18; consider 
where we possess a home, and then consider how we might come thither]. These endings suggest 
that the pain of exile in this life can be replaced with a lasting home in heaven, if one is willing 
to pursue it. Even Deor, a less explicitly Christian elegy, reaches for the comfort that “þæs 
ofereode, þisses swa mæg” [l. 42; it passed away with respect to that, so may it with respect to 
this]. But Satan has already ceded a heavenly home through his rebellion. Still, Satan questions 
the finality of his banishment, concluding in his last lament that he must wait to see whether God 
will give him another home (ll. 276-78). This suggests that either he does not understand or has 
not accepted his fate, contrary to elegiac speakers such as the Wanderer, who resigns himself to 
his unhappy condition with the hope of eternal consolation, or the narrator of Wulf and 





wæs” [l. 18; what was never joined]. Satan’s unstable mind, holding out for a revocation of exile 
that the Christian reader knows to be impossible, seems to swerve from the tradition of 
consolation. Yet it is at this moment that the poem enacts one of the formal strategies that Anne 
Klinck associates with Old English elegies: the repetition of key phrases extending to entire 
lines.65 Elegies employ repetition in the act of remembering, which re-summons the past to link 
it to a redemptive history in a quest for resolution. Satan’s blinkered hope invokes a key structure 
of elegy, in his attempt to imagine a better future in a bleak situation. Yet, as readers know, this 
hope is vain, and although Satan can persist in his delusion through the structures of elegiac 
verse, critical readers are not fooled. 
In fact, because consolation is impossible, the laments themselves become meaningless 
variations on a theme, producing the repetition of elegy to almost parodic extents and emptying 
the affective and salvific force of memory through misappropriation.66 Satan rehearses the past 
events that have led him to this point, the darkness and torment of his present hellish home, and 
the joys of heaven that he will never experience again, shuttling between past, present, and future 
in an elegiac move inflated to ridiculous proportions. Harbus argues that memory is typically a 
recuperative force in elegies: “The past is brought to bear on the present and future through . . . 
rhetorically designed recollection, by which the present is reinterpreted more acceptably.”67 Yet 
for Satan, such repetition cannot lead to comfort, and its iterations only image the eternal nature 
of Satan’s punishment. Many elegiac speakers attempt to reorient their perspective by 
considering eternity, expressing a longing to be free from the cyclical and painful present of 
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66 See also Renée R. Trilling’s discussion of Satan’s repetition “ad nauseam” (108) in The Aesthetics of Nostalgia, 
108-14. Trilling reads this repetition as serving the poet’s instructional purpose: “The narrative passages…serve as 
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elegy and caught up in the atemporality of heaven. The repetitive cycles of earthly time, although 
instituted by God, would come to a merciful end when, as Bede explained in De temporum 
ratione, God would “ipse labentibus temporum curriculis finem cum uoluerit imponet.”68 But 
Satan can never be free from these cycles; indeed, he can only convert the unceasing present of 
heavenly praise into a cyclical recollection of a state that he will never again experience, as he 
reflects on how he and his followers are “ungelice” what they were (l. 149). This causes him to 
reinterpret his present and past less acceptably, declaring at one point that it is worse for him that 
he ever knew the sights and sounds of heaven (ll. 140-44).69 Far from being a recuperative force, 
memory is a broken record leading only to greater pain, in contrast to the presence of heaven in 
which there can be no memory because there is no change. 
Just as Satan’s laments play with structures of longing and consolation and past and 
present, they also play with the tension between bondage or stasis and movement that occupies 
many of the elegies. Irving lists imagery of restraint as one of the key motifs in elegies; this 
binding can refer to external forces such as the weather but also to mental or emotional 
restraint.70 References to wandering underscore perhaps the most painful confinement: that of 
being unable to return to one’s homeland, whether this is the life of the hall or the favors of one’s 
lord. Thus movement reflects confinement, while the mind that is restrained because of custom 
or loneliness is often free to roam in reflection and attempts to make meaning. However, Satan’s 
bonds are not metaphors referring to the weather but literal chains of fire that torment him and 
impede his movement, or as he explains in the third lament, he “sceal nu þysne wites clom / 
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ed. C.W. Jones, CCSL 122B (Turnhout: Brepols, 1977), 263; translation Faith Wallis, The Reckoning of Time 
(Liverpool U. Press, 1999), 3. 
69 Cf. Boethius: De Consolatione Philosophiae Opuscula Theologica, ed. Moreschini, 2.4.2, when Boethius tells 
Lady Philosophy, “nam in omni adversitate fortunae infelicissimum est genus infortunii fuisse felicem” (for in every 
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beoran beornende in bæce minum” [ll. 156-67; must bear burning on my back this chain of 
torment]. Further, he is bound in a burning enclosure with his followers, “in fyrlocan feste 
gebunden” [l. 58; in a fiery prison bound fast]. This physical confinement is linked to his state as 
an exile, permanently ejected from the bounds of heaven and sent to a prison within which the 
demons move restlessly. Satan repeatedly refers to movement as one of his counter-elegiac 
themes, and some of his followers even carry their restless movement to earth to incite conflict 
among men (l. 269). David Johnson has convincingly harmonized the contradictory images of 
Satan being both confined to hell and free to move by referring to the patristic corpus diaboli 
tradition, referring to the demons (some of whom are not confined to hell) as the body of Satan 
in a mirroring of the doctrine that Christians are the body of Christ.71 Satan is thus confined 
physically but free to harm evil souls through his followers. And he is certainly not confined 
verbally by the mode of conduct that the Wanderer follows so that he may “his ferðlocan fæste 
binde” [l. 13; bind fast his mind’s container]; indeed, Satan’s excess is most evident in the 
number of words he forces out exceeding decorum. His speech is described with the verbal 
phrases “wordum indraf” [l. 80; drove in with words], “ut þorhdraf” [l. 162; drove through 
outward] and “sæde / his earfoðo ealle ætsomne” [ll. 125-26; recounted his afflictions all 
together], listing his sorrows point by point. His voice is even described as iron-like and his 
speech manifests visually as sparks to illustrate his tortured words.72 Satan’s violent movement 
and endless recapitulation of torment threaten to exceed the bounds set by elegy as a method of 
giving structure to grief, a reminder to the audience that if words can be redemptive they can also 
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72 For a discussion of the traditions behind this, see Robert Hasenfratz, “Eisegan Stefne (Christ and Satan 36a), the 
Visio Pauli, and Ferrea Vox (Aeneid 6,626),” Modern Philology 86 (1989): 398-403; Thomas D. Hill, “Satan’s Fiery 
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be meaningless. His grimly systematic wandering at the conclusion of the poem, condemned to 
measure hell as punishment for trying to tempt Christ, becomes a parodic imposition of order on 
his disorderly movement.73 
This elegiac deconstruction has many implications for our reading of the poem. Johnson 
speculates that the composer of Christ and Satan may have employed elegiac topoi as “a 
holdover from heroic diction or an indication of the status and tastes of his own audience.”74 Yet 
as my analysis using the mood-cue approach suggests, these tropes have an even further-reaching 
and subversive end: by layering the language of elegy over the plaints of Satan, the poem also 
carefully manages readers’ emotions, presenting cues that should invite empathy but ultimately 
steer it into the realm of counter-empathy. The structural, theological, and stylistic work of 
scholars such as Johnson adds to our inventory of cultural cues, but we must also be attentive to 
the complex ways a reader can interact with these shifting cues in responding affectively to a 
text. Christ and Satan is a case in point, frustrating readers from experiencing consolation by 
employing the cues of elegy only to turn them from their traditional end and replace them with a 
set of homiletic ones. In this way, the poem might inculcate a critical suspicion of the elegiac 
contract as a set of conventions that are affectively charged without conferring moral rectitude on 
the speaker who uses them. The empty elegiac forms in the first part of Christ and Satan have 
ramifications for our understanding of other Old English texts, underscoring the importance of 
considering the strategies that Old English religious texts use to influence readers’ emotions in 
the service of moral reform. Where the Consolation of Philosophy depicts Lady Philosophy 
driving away the muses of poetry to help Boethius recuperate,75 the author of Christ and Satan 
                                                
73 See Jill Fitzgerald, “Measuring Hell by Hand: Rogation Rituals in Christ and Satan,” Review of English Studies 
68 (2016): 1-22. 
74 Johnson, Studies in the Literary Career of the Fallen Angels, 91. 





allows readers to listen to the muses long enough to realize how hollow their song can be when 
diverted to the wrong ends. In the ambition of its approach, the poem deserves artistic credit, 
while encouraging us to reevaluate where affective and heroic language in Old English poetry 
promotes more complex, even ambivalent, emotional responses. 
In the final chapter, I will consider another poem that engages a more complex emotional 
response than uncritical emotional identification. Scholars have long argued over Beowulf’s 
affective positioning, and the stance it wishes readers to take toward the hero, the pagan milieu 
within which he lives, and even the monsters he fights. By examining the movements of 
narrative empathy in the poem through the lens of trauma theory, I show that Beowulf invites 
readers to empathize with characters in unsettling situations, and from this to gain insight into the 
emotional and ethical dilemmas of the pre-Christian past. Further, while Christ and Satan 
presents a suspicion toward narrative empathy with evildoers, Beowulf suggests that narrative 
empathy for flawed figures may allow one to work through the complexity of a past which 






CHAPTER 5: TRAUMA, APORIA, AND EMPATHIC UNSETTLEMENT IN BEOWULF 
 
Chapter 3 argued that Anglo-Saxons saw many uses for narrative empathy. As articulated 
by Gregory, exercising empathy with characters could enable one to understand deeper meanings 
in texts and acquire appropriate emotions for oneself. But if narrative empathy can lead to 
emotional knowledge of oneself, others, or the world, how could it function in situations with 
particularly convoluted or confusing emotions? The Riddles suggest that interpretation is a 
complex, imaginative process, more involved than solving a simple puzzle, and the complexity 
of the Riddles reflects the many life contexts – such as stories of human suffering – in which a 
tidy solution is not possible. In my final chapter, I consider how Beowulf meditates on empathy’s 
potential as an interpretive tool when answers are not definitive or easy. In particular, the poem 
suggests that fictional narratives that invite empathy can help readers to wrestle with the painful 
contradictions of trauma. But just as Christ and Satan discourages readers from feeling 
misplaced sympathy for the devil, Beowulf avoids uncritical identification with its pagan heroes, 
instead deflecting readers into a state which historian Dominick LaCapra calls “empathic 
unsettlement,” in which a reader empathizes with a suffering character but is simultaneously 
distanced from completely understanding their perspective.1 From this vantage, readers are able 
to critique the problems in the social structure of Beowulf as they question their own reactions to 
the pre-Christian past. Empathic unsettlement thus provides an interpretive key for one of the 
most challenging puzzles: the dilemma of how Anglo-Saxons ought to relate to their ancestors. 
It is perhaps litotic to say that the Old English Beowulf is concerned with traumatic 
events. The poem begins and ends with funerals; its major episodes involve three monsters that 
                                                
1 Dominick LaCapra describes his theory of “empathic unsettlement” in Writing History, Writing Trauma 





sow devastation and terror in progressively more threatening and uncanny ways; it is permeated 
with back-stories about cycles of violence and vengeance that overwhelm fragile efforts to make 
peace among peoples; it explores the experiences of humans caught in legal, social, and ethical 
aporias that restrict the expression of emotions while making these emotions nearly impossible to 
bear. But not only is Beowulf a trauma narrative; it is also full of characters who tell hypodiegetic 
trauma narratives that explore how both real and fictional people cope in the aftermath of 
devastating events. In this chapter, I will focus on three such stories within Beowulf. Each story 
covers trauma from a different narrative framing: one is set in the past, one is set in a 
hypothetical future, and one is set in a purely fictional storyworld. But each story grapples with 
traumatic events that produce a sense of paralysis or aporia that cannot be resolved by the ethical 
norms and ideals of heroic society that govern the world of Beowulf.2 In two of these stories, 
further violence erupts when characters tell their own stories that break through aporia by 
inciting vengeance. However, each of these three stories uses sophisticated literary and 
narratological strategies to invite empathic unsettlement; they encourage readers to share in the 
sorrow of characters traumatized by the contradictions within the heroic code, but at the same 
time they distance readers from fully identifying with these characters by emphasizing the 
aporetic or unknowable nature of their trauma. Because these stories paradoxically enable both 
empathy and estrangement, they draw readers into the narrative while also affording them the 
critical distance to interrogate both the flaws in the heroic code and their own affective 
attachments to the past as readers bound by different ethical and emotional norms than the 
characters of Beowulf. These miniature trauma narratives within Beowulf thus mirror the work 
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that the poem as a whole performs as a fictional narrative that helps its readers work through the 
aporia of being unable to fully embrace or reject their heathen ancestors. 
While many scholars have argued that Beowulf presents a tragic critique of its pagan 
heroes’ values,3 we can nuance their insights by reading the poem’s hypodiegetic stories in light 
of literary and cultural theories of empathy and trauma.4 I do not wish to argue for a perfect 
overlap between Anglo-Saxon conceptions of trauma and contemporary definitions, particularly 
as cultural anthropologists have shown that different cultures differently enable or constrain how 
trauma is recognized and addressed.5 However, Christina Lee has recently argued that Old 
English texts do depict trauma, and further that some texts may “explicitly address it.”6 Further, 
as historian Donna Trembinski argues, if significant parallels exist between past responses to 
traumatic events and present-day notions of trauma, it is not entirely reductive to use the 
category of trauma as a descriptive strategy that can “deepen and nuance our perceptions of 
                                                
3 See for example J. R. R. Tolkien, “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 
Volume XXII (London, 1936); John Leyerle, "Beowulf the Hero and the King," Medium Ævum 34 (1965): 89-102; 
E.G. Stanley, ‘Hæthenra Hyht in Beowulf,” in Studies in Old English Literature in Honor of Arthur G. Brodeur, ed. 
Stanley B. Greenfield (Eugene, 1963), 136-51; Margaret E. Goldsmith, The Mode and Meaning of Beowulf 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1970); Fred Robinson, Beowulf and the Appositive Style (Knoxville, University of 
Tennessee Press, 1985); Andrew Orchard, Pride and Prodigies: Studies in the Monsters of the ‘‘Beowulf’’-
Manuscript (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Orchard, A Critical Companion to ‘‘Beowulf’’ 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 238–64; Bernard Huppé, The Hero in the Earthly City: A Reading 
of Beowulf (Binghamton, State University of New York Press, 1984). 
4 I am aware of one other study that reads Beowulf through trauma theory: Ted Morrissey, The Beowulf-Poet and 
His Real Life Monsters (Lewiston, Ontario: Edwin Mellen, 2013). Morrissey focuses primarily on the monsters, 
arguing that they reflect trauma borne from typical events in Anglo-Saxon society, including disease, violence, and 
reproduction. 
5 For anthropologists who discuss different cultural models for coping with trauma, see Cultures under Siege: 
Collective Violence and Trauma, ed. Antonius C.G.M. Robben and Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 2000). For psychologists who highlight the inadequacy of Western models of trauma 
in other cultures, see Derrick Silove, Zachary Steel and Adrian Bauman, “Mass Psychological Trauma or PTSD: 
Epidemic or Cultural Illusion” in Cross-Cultural Assessment of Psychological Trauma and PTSD, ed. John P. 
Wilson and Catherine C. So-Kum Tang (New York: Springer, 2007), 319-336, at 333; Anthony Marsella, 
“Ethnocultural Aspects of PTSD: An Overview of the Concepts, Issues and Treatments,” Traumatology 16.4 (2010): 
17-26. 
6 Christina Lee, “Healing Words: St. Guthlac and the Trauma of War,” in Trauma in Medieval Society, ed. Wendy J. 





historical emotions and actions and historical interactions between . . . people.”7 Indeed, where 
we find sustained patterns of similarities between past and present representations, we might 
question whether certain aspects of our categories are as specific to the present as we believe 
them to be. Analyzing Beowulf through the lens of trauma allows us to articulate with more 
precision what Anglo-Saxons (or at least one, the Beowulf poet) considered productive and non-
productive responses to traumatic events, as well as the role of empathy in responding to 
another’s suffering. In particular, trauma theory offers us vocabulary and tools to describe how 
Anglo-Saxons theorized the role of narrative in both perpetuating violence and in seeking to 
understand and process its effects and therefore to manage if not to resolve it. The hypodiegetic 
stories that I will explore in Beowulf adumbrate an Anglo-Saxon literary trauma theory based on 
the ethical potential of empathic unsettlement and of fictional exempla as methods for dealing 
with trauma.8 This theory in turn has implications for our understanding of how Anglo-Saxon 
audiences might have read Beowulf as a fictionalized account of a legendary and traumatic past. 
Before discussing how these stories within Beowulf represent trauma and induce empathic 
unsettlement, then, I will briefly survey key concepts from contemporary trauma studies that can 
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Trauma, Aporia, Empathic Unsettlement 
Trauma as a theoretical concept has had a fairly short history, and perhaps for this reason 
there is little critical consensus across disciplines on a technical definition.9 Most would agree, 
however, that trauma occurs in response to a particularly devastating event, and that trauma 
produces long-term effects. Further, many argue that trauma destabilizes belief in the structures 
that imbue the world with meaning. In both psychological and sociological accounts, trauma is 
particularly devastating because it challenges one’s basic values and understanding of the 
world.10 It disrupts a sense of social order or even epistemological certainty as one seeks to 
integrate new knowledge about how the world and people behave. 
 In literary theory, this psychic damage caused by trauma is frequently figured as aporia, a 
term that was once used in Greek and early modern rhetorical theory to refer to an impasse in an 
argument, but that later developed the critical meaning of any dilemma, and in particular a 
philosophical deadlock caused by coexisting but incompatible truths.11 Within postmodern 
literary theory, aporia represents the tension of the contradictions at the heart of systems that 
                                                
9 Historian Donna Trembinski notes that “Trauma is variously defined as: 1) an event that causes an acute 
psychological response, 2) the emotional shock caused by a traumatic event, or 3) the psychic and physiological 
symptoms experienced by an individual who has experienced a traumatic event”; Trembinski, “Comparing 
Premodern Melancholy/Mania and Modern Trauma,” 82. For historical surveys of trauma theory, see E. Ann 
Kaplan, Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2005), 24-41; Shoshana Ringel and Jerrold R. Brandell, “Overview: History of Trauma Theory,” 
in Trauma: Contemporary Directions in Theory, Practice, and Research, ed. Shoshana Ringel and Jerrold R. 
Brandell (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2012), 1-12; and Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000). For a psychological definition of trauma, see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5), “Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders,” https://dsm.psychiatryonline.org 
(accessed August 15, 2018). 
10 See for example Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Toward a Cultural Theory of Trauma,” in Cultural Trauma and Collective 
Identity, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, and Piotr Sztompka (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004), 1-30, at 10; Maria P. P. Root, “Reconstructing the Impact of Trauma on 
Personality,” in Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Reappraisals, ed. Laura S. Brown and Mary Ballou 
(New York: Guilford Press, 1992), 229-65, at 229; Kai Erikson, A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in 
Disaster, Trauma, and Community (New York: Norton, 1994), 242; Michelle Balaev, “Literary Trauma Theory 
Reconsidered,” in Contemporary Approaches in Literary Trauma Theory, ed. Michelle Balaev (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1-14, at 4. 
11 See Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “aporia, n.”; Nicholas Rescher, Aporetics (Pittsburgh: University of 





attempt to explain the world. Jacques Derrida described aporia as a “nonpassage … paralyzing us 
in this separation,” and argued that concepts such as gift-giving and mourning were rendered 
impossible by definition.12 Because trauma exposes contradictions in systems of meaning that 
formerly seemed stable, it can lead to feelings of paralysis. Although the contradictions of aporia 
might seem similar to Morrison’s aesthetic paradigm of empathy predicated on opposites, aporia 
is different in important ways. While the aesthetic paradigm enables an empathetic reader to see 
themselves in another and leads (at least in Gregory’s formulation of interpretive empathy) to 
understanding, aporia results when concepts or emotions are considered too disparate or painful 
to achieve resolution or even interpretive closure through the typical means offered by society. 
As I will argue below, a reader who is willing to make the leap of aesthetic empathy can 
empathize with a person experiencing aporia, although such empathy must be carefully managed 
to avoid overidentification that induces paralysis in readers as well.  
Pioneers of literary trauma studies often narrow the focus of aporia to its paralyzing 
unknowability, defining trauma as fundamentally irresolvable and unnarratable. Perhaps the most 
notable proponent of this perspective, Cathy Caruth, argues that trauma “simultaneously defies 
and demands our witness”  as “its very unassimilated nature—the way it was precisely not known 
in the first instance—returns to haunt the survivor later on.”13 For scholars such as Caruth, the 
epistemological gap of aporia reveals itself in texts that are recursive, fragmented, and resistant 
to closure; such texts point to a central event but can never fully represent it. Literary analyses of 
trauma often turn to modern and postmodern texts whose rejection of classic narratological 
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structures are read as particularly appropriate for responding to traumatic crises of modernity.14 
While many theorists have critiqued the view that trauma is “structurally unknowable,”15 this 
view remains influential in understandings of trauma, and even those who argue that trauma can 
be known recognize that it may not be fully understood or resolved. And despite their 
differences, both poststructuralist philosophical and literary definitions of aporia connect it to 
paralysis, or the inability to resolve contradictions—whether it is the contradiction of the 
unknowable or the unsolvable. 
 If aporia is paralyzing, it can also paradoxically lead to destructive or pathological 
activity. Freud developed the term “acting out” to describe such behavior. According to Freud, 
the resistant psychoanalytic patient “does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and 
repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, 
without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.”16 The person who is acting out cannot 
engage with the content of the problematic past event, but actively demonstrates that something 
has happened. In order to move toward a solution, Freud argues that a patient must “work 
through it [the patient’s resistance], to overcome it, by continuing, in defiance of it, the analytic 
work according to the fundamental rule of analysis.”17 Such “working through” does not override 
the traumatic response, but refuses to let it remain unknowable, as the patient allows the trauma 
to be confronted and subjected to analysis. Crucially, for Freud working through takes the form 
of a verbal narrative, making trauma intelligible through the parameters of story. As discussed in 
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Chapters 2 and 4, the Old English elegies often suggest that narrative is a technology for coming 
to terms with the pain of the past. Many of the hypodiegetic stories within Beowulf present 
additional evidence that Anglo-Saxons saw a similar function for narrative as a means to work 
through painful contradictions.  
Theorists outside the field of psychoanalysis have taken up Freud’s terminology of 
“acting out” and “working through” to consider how trauma victims either unconsciously 
reproduce trauma’s effects or seek to confront and analyze trauma. Historian Dominick LaCapra 
adapts these terms to consider how historians can responsibly portray traumatic events. LaCapra 
discusses how those who produce and read narratives about historical trauma can themselves 
become traumatized in ways that lead to paralysis or inappropriate identification with past 
victims; instead, LaCapra wishes to encourage readers to feel a sense of social and ethical 
responsibility in relation to trauma, which he considers more important than fostering a 
therapeutic resolution.18 While LaCapra recognizes that it may be impossible to completely 
avoid acting out,19 he argues that trauma narratives ought to also employ strategies that 
encourage readers to work through historical trauma and gain a greater understanding of it. In 
particular, historiography can do this by provoking “empathic unsettlement” in readers – a state 
in which readers feel the traumatic distress of victims, but remain at a sufficient emotional 
remove to critically analyze the situation and recognize their own ethical agency as individuals 
who are not subject to this trauma and have the ability to seek a better future. 
                                                
18 Amos Goldberg, “An Interview with Professor Dominick LaCapra,” Shoah Resource Center, 9 June 1998, 
http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203648.pdf (accessed July 22, 2018), 2-3. 





While LaCapra is resistant to narrowing down a mechanistic set of rules for inviting 
empathic unsettlement,20 Emy Koopman develops LaCapra’s theory with general suggestions for 
how empathic unsettlement can encourage ethical responses to trauma. She argues that texts can 
unsettle readers by using narrative strategies that emphasize trauma’s aporetic qualities, 
rebuffing readers who cannot fully know the trauma that characters experience. Such 
unsettlement has an ethical dimension, as “distortion and disruption within a narrative can incite 
readers to start challenging normative ways of thinking and being.”21 Yet without empathy, 
unsettlement can alienate readers so much that they are unwilling to engage with trauma 
narratives that feel impenetrable. Thus, appeals to empathy allow readers to experientially 
understand the pain of trauma through emotional engagement with characters, while 
unsettlement prevents them from attempting to completely identify with victims of trauma or 
“indulge”22 in the suffering of another. With the distance afforded by empathic unsettlement, 
readers are thus able to critique the systems that lead to traumatic events. At the same time, 
readers can also critique their own affective responses to trauma victims, as the disruption caused 
by aporia prompts readers to reevaluate why they respond in a particular way. 
Trauma is aporetic in Beowulf in ways that encompass both the unknowability described 
by Caruth and the irresolvability described by Derrida. On the one hand, causes of trauma in 
heroic society are painfully known; trauma produces paralysis primarily because none of the 
social systems that can manage it prove effective, especially as it destabilizes faith in the values 
that safeguard the heroic code by highlighting the contradictions in that code.23 However, 
                                                
20 LaCapra writes, “empathic unsettlement…should have stylistic effects or, more broadly, effects in writing which 
cannot be reduced to formulas or rules of method”; Writing History, Writing Trauma, 41. 
21 Koopman, “Reading the Suffering of Others: The Ethical Possibilities of ‘Empathic Unsettlement,’” Journal of 
Literary Theory 4 (2010), 235-252, at 240. 
22 Koopman, “Reading the Suffering of Others,” 248. 
23 See also John Leyerle’s assertion that the poem explores “the fatal contradiction at the core of heroic society” in 





settlement and treaty marriage—the two primary peaceful means of resolving trauma—attempt 
to make parties forget the trauma by creating agreements that ignore or cover over it. Such 
attempts to treat the trauma as unknown ultimately fail to prevent injured parties from telling 
counternarratives that cause the trauma to resurface and explode in new conflicts that act out 
violence. By contrast, the stories in Beowulf that I will discuss assert that narratives can provoke 
empathic unsettlement as a way to acknowledge the pain brought about by traumatic events 
while allowing readers to recognize and critique the contradictions that have brought about these 
events, working through historical trauma by subjecting it to empathetic analysis. 
Ancestral Aporia: The Lay of Finnsburg 
The first trauma narrative that I will discuss is one of the longest and most significant 
hypodiegetic tales in an epic full of interlacing narratives.24 It occurs roughly halfway through 
the poem, after Beowulf has successfully dispatched Grendel and cleansed Heorot. As the Danes 
and Geats feast together that evening, the scop recites a song that the Beowulf poet paraphrases. 
Although many agree that the audience of Beowulf likely knew the sequence of stories that forms 
the source of the highly allusive lay (a variant version of which survives in the Finnsburg 
Fragment), it is not possible to definitively reconstruct these events from the material that 
survives.25 I posit the following account: a group of Danes led by Hnæf is attacked by their 
Frisian hosts, and Hnæf is slain in the conflict. When neither side has enough men remaining to 
                                                
24 For a discussion of the “interlace structure” of hypodiegetic narratives in Beowulf as a feature of Anglo-Saxon 
aesthetics, see John Leyerle, “The Interlace Structure of Beowulf,” University of Toronto Quarterly 37.1 (October 
1967), 1-17. 
25 For selected major editions and interpretations of this episode, see R.W. Chambers, Beowulf: An Introduction to 
the Study of the Poem with a Discussion of the Stories of Offa and Finn, 3rd ed. with a supplement from C.L. Wrenn 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1959), 245-89; Donald K. Fry, Finnsburh: Fragment and Episode 
(London: Methuen, 1974); J. R. R. Tolkien, Finn and Hengest: The Fragment and the Episode, ed. A.J. Bliss 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982); Richard North, “Tribal Loyalties in the Finnsburh Fragment and Episode,” Leeds 
Studies in English 21(1990), 13–43; John M. Hill, “The Ethnopsychology of In-Law Feud and the Remaking of 
Group Identity in Beowulf: The Cases of Hengest and Ingeld,” Philological Quarterly 78 (Winter 1999), 97-123; 






pursue an advantage, the Frisian king Finn makes an agreement with the Danes, promising to 
share a hall with them, dispense treasure equally to the Danes and Frisians, and punish any 
Frisians who use verbal incitement to revive the feud. Oaths are sworn and Hildeburh, Finn’s 
wife and Hnæf’s sister, presides over funeral arrangements, with her son cremated beside Hnæf. 
The Frisians return home, but Hengest and many of the Danes remain over the winter. When the 
spring comes, Hengest meditates on revenge. Eventually, instigatory actions occur: an old 
warrior named Hunlafing places a sword in Hengest’s lap and two Danish warriors, Guthlaf and 
Oslaf, issue inciting words. In the fight that follows, Finn is killed, and the triumphant Danes sail 
back to their homeland with Hildeburh and spoils from Finn’s hall. 
 In part because the tale is offered as entertainment at a celebration, the Lay of Finnsburg 
is often read by critics as a triumph for the Danes.26 Yet the story highlights in richly literary 
language the aporetic toll that trauma exacts on Hnaef’s men before they successfully take 
vengeance.27 Further, the story presents an aporetic dilemma for the Anglo-Saxon Christian 
readers of Beowulf who might identify with the Danes as the protagonists and recognize the 
positive framing of the story, but still feel dissonance when the tale valorizes violent revenge. 
When Alcuin famously proscribed heroic entertainment in the monastery by asking what Ingeld 
has to do with Christ,28 he referenced a legend that emphasizes the revenge imperative, at least in 
the versions that survive to us, suggesting that tales of such behavior could be attractive but were 
                                                
26 See for example John M. Hill, The Cultural World in Beowulf; Leonard Neidorf, “Hildeburh’s Mourning and The 
Wife’s Lament,” Studia Neophilologica 89 (2017), 197-204. 
27 Many critics, following this emotional tenor, have read the tale as “tragic” and often critical; for a few examples 
see Henry Morgan Ayres, “The Tragedy of Hengest in ‘Beowulf,’” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 16 
(April 1917), 282-95; Martin Camargo, “The Finn Episode and the Tragedy of Revenge in Beowulf,” Studies in 
Philology 78.5 (Winter 1981): 120-34; Jane Chance, Woman as Hero in Old English Literature (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1986), 98-100. 
28 Alcuin, Alcuin Epistoli 124, ed. Ernst Dummler, Epistolae Karolini aevi 2, Monumenta Germania Historiae, 





still ethically dubious.29 As the Lay of Finnsburg provokes empathic unsettlement in readers, it 
could thus invite them to reflect on their affective response to other entertainment that glorifies 
vengeance. 
 From its opening declaration, the Lay presents Finn’s betrayal as fundamentally aporetic, 
an unknowable and inaccessible event. The subject of the Lay is first declared to be “Finnes 
eaferan: [l. 1068; the son of Finn], but the Lay quickly moves to describe the death of this son 
when sudden calamity or fær (l. 1068) overwhelms him. The seeming protagonist is immediately 
shuffled off the stage, along with Hnæf, reflecting the sudden nature of the loss.30 The Fight at 
Finnsburg, a transcription of an Old English fragment of a longer poem about this fight, has 
survived, suggesting that at least in some times and places in Anglo-Saxon England, audiences 
were familiar with a wider legend about this battle. The Lay, however, treats the conflict 
summarily, choosing instead to dilate on its emotional aftermath. The narrative’s refusal to 
engage with details of the event underscores the Frisians’ betrayal as a traumatic incident that 
cannot be accessed. 
 What readers do learn about the battle is provided primarily through the focalization of 
Hildeburh: we see the initial aftermath of the fight through her eyes, as well as the burial of her 
son and brother. The Lay’s description of Hildeburh balances emotional distress with the 
paralyzing contradictions caused by traumatic violence. For example, lines 1071-80 engage 
                                                
29 For the Ingeld story as it has survived in Scandinavian history, see Saxo Grammaticus, Gesta Danorum 6, ed. 
Karsten Friis Jensen and trans. Peter Fisher, The History of the Danes: Saxo Grammaticus, Gesta Danorum, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 392-447. For a discussion of this source, see Chambers, Beowulf: An 
Introduction to the Study of the Poem, 22-23, 282. See also Donald A. Bullough, “What Has Ingeld to Do with 
Lindisfarne?” Anglo-Saxon England 22 (1993), 93-125. Patrick Wormald further argues that many listeners would 
have felt at home with the stories of Ingeld; see Patrick Wormald, “Bede, ‘Beowulf’ and the Conversion of the 
Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy,” 48-58. 
30 This could be compared to the beginning of Blickling 10 (discussed in Chapter 2) which also introduces a seeming 





empathic unsettlement through a series of reversals that suggest how the shocking and traumatic 
nature of the event dislocates Hildeburh’s previous sense of reality: 
Ne huru Hildeburh   herian þorfte 
eotena treowe;   unsynnum wearð 
beloren leofum   æt þam lindplegan 
bearnum ond broðrum;   hie on gebyrd hruron 
gare wunde;   ðæt wæs geomuru ides! 
Nalles holinga   Hoces dohtor 
meotodsceaft bemearn   syþðan morgen com, 
ða heo under swegle   geseon meahte 
morþorbealo maga,   þær heo ær mæste heold 
worolde wynne.31  
[ll. 1071-1080; Nor, moreover, did Hildeburh need to praise the fidelity of the Jutes; 
innocent, she was bereft of dear ones in the shieldplay, of son and brother; they fell in 
fate by a spear wound; that was a sorrowful woman! Not without cause did the daughter 
of Hoc mourn the decree of fate after morning came, when she might see under the sky 
the murder of kinsmen, where she previously held most joy in the world.] 
The Lay insinuates the disruption caused by the betrayal through abrupt temporal shifts, 
beginning with the brief summary of the battle’s carnage, then regressing to narrate Hildeburh’s 
discovery in the morning of her kinsmen’s violent death, in the very place where she “mæste 
heold / worolde wynn” [ll. 1079-80; held most joy in the world] even further in the past. In 
addition to this temporal trajectory, the song moves emotionally from sorrow to imagined 
                                                
31 All citations from Beowulf are from Richard D. Fulk, Robert E. Bjork, and John D. Niles, eds., Klaeber’s Beowulf, 





happiness; in a matter of lines, the audience shifts from celebrating Beowulf’s triumph in the hall 
to tracing the memories of a woman who sorrows because of a broken peace. Litotes in lines 
1071-72 and 1076-77 introduce further reversals. Litotes or ironic understatement is often used 
in Beowulf to underscore moments of particularly poignant emotion; as a statement that works by 
juxtaposing opposite states, it is well-suited to image the dilemma of aporia. As Stephen Graham 
notes, litotes often do not specify the emotion of a character but imply one or more emotional 
states by denying their opposite, and “this ambiguity means that litotes can potentially capture 
more complex emotional states than a series of oppositions might initially suggest.”32 These 
litotes require readers to process the irony of reversal for Hildeburh, from queen tasked with 
bringing peace between the Danes and the Frisians to bereft of brother and son because of her 
husband’s betrayal, all in a single stroke.33 The result of the densely layered deictic reversals in 
this passage is a sense of disorientation that heightens discomfort in readers at the sorrow of the 
situation by mirroring Hildeburh’s loss. Empathic unsettlement is reinforced by the tight 
focalization on Hildeburh in this section, emphasizing her view of the carnage with the verb 
geseon. The audience cannot look away from what Hildeburh sees, forcing them to feel her 
trauma. 
At the same time that the shifts of this passage mimic Hildeburh’s traumatic 
disorientation, the Lay aestheticizes Hildeburh’s distress with literary conventions of the elegiac 
tradition, echoing moments in elegies such as the Wanderer that unsettle past joy in light of 
present bereavement. Leonard Neidorf has highlighted the similarities between Hildeburh and 
the narrator of The Wife’s Lament, including the fact that they both speak in the morning, and 
                                                
32 Stephen Graham, “‘So What Did the Danes Feel?’” 76-77. 
33 For an introduction to scholarship on the concept of “peaceweaving,” or giving women in marriage to cement 
social bonds between previously competing groups, see Alexandra Hennessey Olsen, ‘Gender Roles,’ in A Beowulf 





suggests that the lament later voiced by Hildeburh may be a poem akin to the latter.34 Along with 
the definitively phrased assertion about Hildeburh, “þæt wæs geomuru ides!” [l. 1075; that was a 
sorrowful lady!], this has led some to argue that Hildeburh occupies a stock position as a 
sorrowing noblewoman.35 But the elegiac borrowings of this passage go beyond merely 
presenting an elegiac type; they apply the sadness of elegy, which is usually ascribed to generic, 
nonspecific speakers, to a particular woman in a particular historical situation. The historical 
merges with the literary as a means of communicating the deep emotion that Hildeburh feels, and 
presents the literary as a particularly apt mode of response and analysis in the face of the 
disorientation of trauma. These formal characteristics integrate Hildeburh’s pain into a 
conventional cultural expression of sorrow, and so suggest Hildeburh’s attempt to subject the 
trauma to analysis through mourning. 
Hildeburh continues to function as the empathic focalizer at the funeral as she presides 
over the cremation of her son and brother side-by-side. The reader sees the gory dissolution of 
the bodies through her eyes and is encouraged to share her pain as two of the individuals most 
dear to her are destroyed. Further, Hildeburh engages in what is likely a highly formal act of 
mourning and poetic production: “Ides gnornode, geomrode giddum” [ll. 1117-18; the woman 
sorrowed, lamented with songs]. Alexandra Hennessey Olsen and Leonard Neidorf have 
separately suggested that her words may have an instigatory role, which could allow her to spur 
                                                
34 Neidorf, “Hildeburh’s Mourning and The Wife’s Lament.” For a more extensive discussion of the connection 
between grief and morning in Anglo-Saxon literature, see Karma Lochrie, “Anglo-Saxon Morning Sickness,” 
Neophilologus 70.2 (1986), 316-18. 
35 See for example Joyce Hill, “‘Þæt Wæs Geomuru Ides!’: A Female Stereotype Examined,” in New Readings on 
Women in Old English Literature, ed. Helen Damico and Alexandra Hennessey Olsen (Bloomington: University of 
Indiana Press, 1990), 235-47. But see also Patricia Ingham, “From Kinship to Kingship: Mourning, Gender, and 
Anglo-Saxon Community” in Grief and Gender, 700-1700, ed. Jennifer C. Vaught with Lynne Dickson Bruckner 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 17-31, esp. 23-27. Ingham critiques the view that such female mourning is 
passive in a simplistic active-passive binary; rather, she argues that it accomplishes important cultural work that 





the Danes to action without violating the terms in Finn’s agreement with Hengest.36 If this is so, 
she carries out the roles of both mourner and inciter, while sowing the seeds for the breakdown 
of the new agreement that has been sworn. Yet we cannot be sure, for the poem does not report 
her words, and the text emphasizes her act of mourning rather than the content of her mourning, 
so readers are presented with another intepretive aporia. While readers might understand and 
share her sorrow as a bereft mother and sister, Hildeburh’s full reaction to the trauma is rendered 
unknowable.37 Readers are thus forced back into their own assessment of a particularly gory 
funeral scene, one whose semi-pagan resonances38 would remind them of the distance between 
the Christian Anglo-Saxons and their pagan forbears. 
While the scenes of Hildeburh simultaneously engage empathy and hold the reader at a 
distance as she addresses the aftermath of the trauma, the poem interrupts these scenes with a 
narration of how the men make an agreement that seeks to suppress the trauma. Though the 
Danes have lost their lord, Finn will serve as a surrogate and dispense gifts to both groups 
equally. Theoretically, such an agreement would not have to end in violence.39 Most of the 
stipulations in the oath fall on Finn and the Frisians to carry out, suggesting generous terms. 
Further, some have argued that loyalty to one’s original lord would supersede another oath, and 
that no censure should be given to Hengest for choosing an expedient means of surviving until he 
                                                
36 See Alexandra Hennessey Olsen, “Gender Roles,” 318, and Leonard Neidorf’s suggestion that her song 
“obliquely reminded the men present…of their ethical obligation to avenge their fallen lord,” in “Hildeburh’s 
Mourning and The Wife’s Lament,” 201. 
37 See, however, Ingham, “From Kinship to Kingship,” who argues that Hildeburh is assigned a place “in a 
trajectory of perpetual loss,” 26. Although Hildeburh’s mourning might be unknown in its specifics, Ingham argues 
that its meaning is intelligible in the cultural work that it performs of mourning kinship bonds. 
38 For a discussion of the pagan resonances of the funeral, see Gale Owen-Crocker, The Four Funerals in Beowulf, 
53-56. Owen-Crocker notes, however, that references to pagan sacrifices accompanying the funeral have been 
suppressed, suggesting an attempt to make the funeral more palatable, if still distinctly different from Christian 
Anglo-Saxon burial practices. 
39 As the editors of Klaeber’s Beowulf point out, the terms “would hardly be a likely arrangment if the hostilities 
were assumed to be wholly implacable;” Klaeber’s Beowulf, p.183, n.1086ff. Further, John M. Hill notes that in 
other circumstances, settlements are able to avert feuds – particularly when time has passed and multiple generations 





can take vengeance on Finn.40 But while Finn and Hengest agree to this peace compact, the poem 
implies that it will lead to an aporetic dilemma and suggests it is doomed to prevent victims from 
acting out when trauma erupts through the safeguards placed on it. The verb used to describe 
Finn and Hengest’s assent—getruwedon—echoes ominously the treowe of line 1072 that 
Hildeburh had little reason to rejoice in. Further, at Hengest’s first introduction, he is presented 
in apposition with the kenning “þeodnes ðegn” [l. 1085; lord’s thane], identifying him first and 
foremost as bound in service to the now-dead Hnæf, betrayed by the retainers of his new treaty 
partner. For the Danes, the compact is at the psychic cost of disrupting one of the central values 
of heroic culture – that of loyalty to one’s lord to the end,41 for the Danes must follow “hira 
beaggyfen banan … ðeodenlease, þa him swa geþearfod wæs” [ll. 1102-3; the slayer of their 
ring-giver, lordless, when there was such necessity for them]. The agreement thus produces an 
irresolvable contradiction—the need to be true to an oath and to one’s present lord, and the need 
to pursue vengeance for one’s original lord. The contradiction is such that, to enforce an uneasy 
peace, the agreement contains several stipulations: nobody will break the compact by word or 
deed [wordum ne worcum; l. 1100]; nobody will treacherously complain; and any Frisian who 
performs the traditional role of verbally inciting to violence will be killed. To ensure that 
emotional aporia does not burst out in violent resolution, the law must try to proscribe it by 
requiring the parties to pretend to unknow their trauma; but the very list of proscriptions 
emphasizes the tenuous nature of the compact, drawing attention to all of the ways it can be 
overturned, and presuming that individuals who are parties to it will be tempted to violate it. 
                                                
40 See for example Donald Fry, Finnsburgh: Fragment and Episode, 22, for the theory that Hengest chooses to stay 
over the winter in order to revenge himself on Finn. 
41 The editors of Klaeber’s Beowulf note in their commentary on this section, “Making peace with the slayers of 
one’s lord was dishonorable,” citing the Cynewulf and Cyneheard episode in the A-text of the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle as an example; Klaeber’s Beowulf, p.184, n.1102. For other examples of the ideal bond between lord and 
retainer, see the Battle of Maldon, in The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems, ed. Elliott Van Kirk Dobbie, Anglo-Saxon 
Poetic Records 6 (New York, 1942), 7-16; and Aldhelm’s letter to Wilfrid’s clergy partially quoted in William of 





Indeed, in line 1098 the Danish survivors are described as “wealafe,” a sorrowful remnant, in 
Finn’s promise to support them. The term identifies them with the traumatic event, for to 
describe them as a remnant is to gesture at a time when they were a larger whole, and to 
characterize that remnant as woeful defines their present identity in terms of past trauma, making 
it impossible for them to unknow. 
Readers are invited to inhabit the uncomfortable emotions of this paradox in the second 
part of the Lay as the empathic focalization shifts from Hildeburh to Hengest, conveying his 
distress and paralysis in highly aestheticized terms in lines 1127-1140. Hengest is described as 
“wrecca” or exile in line 1137, evoking one of the most affectively moving subjects in Old 
English poetry. Like an exile, Hengest remembers home—a particularly evocative image for 
those familiar with the Old English elegiac tradition—but is trapped with Finn by the harsh 
winter until spring arrives. The icy weather, although not explicitly compared here to Hengest’s 
internal state, could bring to mind other passages in heroic poetry where ice and storms either 
reflect a tormented or conflicted internal state, as in the Seafarer (ll. 8-26), or ironically contrast 
to a state of resolution, as in Andreas (ll. 1255-65). Here, the storm imagery serves as an 
objective correlative for Hengest’s period of emotional and ethical paralysis. The consequences 
of the fight reverberate throughout the winter, a reminder that hostility cannot always be wiped 
away by a peace arrangement and the passage of time. This section describes aporia through 
association rather than direct description, coding the paralysis of trauma in the literary trope of 
bleak winter and Hengest’s inability to cross the sea. The heightened nature of these pictures 
becomes a means to imagine and understand Hengest’s mental paralysis, much as Beowulf will 





But as the Lay accelerates toward its violent conclusion, it pushes readers away from 
Hengest even while the trauma emerges again in an instigatory narrative that urges vengeance as 
a quick solution to the paralysis of an unsatisfactory settlement. The Lay interweaves description 
of the incitement with announcements of Finn’s death, rehearsing the violence in a manner that 
repetitively “acts out” the trauma in narrative form:  
Swa he ne forwyrnde    woroldrædenne— 
Þonne him Hunlafing    hildeleoman, 
Billa selest    on bearm dyde, 
Þæs wæron mid Eotenum    ecge cuðe. 
Swylce ferhðfrecan    Fin eft begeat 
sweordbealo sliðen    æt his selfes ham, 
siþðan grimne gripe    Guðlaf ond Oslaf 
æfter sæsiðe     sorge mændon, 
ætwiton weana dæl;    ne meahte wæfre mod 
forhabban in hreþre.    Þa wæs heal roden 
feonda feorum,    swilce Fin slægen, 
cyning on corþre,    ond seo cwen numen. 
[ll. 1142-53; So he did not refuse the law of the world—when Hunlafing placed on his 
lap the battle-light, best of swords, whose edge was known among the Jutes. So, the bold 
Finn afterward was slain by sword-peril in his own home, after Guthlaf and Oslaf 
lamented the grim attack and sorrow, blamed them for the portion of woes; nor might the 
unstable mind hold back in the heart. Then the hall was reddened with the lives of 





First, Hunlafing places a noteworthy sword—one likely involved in earlier conflict with the 
Jutes—in Hengest’s lap. Because objects encode memories, often highly emotive ones,42 the 
sword serves as a reminder of that conflict, possibly even the fight in which Hnæf was killed.43 
Next, the Lay briefly alludes to Finn’s death in his own home, with the adverb swylce possibly 
implying that he dies by the same sword whose edge was known to the Jutes.44 The Lay then 
backtracks to note a second cause for Finn’s death: two warriors named Guthlaf and Oslaf, who 
can no longer hold back their emotions, verbally incite violence.45  Their resolve to action 
expressed through public speech relieves them of the pressure of aporia by describing Finn’s 
betrayal as a trauma that has been inadequately avenged. Structurally, their complaint introduces 
a new diegetic level that also images trauma, acting it out by introducing it at deeper narrative 
levels which suggest (if they do not strictly produce) the paradoxical recursion of mise-en-
abyme.46 Intense emotion erupts verbally, here represented as the overflow of a wæfre or 
unsteady mind. The Danes push through their paralysis in decisive action, but the compulsive 
repetition woven into the structure of the passage suggests that the experience of this aporetic 
dilemma will continue to haunt collective memory. 
 While the poem presents Hengest’s vengeance as a resolution, the narrative frame pulls 
back to distance the reader and offer the opportunity to reflect in a more critical manner on the 
                                                
42 See for example Hill’s comments on the sexual connotations of these objects as records of the Danes’ defeat and 
their fathers’ castration in “The Ethnopsychology of In-Law Feud,” 104-5. 
43 For a discussion of the idea that the giving of the sword may be a ritual act that might codify and encourage 
emotions such as anger, see William Ian Miller, “Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in 
Medieval Iceland and England,” Law and History Review 1 (Fall 1983), 159-204, at 195-99; and Erik C. Van Meter, 
“The Ritualized Presentation of Weapons and the Ideology of Nobility in ‘Beowulf,’” Journal of English and 
Germanic Philology 95 (April 1996), 175-89, esp. 185.  
44 See the note on this in Klaeber’s Beowulf, p.190, n.1146f. 
45 Exactly how their incitement leads to violence is difficult to tell; see Scott Gwara’s summary of some possibilities 
in Heroic Identity in the World of Beowulf, 159-61. 
46 For an introduction to mise-en-abyme as a narratological strategy, see Lucien Dällenbach, The Mirror in the Text, 
trans. Jeremy Whiteley with Emma Hughes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). For a discussion of mise-
en-abyme in Beowulf, see Joseph Harris, “‘Double Scene’ and ‘Mis en abyme’ in Beowulfian Narrative,” in Gudar 
på jorden: festskrift til Lars Lönnroth, ed. Stina Hansson and Mats Malm, 322-38 (Stockholm: Brutus Östlings 





imposition of the revenge ethic as a solution. The narrative concludes with a reference to 
Hildeburh, who is taken back to the Danish homeland along with the spoils. Critics have read 
Hildeburh as either passive like the booty or triumphantly reunited with her original family.47 
But the poem is no longer focalized through her, and does not even mention her name, referring 
to her now as “seo cwen” [l. 1153; the queen]. The poem thus pushes readers away from 
Hildeburh at the end, so that as the heroic code reasserts itself decisively with vengeance, 
plunder, and departure, Hildeburh’s emotions can only be guessed at, and she exits the lay as 
another interpretive aporia for the audience. But not only are Hildeburh’s emotions not 
described; the feelings of Hengest and the other Danes are also not reported. Where one might 
expect a description of their relief or triumph, the Lay is silent, dissolving instead into a 
description of the joy in Heorot as the warriors drink. The reader is caught in an interpretive 
impasse and unable to settle on either resolution as the Lay unsettles both possibilities by making 
them unknowable. 
The larger narrative of Beowulf resumes with renewed feasting in the hall. The poem, as 
is typical, does not comment on the particular lesson of the Finnsburg Lay, or how the listeners 
in Heorot respond to it. For readers, however, the episode dramatizes the problems with heroic 
methods of settlement that prevent characters from successfully managing trauma. Readers 
experience the distress and loss of both Hildeburh and Hengest as they grapple with the 
aftermath of betrayal and defeat; however, as they work in varying ways toward resolution 
through mourning or vengeance, the poem removes access to their thoughts and distances 
readers. In this way, the poem encourages readers to interrogate the systems that lead the Danes 
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to renewed violence. The Lay uses lexical and narratological strategies to represent aporia on a 
formal level; in so doing, it asserts the value of the literary as a means both to depict trauma 
where other methods fail, and to invite empathy that gives emotional and historical insight. In 
particular, the poem invites empathy by drawing on resonant elegiac tropes such as the exile or 
the sorrowful woman, while the poem distances readers by using recursion and fragmentation. 
The Lay’s self-consciously aesthetic depiction of ancestral trauma represents an Anglo-Saxon 
correlative to Dominick LaCapra’s call for historiography that refuses to disengage from the 
difficult emotions of trauma or to offer simplistic resolutions to it. In Chapter 1, I discussed 
Gregory the Great’s injunction to the readers of the Moralia in Job that they could understand 
the wisdom of Job’s statements by empathizing with his grief-stricken emotions; in the Lay of 
Finnsburg, empathy with the emotions of the suffering is also presented as a means of gaining 
insight from historical trauma. 
Future Shock: The Story of Freawaru 
While the Lay of Finnsburg invites empathic unsettlement with a trauma experienced in 
the distant past, the story of Freawaru encourages empathic unsettlement in relation to a 
hypothetical future tragedy. When the triumphant Beowulf regales King Hygelac with a tale of 
his exploits against Grendel, he pauses in a description of Heorot to note that Hrothgar’s 
daughter has been promised to Ingeld as part of an attempt to establish peaceful relations with 
the Heathobards. Beowulf emphasizes that Hrothgar, acting in his kingly role as “rices hyrde” [l. 
2027; guardian of the people], exercises careful thought in this plan: “þæt ræd talað, / Þæt he mid 
ðy wife wælfæhða dæl, / sæcca gesette” [ll. 2027-29; considers that counsel (or benefit), that he 
should settle a portion of slaughterous feuds, of conflicts, with the woman]. Far from a hasty or 





connection to avoid an outbreak of violence that would cost further lives. Beowulf doubts that 
such an arrangement will prove successful, however, and offers a gnomic observation on the 
improbability of a marriage averting hostility in such a short time: “Oft seldan hwær /Æfter 
leodhryre lytle hwile / bongar bugeð, þeah seo bryd duge” [ll. 2029-31; as a rule, rarely does the 
spear rest for a little while after the fall of a prince, although the bride be good]. His maxim hints 
at a fundamental aporia in such an arrangement: an agreement formed by marriage will try to 
promote unity, but leodhryre—the violent death of a prince on one side at the hand of a slayer 
from the other—still demands a response. As in the Lay of Finnsburg, the traumatic leodhryre is 
only noted in passing, an event that can only be known through its after-effects. Beowulf 
validates his maxim by projecting a traumatic conclusion to Hrothgar’s peace-weaving 
diplomacy: the Heathobards will be displeased when they see the new queen’s attendants 
carrying the swords of their slain companions, until an old Heathobard finally goads a young 
warrior into renewing the conflict by killing one of the Danes, breaking the agreement. 
While his gnomic observation summarily conveys the dilemma of a husband caught 
between love for his foreign bride and loathing for her kindred, Beowulf adds a hypothetical 
story to communicate the lesson more fully and to help Hygelac (and by extension, audiences of 
Beowulf) to reflect critically on Hrothgar’s precarious situation and in particular how unstable 
emotions whetted by the expectations of the heroic code will lead to a violent outcome despite 
the best counsel. While the plot is similar to the Lay of Finnsburg, the narratological framing of 
this story places readers of Beowulf in a different position than in the previous tale. For Hygelac, 
the story is predictive, set in a hypothetical future; however, readers of Beowulf versed in 
Germanic legend know that Beowulf’s story will come true (and the poem hints this earlier in 





know are set by Ingeld’s forces). Readers are thus distanced from the audience in Hygelac’s 
court because readers approach the event from a different temporal and factual perspective, with 
an additional knowledge that influences their interpretation. This distance might also remind 
them of their differences as Christians who do not fully share the values of Beowulf or Hygelac. 
The story draws Anglo-Saxon readers into empathic unsettlement as they feel the 
pressure of the Heathobards while the framing of the story keeps them at a sufficient remove to 
see the problem in the old warrior’s decision to instigate vengeance. But whereas the Lay of 
Finnsburg kept readers at a distance by emphasizing that the victims’ emotions could not be fully 
known, the story of Freawaru provides readers with a detailed direct speech from one of the 
trauma victims that highlights how living with traumatic contradictions has affected him. As 
readers evaluate this speech from the position of listeners, they move from sharing the victims’ 
distress to critiquing the victims’ descent into an ethically problematic vengeance. 
Beowulf’s introduction highlights the fictionality of his speech; he specifically frames 
this tale as hypothetical with the modal verb mæg as he imagines how the gnomic utterance will 
be realized in the minds of the Heathobards: 
Mæg þæs þonne ofþyncan    ðeoden Heaðo-Beardna 
ond þegna gehwam    þara leoda 
þonne he mid fæmnan     on flett gæð, 
dryhtbearn Dena,    duguða biwenede. 
On him gladiað    gomelra lafe, 
heard ond hringmæl    Heaða-Bar[d]na gestreon, 
þenden hie ðam wæpnum    wealdan moston – 





swæse gesiðas     ond hyre sylfra feorh. 
[ll. 2032-40; This may then displease the lord of the Heathobards and each of the thanes 
of the people when he goes with the woman on the floor, lordly son of Danes, attended 
by young warriors. On him shines the heirloom of ancestors, hard and ring-marked 
treasure of the Heathobards, as long as they were able to wield weapons—until they 
forsook in the shield-play dear companions and their own life.] 
The lexical and narratological framing of the scene invites readers to empathize with the distress 
of the Heathobards. The scene is focalized through the Heathobards as they watch an unnamed 
dryhtbearn, one of the Danish retainers accompanying Freawaru to the wedding. The perspective 
zooms in on the sword he wears, praised for its quality and ornamentation but identified as a 
Heathobard heirloom. The memory prompted by this weapon leads to a temporal shift to when 
the Heathobards enjoyed control of this weapon, before their defeat in battle led to the loss not 
only of weapons but of dear comrades, sundering an emotional bond focalized through the 
Heathobards, for whom those comrades were swæse. John M. Hill has suggested the psychically 
damaging potential of a sword as a symbol of castration,48 but on a more basic level the sword 
encodes the memory of the dear comrades who carried them, and also of the trauma that led to 
their end. But this young Danish warrior who bears such provocative equipment walks “mid 
fæmnan,” that is, with Freawaru, the living embodiment of the treaty that has united the warring 
groups through marriage. Although the marriage settlement attempts to cover over the trauma 
with new relationships, the sign of marriage is here juxtaposed with weapons that serve as 
painfully visible reminders of the past trauma. Aporia is thus imaged through these conflicting 
visual signals centrally staged on the floor of the hall, the primary space of heroic life, while 
readers are invited to experience the displeasure that the Heathobards feel at them. 
                                                





 As in the Finnsburg Lay, the movement from an aporetic settlement into acting out 
trauma continues with verbal urging. This time the incitement is imagined in more detail as an 
“eald æscwiga” [l. 2042; old spear-warrior] begins to goad a younger warrior. Whereas the 
Finnsburg Lay only paraphrased characters’ utterances, Beowulf uses direct speech to relate the 
old warrior’s tempting. The warrior’s recital (and the temptation it invites) is thus more 
immediate for readers, who are positioned with the young Heathobard as the audience of his 
admonition. This position discourages readers from identifying with the old warrior, so that they 
stand outside him and evaluate his speech critically rather than sharing in his sentiments. 
Beowulf sums up the old warrior’s character and motivation in terms of sight and memory: he is 
“se ðe beah gesyhð…se ðe eall ge(man)” [ll. 2041, 2042; He who sees the treasure…he who 
remembers everything]. As with the collective memory of “dear comrades” prompted by the 
sight of Heathobard heirlooms in the possession of their slayers’ sons, the old warrior’s response 
comes from what he sees, and the memories it triggers within him. The paralyzing contradiction 
here is clearly not that the trauma is unknowable, but that it is all too known and raw, because 
marriage settlement cannot successfully suppress this memory or offer restitution. The old 
warrior’s discourse, a capsule story couched as a question with elaboration, emphasizes the 
transformative emotional power of memory, and how feeling the traumatic effects of the past 
will lead to anger in the present. Further, it shows to the critical reader the strain that he 
experiences under a treaty that attempts to suppress what he remembers: 
“Meaht ðu, min wine,    mece gecnawan, 
þone þin fæder    to gefeohte bær 
under heregriman    hindeman siðe, 





weoldon wælstowe,    syððan Wiðergyld læg, 
æfter hæleþa hryre,    hwate Scyldungas? 
Nu her þara banena    byre nathwylces 
frætwum hremig    on flet gæð, 
morðres gylpe(ð),    ond þone maðþum byreð, 
þone þe ðu mid rihte    rædan sceoldest.” 
[ll. 2047-56;  Might you, my friend, recognize the sword which your father bore to the 
fight under the warmask the last time, deadly iron, where the Danes slew him, controlled 
the place of slaughter, after Withergyld lay dead, after the fall of heroes, the bold 
Scyldings? Now here I know not what son of those slayers exulting in treasure goes on 
the floor, boasts of murder, and bears the treasure, the one that you by right ought to 
possess.”] 
The outline of the story is simple: the young warrior’s Heathobard father carries a sword into 
battle; after the death of Withergyld, the Danes win the battle and kill him; years later, a son of 
one of the victorious Danes, likely a member of Freawaru’s retinue, carries his father’s sword in 
the Heathobards’ hall. But the first half of the story is posed as both question and answer—both 
the query whether the young man knows the sword and the answer that tells him the history 
attached to it. The story is a masterful attempt to reinterpret the sword not as a sign of an 
irresolvable contradiction, but of a past injury that can be resolved through appropriate 
vengeance. In the terms of sociologist Jeffrey C. Alexander, the warrior creates an effective 
“trauma narrative” that publicly constitutes the marriage settlement as personal injury demanding 
vengeance.49 Yet for the rhetorical effectiveness of this speech, its aesthetic patterning (which is 
of course Beowulf’s artistic creation as storyteller) also represents starkly the affect of aporia on 
                                                





the old warrior, suggesting the emotional cost of maintaining peaceful relations with enemies. 
The syntax of the initial question shifts the focalization in a disorienting and emotionally-
charged manner, from the father on his way to battle, to the sword in the possession of the Dane, 
then quickly to the father’s death, then to the ultimate outcome of the battle—the Danes 
controlling the space—then back to the death of Withergyld (as unfamilar to the reader as he 
would have been dear to the Heathobards), then the general fall of heroes. At last it settles with a 
reference to the Danes, “hwate Scyldungas,” ending an extended description of ruin with a focus 
on the ones who caused it as targets for the young warrior’s emotional buildup. “Hwate 
Scyldungas” appears as an odd appositive term two lines after the first reference to the Danes, 
marking a disjunctive stop in the narration, waiting only for the cycle of violence to continue it. 
This fragmentation reflects the psychic toll of aporia as much as it urges the young warrior to 
pursue a resolution by identifying a clear villain.  
The old warrior relentlessly keeps the focus on the guilt of the Danes, but readers are 
invited to see the potentially deceitful nature of his framing. He addresses the young warrior as 
“min wine,” a term that could suggest friendship or endearment but to a critical reader might 
sound more like the address of someone with ulterior motives.50 On the other hand, the young 
Dane is identified as an enemy by the treasure he carries wrongfully and by the arrogant attitude 
attributed to him as “frætwum hremig” [exulting in treasure]. The old man attributes both 
personal responsibility and deliberate provocation to the Dane by saying that he is boasting of 
murder, “morðres gylpe(ð),” bringing the past violence into the present through his attitude. 
Because readers are not given access to the mind of the Danish retainer himself, it is an open 
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question whether the Heathobard’s emotional attributions are true, leading to another interpretive 
aporia that might cause them to question the Heathobard’s version of the story. 
The cornerstone of the old warrior’s case for vengeance, however, is that the Danish 
retainer carries a treasure that the young Heathobard ought to possess by right, emphasizing the 
jural importance of carrying on the conflict. The sword is identified as the Heathobard’s, thus 
identifying him with his father, as the true successor. Treasures ought to be passed down 
hereditarily, as gomelra lafe [l. 2036; the remnant of ancestors], but have here been surrendered 
because of defeat. The image of the young warrior walking on the floor of the hall repeats the 
earlier image of Freawaru’s warriors walking on the floor with ancestral treasures, so that the old 
warrior’s question becomes a compulsive repetition of the event, and further one that links the 
habitual action of warriors walking through the hall to a history of defeat and death.51 The story 
thus repetitively imagines violence as it urges the young warrior to continue this cycle through 
action. However, unlike Freud’s classical “acting out” in which violence replaces the memory of 
the event, vengeance is built on recollecting the trauma over and over. And the story must be 
repeated habitually, as the old warrior “Manað swa ond myndgað mæla gehwycle” [l. 2057; 
urges and reminds each time], until one time becomes too many and the warrior acts physically. 
The warriors remember and repeat the violence, but refuse to work through it. 
Beowulf describes the corpse rather than the murder, in keeping with other stories that 
avoid directly narrating trauma but instead give attention to its aftermath. The description 
downplays the murderer as agent and focuses instead on the corpse of the Dane, who “fore fæder 
dædum / æfter billes bite blodfag swefeð, / ealdres scyldig” [ll. 2059-61; for the father’s deeds 
sleeps blood-stained after the bite of the sword, liable with his life], while the killer escapes into 
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the land he knows well. Revenge brings past trauma into the present, making someone liable for 
a previous deed, with the word scyldig emphasizing the just nature of the killing. In the heroic 
world of the poem, blood vengeance is an appropriate response to a violent crime, even as 
Hrothgar’s attempt to settle with marriage was also according to counsel.52 Yet the Christian 
audience of Beowulf would likely find the act ethically problematic, as a thane pays for his 
father’s actions with his own life, and tenuous peace breaks into slaughter again. Because the 
emphasis falls on his death for another’s sins, he represents a potentially sympathetic sacrifice, 
despite the vilifying portrait in the old warrior’s speech. Beowulf’s narration subtly conveys the 
double position of the Danish warrior, as both liable and victim. Readers are further distanced 
from the Heathobards as they see the disturbing result of acting out trauma—a result that even 
pagan readers would find ethically dubious in its willful violation of a peace agreement that was 
made according to the best wisdom of the heroic world. 
The dramatic reversals in the conclusion of the story show dilemmas resolving into 
action, while at the same time ominously suggesting that new offenses will emerge that demand 
redress as new oaths are broken. After the murderer escapes, conflict is renewed as both sides 
ignore their previous agreements; the ironic result of the jural punishment visited by the young 
Heathobard is that oaths previously made are “(ab)rocene” [l. 2063; broken] by Danes and 
Heathobards. As a result, Ingeld’s emotions change in a manner described in the “hydraulic” 
terms that Lockett has shown to characterize Old English psychological discourse: “him wiflufan 
/ Æfter cearwælmum colran weorðað” [ll. 2065-66; love for the woman becomes cooler in him 
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after seething cares].53 It is for this reason, Beowulf explains, that he does not believe the 
marriage agreement will be sufficient: some emotions are stronger than marital love, which can 
after all cool down. But although the reader is given Ingeld’s emotions, the text is silent on 
Freawaru’s feelings, although she serves as the fulcrum of the original settlement and her 
departure signals the end of the tenuous peace. By refusing to present her thoughts and emotions, 
Beowulf leaves her (like Hildeburh in the Lay of Finnsburg) as an interpretive puzzle for the 
audience; although readers could arguably imagine what she feels like, they are given no clues in 
the text to aid attempts to empathize. Unsettlement takes over, and readers might be prompted to 
evaluate what they have learned from their empathy with the Heathobards. 
Beowulf’s story demonstrates political wisdom to Hygelac in recognizing the inadequacy 
of heroic systems of settlement to do more than propel the cycle of trauma into the future. Like 
the Lay of Finnsburg, Beowulf’s story illustrates how incitement leads to vengeance, resolving 
emotional paralysis by creating more violence. However, the story of Freawaru highlights even 
more overtly how narrative can play on memory and emotion to provoke a response. In the case 
of the old warrior, narrative leads to acting out, because the values that allow for settlement 
between tribes come into conflict with other heroic structures of meaning that require vengeance. 
But at the same time, Beowulf shows that narrative can teach readers through empathic 
unsettlement. He invites this unsettlement both by aesthetically depicting the frustration of the 
Heathobard warriors and by distancing the readers so that they can critique this frustration as it is 
expressed in the old warrior’s speech. Beowulf’s tale illustrates the power of a story to explore 
multiple subject positions and invites readers to question the evaluations that characters provide 
in the aftermath of trauma—and perhaps also to question their own affective responses to the 
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traumatic stories told in Beowulf. When rightly managed, narrative empathy becomes a tool for 
social and personal understanding. 
Like Father, Like Father: The Father’s Lament 
The final example presents a progression from the previous two stories. Whereas the tales 
of Finnsburg and Freawaru show the heroic code breaking down because its primary modes of 
addressing trauma—settlement and vengeance—produce an unbearable aporia, the Father’s 
Lament imagines what happens when neither mode is available. Further, Beowulf’s final story 
moves on from imagining the traumas of real individuals to creating a completely fictional story 
that allows him both to understand another’s past trauma and to work through trauma of his own.  
The Father’s Lament has long been acknowledged as a particularly moving moment in 
Beowulf, and praised for its pathos and elegiac qualities.54 Near the end of the poem, as Beowulf 
prepares to respond to the dragon that has burned down his hall and threatens his people, he 
makes a lengthy speech (ll. 2426-2509) to the retainers he has chosen to accompany him in 
which he reviews a series of historical narratives, including the history of the Geatish kings from 
Hrethel to Hygelac and the Swedish-Geatish wars that preceded Beowulf’s kingship. It is a 
recollection as much of his personal history as of Geatish history, prefaced by Beowulf’s 
statement, “ic þæt eall gemon” [l. 2427; I remember all that]. At the beginning of his speech, 
Beowulf discusses his fosterage by Hrethel, who treated him like a son, and recounts the disaster 
that befell Hrethel when his son Haethcyn accidently killed his brother Herebeald. With one son 
dead and the other impossible to prosecute,55 Hrethel is caught in a legal as well as an emotional 
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dilemma. Beowulf then compares Hrethel’s tragedy (regarded as historical) with a purely 
hypothetical case of another, nameless father whose son has been hanged as a criminal and for 
whom he cannot therefore take vengeance or receive compensation. Beowulf here evokes 
empathy by requiring readers to process two similar and emotionally fraught cases of bereaved 
fathers, the second of whom is explicitly fictional. 
Scholars have pointed out the unusual nature of this episode, as the only fictional story 
constructed by any character and the only epic simile in the poem,56 and have attempted in 
various ways to explain its prominence in Beowulf’s discourse to his retainers. Linda Georgianna 
argues that the lament invites readers to empathize with the bereaved King Hrethel while 
distancing themselves from Beowulf, learning to critique the heroic values that were 
aggressively celebrated in the first part of the poem.57 She criticizes the attempts of many 
scholars to underplay the inconsistencies of view in Beowulf’s speech through the mode of 
“‘realistic’ character development,” arguing that the poem’s fragmentation here speaks more to 
the poet’s compositional artistry in distancing readers than to Beowulf’s frame of mind.58 
Georgianna’s argument anticipates the idea of empathic unsettlement, but she engages only in a 
limited way with the fictionality of Beowulf’s story—which is less a telling of his own trauma 
and more an attempt to understand that of another. In a similarly influential essay about the 
Father’s Lament, Laurence de Looze directly tackles that fictionality, reading the episode as 
Beowulf’s attempt to use a simulated story to solve the dilemma of whether to confront a dragon 
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that is ravaging his people but will likely kill him.59 By testing the hypothetical scenario of the 
lamenting father and running it like a simulation to its conclusion of death from passive sorrow, 
Beowulf comes to resolve on an active course of confronting the dragon.60 As Georgianna 
recognizes, however, de Looze relies on a psychologically rational portrait of Beowulf as king, 
one that perhaps overemphasizes the consistency of the narrative. Further, de Looze’s analysis 
curiously has little to say about the section’s focus on childlessness, an issue which preoccupies 
characters at all diegetic levels of this passage. 
But the Father’s Lament takes on additional meaning when read through trauma theory as 
an empathic attempt to understand and interpret the aporia that arises when contradictions within 
the heroic system allow no easy redress for trauma. The disjunctions that Georgianna observes 
need not be divorced from Beowulf’s character; rather, they image his feeling of paralyzing 
despair in repetition around an impossible paradox. This repetition is most strongly encoded in 
the text through mise-en-abyme.61 Beowulf addresses his aporetic dilemma by telling a tale that 
gives him sufficient distance to interpret Hrethel’s situation, allowing him to critically analyze 
the paralysis of his own situation as a childless king facing death even as he works through the 
trauma he witnessed as a foster-child at Hrethel’s court. Beowulf’s story self-consciously draws 
attention to the power of literary narrative to help readers come to terms with the inexpressible or 
irresolvable, and Beowulf is able to face his impending death with a measure of clarity and 
resolution at the end of his speech. Further, readers who have been empathically unsettled by his 
                                                
59 De Looze, “Frame Narratives and Fictionalization.” 
60 Edward Irving similarly comments that Hrethel’s story encourages Beowulf to activity by its inverse example; see 
Irving, A Reading of Beowulf, 223-29. See also Éamonn Ó Carragáin, “Structure and Thematic Development in 
Beowulf,” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 66 (1967), 1-51, at 34-37. 






story learn the value of fiction for helping them understand their reactions to past traumatic 
events, an implication I will discuss further in the conclusion. 
The framing of the Father’s Lament highlights Hrethel’s unsolvable paradox in language 
suggestive of aporia: “Þæt wæs feohleas gefeoht, fyrenum gesyngad, / hreðre hygemeðe; scelde 
hwæðre swa þeah / æðeling unwrecen ealdres linnan” [ll. 2441-43; that was a fight without 
compensation, wickedly wronged, mind-wearying to the heart; nevertheless the unavenged noble 
must lose his life]. Here the aporetic contradiction is specifically legal, with one son dead and the 
other impossible to prosecute or receive compensation from. This dilemma is encapsulated in the 
adjective hygemeðe or “mind-wearying,” a word that occurs only twice in the Anglo-Saxon 
corpus, both times in Beowulf.62 Here the context suggests that the irresolvability itself is what 
induces Hrethel’s mental weariness—the cognitive paralysis that results from confronting an 
aporia. In this case, the aporia results in part because neither of the two methods offered by the 
heroic code for resolving wrongful death—settlement or vengeance—may be attempted.  
After introducing this impasse, Beowulf inserts the fictional narrative of the Father’s 
Lament, signalling by the comparative swa (“so, in this way”) its analogical function, which is to 
characterize the emotional paralysis this legal aporia caused in Hrethel: 
Swa bið geomorlic    gomelum ceorle  
to gebidanne,    þæt his byre ride 
giong on galgan.    Þonne he gyd wrece, 
sarigne sang,    þonne his sunu hangað 
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Dictionary, s.v. “hyge” and “meþe,” http://bosworth.ff.cuni.cz/020251 and http://bosworth.ff.cuni.cz/022751 





hrefne to hroðre,    ond he him helpe ne mæg 
eald ond infrod    ænige gefremman, 
symble bið gemyndgad    morna gehwylce 
eaforan ellorsið;    oðres ne gymeð 
to gebidanne    burgum in innan 
yrfeweardas,    þonne se an hafað 
þurh deaðes nyd    dæda gefondad. 
gesyhð sorcearig    on his suna bure 
winsele westne,    windge reste, 
reot[g]e berofene;    ridend swefað, 
hæleð in hoðman;    nis þær hearpan sweg, 
gomen in geardum,    swylce ðær iu wærron. 
Gewiteð þonne on sealman,    sorhleoð gæleð 
an æfter anum;    þuhte him eall to rum, 
wongas ond wicstede. 
       Swa Wedra helm 
æfter Herebealde    heortan sorge 
weallinde wæg;    wihte ne meahte 
on ðam feohrbonan    fæghðe gebetan; 
no ðy ær he þone heaðorinc    hatian ne meahte 
laðum dædum,    þeah him leof ne wæs. 
 [ll. 2444-66; So it is sorrowful for an aged man to experience, that his son should ride 





benefit to the raven, and he, old and very aged, might not accomplish any help for him, 
always is mindful every morning of the death of his son; does not care to await another 
guardian for the inheritance in the town, which he alone has experienced through the 
anguish of death for sins. He sees sad-minded in the chamber of his son the deserted 
wine-hall, the rest of winds, weeps, despoiled; the rider sleeps, the hero in darkness; nor 
is there the sound of the harp, joy in the yards, as there was before. He departs then to 
bed, sings a sorrow-song one after another; the plains and the dwelling-place seem to him 
all too wide. So the protector of the Weders carried welling sorrow in heart after 
Herebeald; he might not recompense the feud on the slayer at all; nor moreover might he 
hate the man for the evil deed, though he was not dear to him.] 
On a surface level, the lament is clearly intended as an interpretive gloss to understanding 
Hrethel’s situation, as indicated by the bracketing “swa … Swa.” Yet as Erin Sebo points out, the 
focus of the simile is about clarifying Hrethel’s emotion rather than other aspects of his 
situation.63 It is meant to help Beowulf (and readers) understand how he feels, suggesting that 
Beowulf considers it crucial to understand Hrethel’s emotional aporia. After briefly sketching the 
father’s dilemma, Beowulf describes his mournful song and his perceptions of a landscape that 
now lacks both his son and the trappings of heroic culture. After this story, Beowulf resumes his 
explanation of Hrethel’s situation with a correlative swa. In the same way as the bereaved father 
in the story, then, Hrethel experiences intense emotion (given a physiological basis in the 
hydraulic image of “weallinde” or welling sadness carried in his heart) for his dead son. The 
legal aporia is restated—Hrethel may not receive recompense from the feud from the killer—but 
Beowulf now makes explicit the concomitant emotional aporia: Hrethel can neither hate nor love 
his other son, the murderer. Overwhelmed by this paralyzing paradox, Hrethel can only escape it 
                                                





through death, forsaking the joys of men (“gumdream ofgeaf”) and dying “mid þære sorhge” 
(with the sorrow) from the grief of his dilemma.64 The lament gives readers the necessary 
interpretive information to move from contemplating the legal impasse to empathizing with the 
emotional impasse that ultimately claims Hrethel’s life.  
As in the Lay of Finnsburg, the Lament’s self-consciously literary characteristics 
facilitate emotional insight into Hrethel’s condition. The literary signals begin with the “swa . . . 
Swa” which, as Harris notes, marks the Father’s Lament as the only example of a “Homeric 
simile” in the poem.65 The latter portion of the Lament is redolent of the literary language of 
elegy, with its allusion to the absence of riders and harps and its images of vacant surroundings. 
Indeed, the poem is elegiac in more ways than its ubi sunt set pieces.66 The Lament also draws 
on elegy’s sense of isolation in its focus on a solitary character looking on a landscape that is “all 
too spacious” (eall to rum). It plays dramatically on elegy’s thematic emphasis on memory in the 
father’s constant reminder “every morning” (morna gehwylce) of his son’s death as well as in the 
poem’s repeated references to the fact of his death (“his son hangs,” his sunu hangað; “the 
journey elsewhere of his son,” eaforan ellorsið; “he alone has experienced through the anguish 
of death for sins,” se an hafað þurh deaðes nyd dæda gefondad). But in this case, the consolation 
typically offered in elegies is impossible for the father, who “does not care for” (ne gymeð) an 
heir,67 and resorts to song. For Hrethel at least, outside the frame of simile, there is at least in his 
death the potential for consolation, as he “chose God’s light” and as his ability to leave land and 
town to his heir is suggested to be the act of a “blessed man.” Unlike the many stand-alone 
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elegies that feature first-person narrators, this elegy is delivered in third person. The father’s 
words are not provided, thus placing the narrator, Beowulf, in control and foregrounding the 
Lament as his poetic creation. The Lament also draws on the emotive power of a mythic tradition 
that foregrounds paralyzing stasis. Harris has noted parallels between the old man and Odin after 
the death of his son Baldr, who was also killed accidentally by a brother,68 but it is also striking 
that Snorri’s version of the Baldr story likewise evokes emotional paralysis: in Snorri’s Prose 
Edda, in response to Baldr’s death, the gods are temporarily unable to act, or even to speak; later, 
at his funeral, his funerary ship refuses to push off, and must be pushed by a troll.69  
Readers are also invited to empathize with Hrethel’s aporia through the “swa . . . Swa” 
construction, which emphasizes the literary structure of mise-en-abyme or infinite, nested 
narratives. Joseph Harris reads a further level of recursion in this episode in the statement that 
the father “oðres ne gymeð / to gebidanne burgum in innan / yrfeweardas” [ll. 2451-53; does not 
care to await other heirs within the fortresses]. Citing Old Norse analogues, Harris has argued 
that this implicitly reflects a gnomic saying about the value of waiting for another heir, a saying 
that the father chooses to ignore.70 The iteration of mise-en-abyme highlighted by the “swa . . .  
Swa” promotes a sense of despair in a repetition of similarity that mirrors the hopelessness of 
aporia—at every level, men lack heirs and are powerless to acquire them.71 Constructing a story 
allows Beowulf to reproduce this despair over childlessness through a fiction that produces a 
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sense of cyclical destruction. He too has no heirs, yet his story continues to reproduce. The 
literary and mythic elements weave into the lament to depict frustrated emotion through 
frustrated literary tropes, illustrating Hrethel’s hygemeðe or weary-minded state in a way 
specially suited to fiction and elegy. These literary techniques enable an emotional understanding 
of Hrethel’s trauma that might not be possible otherwise, for Beowulf and readers, while also 
suggesting something about Beowulf’s regret over lacking an heir—a regret he states in lines 
2729-32. 
While the literary characteristics of the lament invite the reader to emotionally identify 
with the father in order to understand Hrethel’s situation, the lament itself also draws attention to 
the role of fictional and poetic production in processing unsettling emotion. As Susan Kim notes, 
the lament is bracketed by references to singing, folding it into images of artistic production: in 
lines 2446 and following, Beowulf reports that the father “gyd wrece, sarigne sang” [composes a 
poem, a sad song] and in line 2460, “sorhleoð gæleð an æfter anum” [sings a sorrowful song, one 
after another].72 The father’s reaction at beginning and end is to turn to songs that express his 
emotional state. Harris notes Norse analogues in which grief-stricken fathers compose poetry for 
their dead sons, suggesting a common cultural origin for this image.73 Such generic horizons of 
expectation might well guide readers’ interpretation of the emotional norms articulated in this 
scene. Sebo further notes the complex wordplay within the lament on wrecan ‘to avenge’ and 
wrecan ‘to recite’; the father cannot avenge his son’s criminal death and so instead composes.74 
These reminders imply a context in which producing narrative or song helps one to express or 
understand emotion in an attempt toward resolution when legal methods are not available. The 
persistent connection between formal composition and intense emotion might imply that 
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Beowulf constructs this story not just as a distancing technique but as a mode of expressing 
emotion that is otherwise impossible to act on. In other words, the Father’s Lament need not be a 
simulation used to analyze the situation, as De Looze suggests, but one used to reenact it where 
expression is otherwise prohibited. In this way, the Lament serves a purpose similar to that of 
historical trauma narratives that attempt to work through suffering by analyzing it; however, as a 
fictional story about another character’s trauma, the Father’s Lament reenacts another emotion to 
understand both a past and a present situation.75 
The Lament allows Beowulf to gain insight into Hrethel’s aporia by creating narrative 
empathy through a hypothetical example. But it also avoids overidentification with Hrethel and 
the weariness of mind or hygemeðe that overcomes the old king by channeling empathy through 
a fictional proxy. By creating a story that figures Hrethel’s dilemma through the literary modes 
of elegy and the bereaved father who writes poetry, Beowulf mirrors the creative activity of the 
father in the poem, but incorporates unsettlement to cut through emotional paralysis. The Lament 
is perhaps most unsettling because it does not present a breakthrough: in its deployment of 
elegiac tropes, it draws on a traditional tension between past and present (depicted in the vacant 
buildings full of trappings of a vigorous past), but avoids consolation. Indeed, the Lament ends 
on a profoundly ambivalent note as the father gewiteð þonne on sealman [turns then to bed]. 
Gewitan can mean simply a departure, but is also used to refer to death (as it will be to describe 
Hrethel’s passing in line 2471), lending an ominous tone to the father’s exit. However, the 
father’s repetition of sorrowful songs “one after another” [l. 2459; an æfter anum] images the 
despair of infinite recursion, and a pattern of activity that never ends. At the conclusion of the 
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Lament, we cannot be sure if the father continues on or dies in his despair as Hrethel does, and 
the mixed signals of his departure and his endless song leave the matter unresolved (much as 
Hildeburh’s emotions are left unspecified at the end of the Lay of Finnsburg), distancing the 
reader again by emphasizing what cannot be known. Yet at the end of the story, Beowulf is able 
to explain Hrethel’s sorrow at the loss of his son and the paralysis of someone who “could not 
hate” (l. 2466; hatian ne meahte) a killer who is nevertheless not “dear” (l. 2467; leof) to him. 
Having worked through this paralysis in another’s life via a fictional stand-in, Beowulf is able to 
turn in his discourse to discuss his own life again and the other conflicts he has engaged in, and 
finally to make a decision to fight the dragon, resulting in his final formal boast announced in 
line 2510. Narrative empathy with the father’s paralysis combined with the unsettlement offered 
by fiction provides the necessary force to move forward from the site of trauma and out of the 
infinite recursion of mise-en-abyme.  
Outside the diegetic world of the text, the Father’s Lament also enables readers to move 
beyond aporia to interpret and link the historical narratives surrounding it. First, more narrowly it 
might clarify Beowulf’s emotions as he faces his final fight. His emotional state before he gives 
his speech is described in lines 2419-20: “Him wæs geomor sefa, / wæfre ond wælfus” [his mind 
was sorrowful, restless and ready for death]. The Father’s Lament evokes similar emotions, with 
the wæfre [restless] mind of Beowulf not dissimilar from the conflicted, frozen mind of Hrethel, 
although the narrative causes of their paralysis are different. It emphasizes the power of literary 
narrative to interpret and overcome the paralysis of trauma while allowing readers to understand 







Toward an Anglo-Saxon Literary Trauma Theory 
Examining the Father’s Lament in the context of Beowulf’s speech to his retainers, John 
C. Pope sees his discourse as “motivated partly in magnanimous sympathy, partly as if to look 
steadily at the whole range of human suffering, what he has observed as well as what in his own 
person he has endured, and to prove to himself that he is not dismayed.”76 Yet Beowulf’s acts of 
imagination throughout the poem are not just means of self-confirmation, but equally attempts to 
understand fraught emotional situations—the feelings of a father who has lost one son and is 
rendered incapable of either hating or loving the other, or the emotions of a lord who once loved 
his wife but is conflicted by an impulse of vengeance against her people. Beowulf’s propensity 
for storytelling suggests that, when facing complex or contradictory emotions, he sees literary 
narrative as a technology for understanding, one which allows him to simulate what these 
conflicting impulses might mean and learn about them from a controlled distance. 
The Father’s Lament is perhaps the most striking example of how Beowulf explores the 
potential for literary narrative to depict trauma in a manner that presents the distress of victims 
without encouraging an inappropriate identification with their suffering.77 But all three of the 
hypodiegetic tales discussed here present fictional or literary narrative as a means to explore and 
understand the irresolvable contradictions of aporia. The Finnsburg and Freawaru episodes in 
particular emphasize that the heroic code is inherently aporetic, because its methods for resolving 
acts of violence present their own dilemmas. Settlement precludes vengeance, yet settlement is 
inadequate because it refuses to acknowledge the persistence of traumatic memory imaged in 
such traditions as carrying the weapons of one’s defeated foes. However, narratives about heroic 
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life offer a means to analyze these paradoxes, empathize with characters who have experienced 
their effects, and learn to critique the flaws in the heroic code. Such narratives can use formal 
strategies such as mise-en-abyme to image the dislocations of dilemma, cognitive stylistic and 
generic conventions to invite empathic association, and control over focalization and information 
to keep readers from over-identifying with problematic characters. These stories present literary 
narrative as a rich store of resources for working through past trauma precisely because literary 
narrative allows readers to feel imaginatively and vicariously the devastating effects of aporia, 
but then encourages them to subject trauma to analysis rather than seeking a breakthrough that 
only repeats violence. 
 These episodes adumbrate an Anglo-Saxon literary trauma theory that parallels and 
extends current work in trauma studies. While much contemporary literary trauma theory asks 
how literature can obliquely witness an event that cannot fully be known or represented, the 
hypodiegetic stories within Beowulf suggest that literature offers a way to represent and analyze 
traumatic events that cannot be resolved by other means. Further, the literary trauma theory 
offered in Beowulf supports Dominick LaCapra’s assertion that narratives of empathic 
unsettlement best allow readers to come to terms with historical trauma while avoiding unhealthy 
association with past victims that would abnegate readers’ responsibility in the present. Readers 
of Beowulf can better understand aporia through the aestheticized mediation of affect, and also 
learn to critique social and cultural systems that can offer only inadequate treatment for trauma. 
But Beowulf goes a step further than LaCapra, for it argues that not only can historiography 
usefully provoke empathic unsettlement, but that fiction can also help readers to understand the 





similar enough to the traumatic situation to invite understanding without allowing readers to 
inappropriately project themselves onto trauma victims.  
Similarly, the heroic trauma narratives in Beowulf offer readers a literary means to 
understand and work through the paradoxes of a pagan, heroic past that Anglo-Saxon readers 
celebrated in their material culture and geneaologies but were discouraged by their faith from 
embracing without qualification. While evidence suggests that many Anglo-Saxons felt no 
cognitive dissonance in celebrating their pagan forbears, 78 this does not mean that Anglo-Saxon 
religious might not sometimes feel unsettled given that according to official church teaching, 
pagans were condemned,79 and many scholars have followed J.R.R. Tolkien in arguing that the 
poem presents the past as “noble, heathen, and hopeless.”80 Even if Anglo-Saxons chose to 
believe that their ancestors were saved or damned, they might feel the dissonance of arguments 
to the contrary. Augustine admitted in a fifth-century letter to Evodius that in the case of some 
virtuous pagans, their admirable qualities “uerum tamen quadam indole animi ita delectant, ut 
eos, in quibus haec fuerunt, uellemus … ab inferni cruciatibus liberari, nisi aliter se haberet 
sensus humanus aliter iustitia creatoris.” [“please us so much that we would desire those in 
whom they exist … to be freed from the pains of hell, were not the verdict of human feeling 
different from that of the justice of the Creator.”]81 Although Augustine acknowledges the gap 
between human desire and divine justice—and elsewhere in the letter he rationalizes the good 
                                                
78 Wormald, “Bede, ‘Beowulf’ and the Conversion of the Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy”; see also Thomas D. Hill, 
“Beowulf and Conversion History.” 
79 See also Wormald’s reading of the evidence that the orthodox Christian position condemned both unbaptized 
pagans and heroic literature in “Bede, ‘Beowulf’ and the Conversion of the Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy,” 41-47. 
Wormald argues that eighth-century Anglo-Saxon culture was far from “orthodox” in this sense, however, and 
would have appreciated works like Beowulf. 
80 Tolkien, “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics,” 22. See also note 3 above. 
81 Augustine, letter 164, ed. Alois Goldbacher, S. Aureli Auvustini Operum Sectio II: S. Augustini Epistulae, Corpus 
Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 44 (Vindobonae: 1904), p. 521-41, at p.525, l.5-9; trans. J.G. Cunningham, 
Letters of Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, The Works of Aurelius Augustine Bishop of Hippo vol. XIII 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1872), par. 4, p.279. See also Wormald’s discussion of this letter in “Bede, ‘Beowulf’ 





deeds of these pagans as likely motivated by desire for human glory and thus suspect—he 
nevertheless betrays a desire for them to be saved. It is likely that some Anglo-Saxon religious 
felt similar attachments.82 
Being caught between valorizing and condemning ancestors constitutes another kind of 
aporia—a culturally rather than personally traumatic one, but potentially still a painful impasse 
to process. Beowulf’s hypodiegetic trauma narratives prompt readers to be unsettled by this 
impasse and to interrogate their emotional reactions to their ancestors while recognizing that they 
inhabit a different world as Christians, even as the poem exposes the heroic code itself as 
fundamentally aporetic and prone to failure and violence. James W. Earl draws on Freud to argue 
that the poem is an act of “cultural mourning” or coming to terms with the passing away of pre-
Christian ways of life, which incorporates “both a full acknowledgment of the love which has 
been withdrawn from it and a clean detachment from it by accepting its death as absolute.”83 I 
wish to push this conclusion further, to argue that in the stories of mourning Beowulf tells along 
the way, the poem suggests that narratives of empathic unsettlement are one of the most effective 
methods for coming to terms with trauma—in the case of Beowulf, the trauma of losing one’s 
past. 
                                                
82 For others who suggest this, see Thomas D. Hill, “The Christian Language and Theme of Beowulf,” in Companion 
to Old English Poetry, ed. Aertsen and Bremmer Jr., 63-77; Larry D. Benson, “The Pagan Coloring of Beowulf,” in 
Old English Poetry: Fifteen Essays, edited by Robert P. Creed, 35-50 (Providence: Brown University Press, 1967). 
83 James Earl, Thinking about Beowulf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 133. See also Robin Norris’ 







The complex empathy engaged by Beowulf demonstrates the sophistication with which 
Anglo-Saxon texts could invite and channel readers’ emotional responses. As my readings 
throughout the dissertation have demonstrated, even though narrative empathy is not directly 
lexicalized in Old English, it remains a preoccupation throughout Old English texts. It was 
enabled by cultural bases that encouraged readers to see themselves as part of the body of Christ 
united across time and space, but particularly in their experience of embodiment. For Anglo-
Saxons with religious education, Latin texts offered examples and instructions on the value of 
empathy as a trained skill that made one a better reader and member of Christ’s body. But even 
for laypeople who did little more than participate in major church festivals such as Rogationtide 
or Easter, the typology encoded in the liturgy would encourage them to imagine the emotions of 
other characters in salvation history through liturgical reenactment. 
Old English texts invite empathy in a variety of ways. While Anglo-Saxon writers might 
not have used the terms that we can use today to describe their affective techniques, the 
vocabulary offered by Richard Morrison, Don Kuiken, David Miall, and Peter Stockwell helps us 
to describe with more precision how these texts encourage readers to share the emotions of 
characters. In particular, Old English texts often use one of two paradigms to invite empathy: a 
biological paradigm that invites identification based on relationships of similarity among parts of 
a larger organism, such as the Church or humanity; and an aesthetic paradigm that invites readers 
to feel themselves into someone different from them based on relationships of aesthetic contrast 
that allow them to hold in tension multiple possibilities. These paradigms are reflected both 





pairs of empathic opposites that fill the Old English elegies. Future work might take these bases 
and mechanisms to explore more fully how they are fleshed out in genre-specific ways or 
particular emotional communities. 
The functions of Anglo-Saxon empathy diverge in important ways from contemporary 
debates on empathy as a route to altruism. The empathy invited by Old English texts is often 
self-directed, even if it ultimately forms the identity of the community. Texts such as the Life of 
Swithun, the Old English translation of Gregory’s Dialogues, and the Exeter Book Riddles invite 
empathy to teach, form, and console readers; some texts even fulfill the role of a pastor to lead 
readers through the experience of consolation. In turn, readers might choose to empathize to 
better understand the world or to acquire appropriate emotions for themselves. But as my 
readings of Christ and Satan and Beowulf show, texts could also employ and manage narrative 
empathy in nuanced and complex ways that warn readers against uncritical empathy and allow 
them to explore particularly challenging ethical and emotional dilemmas. For every text that 
invites empathy with entities as divergent as a dented shield or a damned soul, there are others 
that caution readers against identifying fully with characters who could train desires in 
inappropriate ways. Where Christ and Satan deflects empathy into Schadenfreude, Beowulf 
rebuffs readers to a critical distance of empathic unsettlement that allows reflection on the 
complex and contradictory ways that the poem’s characters respond to trauma. The functions of 
empathy in these narratives show how Anglo-Saxons saw potential in stories as vehicles not only 
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